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The central claim of this work is straightforward: if one endorses a non-
exclusionary standpoint, then one ought also to avoid excluding people from 
disagreements. This is valid even if these people hold particularly deplorable 
worldviews. In political theory, this is not the generally held view. Political 
liberalism has endorsed the exclusion of unreasonable people. More or less 
explicitly, modus vivendi theory also limits access to the relevant constituency for 
those people who do not share the higher good of peace, or who are unable to meet 
other requirements. In this work, I aim to demonstrate that exclusion is bad. 
Therefore, the point of this project is to begin with the debate on pluralism and 
disagreement in order to affirm a novel normative standpoint – a non-exclusionary 
political theory. This theory defends a general right to have a say. To do so, I divide 
the argument into three parts. First, I define the non-exclusionary desideratum. I 
also pay attention to conceptual difficulties in existing responses to pluralism in 
political theory. Then, to answer the need to construct a normative standpoint that 
people with different worldviews can affirm, I develop a perspectivist political 
theory. In the second part of this work, I recognize two orders of normativity, and I 
idealize an ideal position of disagreement – the many-to-one relationship. At the 
heart of this normative proposal, there is a general standpoint of justice (the right to 
have a say), and a conception of legitimacy for societies where all members have a 
right to have a say. For me, a decision is legitimate when all members can recognize 
their individual subject-object relations in the outcome. Finally, in the third part of 
the dissertation, I consider the pluralistic society – an ideal society where all 
members have a right to have a say. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
This work begins with pluralism, but it is mostly about exclusion and disagreement. 
To rethink exclusion, I examine existing theories of pluralism. I suggest that the 
capacity to put people in the position not to be excluded – the non-exclusionary 
desideratum - is a metric to comparatively evaluate normative theories. To define 
this desideratum, I argue that the fact of pluralism, reasonable or deep, is the wrong 
starting point. And I focus on disagreements as the instances in which there is 
variance of opinion on a matter. At the same time, I construct a novel account – a 
perspectivist political theory – and a general standpoint of justice: the right to have 
a say. The right to have a say is not a generic permission to say and do what we like 
in public. It states that a just society is a society where all members have all the 
required means to have a meaningful mark on objects of disagreement.  
The argument points to new ways to improve and deepen political 
arrangements and further inclusion of the most marginalized segments of society, 
without taking liberal and democratic values as the necessary and natural 
framework. Though several political theorists have uncovered the pluralist 
character of our societies, and most particularly of Western liberal democracies, 
these exercises in political philosophy have naturalized the liberal framework and 
the assumption that no normative arrangement can accommodate all forms of life. 
The pairing of pluralism and liberal democratic values has become so pervasive that 
almost all contemporary political theorists, who work on pluralism, seem to be 
liberal. Since liberalism promises individuals an array of choices, and pluralism 
multiplies the options on the menu, liberalism and pluralism seem to make, as 
someone writes, a handsome pair.1 
                                                          
1Robert Talisse, Pluralism and Liberal Politics (London: Routledge, 2013).  
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In this vein, several liberals treat difference as the starting point, but this 
diversity is not total. By dealing with difference on the assumption that not all 
worldviews can be accommodated, existing responses envisage pluralism as a 
feature that we must somehow govern, accommodate, overcome, or manage. This 
narrative gives us the impression that exclusion is somehow an undesirable 
externality in heterogeneous and diverse societies. Or it fosters the imaginary 
narrative that those who are left at the margins are only Nazi, fanatics, critics, and 
the unreasonable, whose exclusion does not affect readers as an injustice.2 
 
 Disputes about pluralism associate pluralism with the realization of other 
public goods, such as equality, liberty, and justice, or with some higher epistemic 
qualities – like truth.3 In this frame of mind, political theorists have explored 
different avenues. Some have approached pluralism by emphasising the connection 
between pluralism and some liberal assumptions.4 Common to these comprehensive 
variants of the liberal tradition is a precise conception of man and society. It 
includes a fundamental worry with systematic ethical and political theories, and a 
defence of freedom of choice between competing ways of life.5 As his work 
evolved, John Rawls insisted that his liberalism was not a ‘comprehensive’ 
doctrine, that is, from his own perspective, a theory that includes an overall theory 
of value, an ethical theory, an epistemology, or a controversial metaphysics of the 
person and society. In diverse and complex societies, he argues, comprehensive 
liberalism (and perfectionism) is sectarian and authoritarian. For him, the fact of 
pluralism is the proof that a particular ideal of what constitutes a valuable and 
worthwhile human life, or other metaphysical beliefs, seems untenable, both at the 
normative and descriptive level.6 For this reason, he seeks to found the principles 
                                                          
2 On this issue, see David Enoch, “Against Public Reason,” in David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall 
(eds.), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).  
3 For the fundamental epistemic argument in favour of diversity, see John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989). See also, Scott Page, The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates 
Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). Recently, his work 
has inspired Gerald Gaus, The Tyranny of the Ideal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016) and Ryan 
Muldoon, Social Contract Theory for a Diverse World: Beyond Tolerance (London: Routledge, 2016). 
4 William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
5 Galston 2002. See also William A. Galston, The Practice of Liberal Pluralism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). See also George Crowder, “From Value Pluralism to liberalism,” Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy, 1 (3) (1998): 2-17.  
6 John Rawls, Political Liberalism: expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 13. 
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of fair cooperation upon a core political conception of justice that suitably 
constructed people can accept despite a tendency to disagree on values. The search 
for consonance between prescriptions of justice and pluralism leads to argue that, 
together with the fact of pluralism, abstractly characterized agents, because of 
common moral traits, agree with the principles of justice as fairness. 
Rawls’s idea that pluralism can accord with more or less explicit normative 
pre-commitments has attracted criticisms from all sides. In its different expressions 
and motivations, with a pinch of oversimplification, we can bring a recurring motif 
of reproach to Rawls. Namely, for the sake of normative cogency, people have 
argued, Rawls idealizes the boundaries of the relevant political community, and, 
simultaneously, he conceives what fills these boundaries. Specifically, this criticism 
has taken a few variants. Firstly, scholars, who contend the normative pre-
commitments of the theory, contest the very presupposition of its boundaries.7 
Secondly, political theorists argue against the nature of the boundaries. 
Consequently, they criticize the way Rawls idealizes pluralism, social interactions 
and the stability of consensus.8 Thirdly, people, who accept both the normative pre-
commitments and the boundaries, discuss what the theory actually allows for.9 
For much of mainstream political theory literature, the boundaries of 
pluralism are the most important object of contention. On this view, accessibility 
and unobstructed entrance in the relevant constituency are comparative merits for 
theory selection.10 In this vein, worries about Rawls’s conception of the person as 
reasonable and rational have existed since the first edition of Political Liberalism.11 
For him, reasonable citizens are willing to interact with others on terms that all can 
                                                          
7 Chantal Mouffe, “Democracy, Power, and the Political,” in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: 
Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996): 245-57. See also, Iris 
Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
8 Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). See also Kevin 
Vallier, “Convergence and Consensus in Public Reason,” Public Affairs Quarterly 25 (4) (2011): 261-79. 
9 Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
10 On this point, see Martha C. Nussbaum, “Perfectionist, Liberalism and Political Liberalism,” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 39 (1) (2011): 3-45. And, Martha C. Nussbaum, “Introduction,” in Thom Brooks and Martha 
Nussbaum (eds.), Rawls’s Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).  See also Joseph 
Raz, “Facing Diversity: The case for epistemic abstinence,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (1) (1990): 3-46. 
11 See Marilyn Friedman, “John Rawls and the Political Coercion of Unreasonable People,” in Victoria Davion 
and Clark Wolf (eds.), The idea of Political Liberalism: Essays on Rawls (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2000), 23. See also Erin Kelly and Lionel McPherson, “On Tolerating the Unreasonable,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 9 (2001): 38-55. Jean Hampton, “The Moral Commitments of Liberalism,” in David Copp and Jean 
Hampton and John E. Roemer (eds.), The Idea of Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
299.  
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accept. They also accept the compresence of conflicting empirical evidence, and 
disagreement about how we can use it. Several political theorists have taken this 
idealization as the starting point for the study of pluralism. Scholarship on Rawls 
tends to maintain the overall mechanics of his account, but it also tries to moderate 
some of the idealizing elements in his conception of reasonableness.12 When 
liberals have a realist spirit, they stress the deep and adversarial nature of pluralism 
– something, they say, that an ideal community of reasonable people fails to 
capture.13 In his construction of an alternative account of political liberalism, Gerald 
Gaus also emphasises the need to picture pluralism less idealistically than Rawls.14 
This criticism has fostered disputes about the sectarianism of different variants of 
political liberalism. Yet again, inclusiveness is seen a comparative merit for theory 
selection.15 
Throughout its development, however, this debate has remained largely 
internal to the premises of liberalism. The onus of justification, therefore, seems to 
be on those people who challenge the framework. However, despite its success in 
contemporary political theory, the combination of liberalism and pluralism is far 
from being uncontroversial. From this perspective, liberalism is not the condition 
for pluralism to exist and survive, but rather liberalism is one among many other 
expressions of pluralism.16 It is one among many other life choices, and other forms 
of human flourishing might not be fully realizable within the liberal state.17 
Moreover, against the widespread belief that pluralism is a liberal and 
Western prerogative, rising debates in comparative political theory have contested 
the provincialism of this framework of mind.18 When we look at the historical and 
                                                          
12 On this issue, see RJ Leland and Han Van Wietmarschen, “Reasonableness, Intellectual Modesty, and 
Reciprocity in Political Justification,” Ethics 122 (4) (2012): 721-747. 
13 For instance, see Matt Sleat, “Coercing non-liberal persons: Considerations on a more realistic liberalism,” 
European Journal of Political Theory 12 (4) (2013): 347-67.  
14 Gaus 2010.  
15 On this issue, see Paul Billingham, “Liberal Perfectionism and Quong’s Internal Conception of Political 
Liberalism,” Social Theory and Practice 43 (1) (2017): 79-106. See also Gerald Gaus, “Sectarianism without 
Perfection? Quong’s Political Liberalism,” Philosophy and Public Issues 2 (1) (2012): 7-15. See also Kevin 
Vallier, “On Jonathan Quong’s Sectarian Political Liberalism,” Crime Law and Philosophy (2014). 
16 John Kekes, The Morality of Pluralism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
17 Richard E. Flathman, Pluralism and Liberal Democracy (Baltimore, NJ: Johns Hopkins Press, 2005).  
18 For instance, see Fred Dallmayr, “Toward a Comparative Political Theory,” The Review of Politics 59 (3) 
(1997): 421. See also Fred Dallmayr, Comparative Political Theory: An Introduction (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010). See also, David Schlosberg, “The Pluralist Imagination,” in John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, 
and Anne Phillips (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth (London: Penguin, 
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geographical development of political philosophy, it is relatively easy to find a 
number of alternative responses to pluralism, which do not link up with liberal 
premises.  
At the same time, across the spectrum of contemporary political theories, 
inside and outside the Western canon, there seems to be continuity in the idea that 
pluralism is a “fact”, an “actual” thing, or a “quality” of today’s societies.19 In other 
words, pluralism is something that cannot be explained away: it is deep, evident 
and undeniable. This widespread stipulation typifies ambivalence between a 
reading of pluralism as a quasi-natural property of liberal democratic societies and 
an affirmation of value that pluralism is a good or bad thing.20 When pluralism is a 
fact, political philosophers acknowledge it as something that actually exists. When 
pluralism is a valuable thing, philosophers commend normative solutions that 
uphold great diversity of opinions and points of view.21 Despite philosophical 
common sense, we also have to keep in mind that pluralism may be a controversial 
philosophical position that someone may reject. Being bound to a diversity of 
worldviews in a complex and heterogeneous world, a theory of pluralism must be 
able to account for those human beings who challenge its own prerogatives.  
My suggestion is that, if we want to avoid the risk to limit the arguments for 
pluralism to those that already supports liberalism, and we aim to elude 
controversial evaluative judgments on pluralism itself, we are left with one option 
– a phenomenological investigation of the factual character of pluralism. Namely, 
we should reflect upon what makes philosophers think of pluralism as something 
that actually exists. Then, once we have isolated this visible element, we should 
consider normative schemes that are coherent with our understanding of such a fact. 
                                                          
2001). Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian: writings on Indian history, culture and identity (New Delhi: 
Penguin, 2006).   
19 See Bernard Williams, “Realism and Moralism in Political Theory,” in Geoffrey Hawthorn (ed.), In the 
Beginning was the Deed (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 13. For disagreement and liberalism, 
and the idea that certain elements of liberalism cannot be subject to disagreement, see Michael Blake, “Liberal 
Foundationalism and Agonistic Democracy,” NOMOS 46 (2005): 231, 233.  
20 When, like in Weber and Habermas, pluralism is a distinctive feature of modern societies, as the endpoint of 
moral and political development, the ambiguity between pluralism as a fact and pluralism as positive attribute 
of this world is particularly evident.  
21 For instance, see some epistemic arguments for democracy. Elizabeth Anderson, “The Epistemology of 
Democracy,” Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology (3) (2006). Elizabeth Anderson, “An Epistemic 
Defense of Democracy: David Estlund’s Democratic Authority,” Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 
(2008) (5). See also, Fabienne Peter, “The Epistemic Circumstances of Democracy,” In Miranda Fricker and 
Michael Brady (eds.), The Epistemic Life of Groups (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016): 133-49.   
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On my view, in a given society, in the same moment in time, pluralism accounts for 
a fundamental relation that describes the compresence of different people with 
different and visible worldviews, which have shared objects of concern. Under 
these lenses, pluralism typifies the observation that there is more than one 
worldview in the same space. First, it denotes an aggregation of different 
worldviews. Second, it denotes the quality of these worldviews being visible and 
present together. Following this, the widespread confidence that pluralism is a fact 
alludes to the idea that the experience of diversity is a natural phenomenon of this 
world, which everyone, if exposed, can notice. If we focus on the ostensible 
character of this relation, it is possible to notice that the common usage of pluralism 
encompasses only recognizable and visible worldviews. I say “only”, because there 
might be a number of other worldviews that are neither visible nor recognizable, 
which, therefore, fall outside the descriptive power of pluralism. Alternatively, by 
considering the fact of pluralism as a relation, we are able to cast lights upon an 
important mismatch. So far, in political theory, the study of pluralism have started 
with the implicit stipulation that pluralism means all possible worldviews in a 
society, including silent, marginalized, undiscovered, or voiceless forms of life. In 
this work, as an alternative to this reading, I start with the idea that there is a 
conceptual and descriptive difference between two elements: “all possible 
worldviews that in fact exist in a given society” and the worldviews that the fact of 
pluralism accounts for. From this starting point, pluralism is a metonymy for 
investigating the exclusion of certain worldviews from complex and diverse 
societies.  
 
 
2. The non-exclusionary desideratum  
The study of the factual character of pluralism opens a reflection on who are the 
individuals that those theories must account for, and why this is the case. A 
preliminary remark is in point. I am not joining the debate on sectarianism –to what 
extent a liberal political theory can coerce without justification. I am not entering 
15 
 
into disputes about the containment of unreasonable people either.22 Despite the 
increasing interests in this field, the perspective is that of a liberal theory, which 
investigates and ponders different normative instruments to extend its perimeter 
without falling into circularity. In other words, the point seems that of extending 
the reach of coercive liberal policies to the point where, despite the assumption that 
all human beings are free and equal, unjustified coercion does not look like a form 
of injustice. These two debates also begin with a division.23 In coming to terms with 
pluralism, they divide the population into two units. On the one side, there are 
members of the society who, in the process of construction of fair terms of 
cooperation, count and deserve recognition for the worth of their moral views. On 
the other side, a minority is denied meaningful participation.24 By under-
thematising this demarcation, I argue, political theories are not only sectarian but 
also exclusionary. Namely, systematically, they cause someone not to take part in 
the public activities of the society.  
By being exclusionary, a theory may reproduce social disadvantages: it 
relegates some fringes at the margins of the society; it blocks people from 
negotiating terms of cooperation in their own ways; it favours disenfranchisement, 
maldistribution of resources and essentialization.25 At times, the division may affect 
only a small part of society; at times, it may apply to anyone appears to deviate in 
any ways from the alleged norms (or higher good) of a population. In its worst 
consequences, it is a process of progressive social rupture, which, by separating 
individuals from political relations, thinks of some persons only as passive 
recipients of normative indications. 
                                                          
22 On this issue, see Jonathan Quong, “The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens,” Journal of Political Philosophy 
12 (3) (2004): 314-35.  
23 On this point, see Mouffe 1996.  
24 These remarks have been central arguments in contemporary disputes about multiculturalism. On this topic, 
see Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
Judith Squire, “Representing groups, deconstructing identities,” Feminist Theory 2 (2001): 7-27. Pnina 
Werbner, “Essentialising Essentialism, essentialising silence: ambivalence and multiplicity in the construction 
of racism and ethnicity,” in P. Werbner and T. Modood (eds.), Debating cultural Hybridity: Multicultural 
Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 2015). 
25 On this issue, see Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2007). This topic also has been important in contemporary disputes about toleration and recognition. Precisely 
on this issue, see Magali Bessone, “Beyond liberal multicultural toleration: A critical approach to groups’ 
essentialism,” European Journal of Political Theory 12 (3) (2012): 271-287. See also Nikolas Kompridis, 
“Normativizing Hybridity/Neutralizing Culture,” Political Theory 33 (3) (2006): 318-43. 
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If we consider these problems as unnecessary forms of injustice, it is 
important to construct a standpoint of justice that individuates and challenges these 
examples of social and political disenfranchisement. In my view, this standpoint 
must have a fundamental characteristic. Namely, it must entitle all human beings to 
have a meaningful mark on aspects of external reality. From this perspective, a just 
society is a non-exclusionary society, when all members can assert claims and shape 
forms and contents of political, economic, social and legal arrangements. It follows 
that the capacity to avoid exclusion becomes a desideratum by which one compares 
and judges different political theories. Instead of weighting the costs and benefits 
of inclusion within a liberal architecture, from this standpoint, scholars should focus 
first on finding types of normative schemes that allow everyone to play a role in the 
collective decision-making, and help to individuate existing hidden forms of 
exclusion. 
There is a growing recognition of the important connection between 
participation and justice, for the individual, when there might be heterogeneity of 
justice discourses.26 Moreover, other contemporary theorists have seen the 
construction of principles for the creation of appropriate relationships among 
participants as a fundamental problem of justice.27 From the substance of a 
conception of justice, others have moved the focus on the formation of conceptions 
of justice for procedures, where procedures must ensure a fair hearing of all sides 
in a conflict. In these alternatives, the question is not only about the balance among 
competing considerations, but the problematic also is to define who counts and why 
(and why not) in the definition of the avenues to weight different worldviews.28 
Proceduralist political theories defend the belief that, in value-conflicts, it is 
fundamental to find an overriding normative principle that all citizens have good 
                                                          
26 On this issue, see Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Axel Honneth, Freedom’s Right: The social foundations of 
democratic life (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).  
27 Rainer Forst, The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011). 
28 See Emanuela Ceva, “Just Procedures with Controversial Outcomes: On the Grounds for Substantive 
Disputation within a Procedural Theory of Justice,” Res Publica 15 (2009): 219-35. Emanuela Ceva, “Just 
Interactions in Value Conflicts: the Adversary Argumentation Principle,” Politics, Philosophy and Economics 
11 (2) (2012): 149-70. Stuart Hampshire, Justice is Conflict (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).  
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reasons to accept and uphold in practices of disagreement. For them, fairness in 
procedures for the resolution of values conflicts embodies this kind of normativity. 
Just political and legal procedures supply a common ground of loyalty shared by 
citizens, who feel the bond between one another despite adverse decisions.29 What 
matters, therefore, is the construction of enabling procedures that make outcomes 
acceptable and, perhaps, malleable to further amendments. Since the focus is on the 
determination of a conception of justice for procedures that parties in conflict can 
uphold and accept, the entitlement to participate, however, is under-thematised. 
Specifically, in the adversarial exchanges that generate just procedures, the starting 
assumption is that parties are able to participate. Some take as a stipulation that 
parties can have a say.30 Others assume that ‘on both sides of the barricades, 
conservatives, and reformists, everyone has adversaries’.31 As Hampshire puts it, a 
party is ‘already prepared to step out onto the political or legal case to argue his 
case’.32 
Adversarial relations also are pivotal for agonistic political theories.33 On 
this view, politics is best understood as a sphere of uninterrupted contestation, and 
normative accounts are nothing more than partial domestication of such an 
ineradicable adversarial nature.34 For all the variants of agonistic political theory, it 
is, therefore, crucial to rethink political participation in ways that unleash the 
expression of a wide array of ethical differences. The focus on disagreement 
responds to two commitments. On one side, it is a proxy to illuminate the clash 
between the promise of democratic values to be inclusive and recurring restrictions 
to contestation. On the other side, the emphasis on disagreement plays an important 
methodological role. Political theory should set in motion an ongoing practice of 
questioning practices of governance. It should read political arrangements as 
objects of questioning, deconstruction, and cross-examination of existing power 
                                                          
29 Hampshire 2000, 79.  
30 Ceva 2009.  
31 Hampshire 2000, 93. 
32 Ivi, 94.   
33 Chantal Mouffe, On The Political (London: Routledge, 2005). Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox 
(London: Verso, 2000). Chantal Mouffe, Agonistics: thinking the world politically (London: Verso 2013). See 
also James Tully, “Political Philosophy as a Critical Activity,” Political Theory 30 (4) (2002): 533-55. See also 
Sheldon Wolin, “Fugitive Democracy,” Constellations 1 (1) (1994): 11-25. 
34 Mouffe 2000, 12, 21, 99-100, 104. 
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relations.35 Also never far away from this debate is the question of the nature of 
pluralism. The claim made on behalf of disagreement and pluralism is that different 
worldviews often resist rational resolution. It is, however, unclear whether the 
emphasis on disagreement and the adversarial nature of politics is descriptive or a 
judgment of value.36 Moreover, common in agonistic accounts there is a more or 
less explicit commitment with the political principles of democracy. Ultimately, 
these principles enable the adversarial mode of interaction, but they also justify 
exclusion for undemocratic worldviews and political practices.37 
In my view, a non-exclusionary political theory must avoid political or 
moral pre-commitments. It also must begin with the idea that not all individuals are 
able to participate in disagreement. From these observations, this work tries to 
construct a normative standpoint that justifies normative action and helps to 
individuate hidden instances of exclusion. The construction of this standpoint, then, 
necessitates a heuristic premise. To be valid, the search for a general normativity 
for diverse and heterogeneous societies must begin with the idea that all affected 
subjects have different worldviews. In this way, a non-exclusionary theory of 
justice can hope to catalyse demands for contesting exclusion and empower, with a 
strong claim for participation, all members without distinction. Here, my thesis is 
that a general entitlement to have a say can inform such a non-exclusionary political 
theory.  
 
 To do so, I focus on the relation between a person and an external object of 
disagreement. By deconstructing intersubjective exchanges into simultaneous 
relations with external and common objects of disagreement, it is possible to 
construct an entitlement to access such objects without assuming any moral or 
political doctrine. Simply, if we look at exchanges of reasons as disagreement 
among people with different worldviews who hold the same concern, we can 
                                                          
35 Mark Wenman, Agonistic Democracy: constituent power in the era of globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). 
36 On this point, see Monique Deveaux, “Agonism and Pluralism,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 25 (1) 
(1999): 1-22. 
37 On this issue, see Clive Barnett, “Deconstructing Radical Democracy: Articulation, Representation and 
Being-With-Others,” Political Geography 23 (5) (2004): 503-528. See also Mark Wenman, “Agonistic 
Pluralism and three Archetypical forms of Politics,” Contemporary Political Theory 2 (2003): 165-186. 
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capture that the individual relation with the object of communal concern is logically 
prior to the exchange of reasons.38 Such exchange depends on people having a 
connection with the object. If we ensure this connection, I argue, we empower 
people with a claim not to be excluded from any kind of intersubjective exchange.  
The construction of the right to have a say implies a methodological shift. I 
develop a perspectivist political theory as a promising alternative to existing ways 
of dealing with pluralism. In a Nietzschean stream, perspectivism is widely seen as 
a reaction to objectivity and thus as a form of relativism. However, an alternative 
reading shows that perspectivism is a philosophy of pluralism that stresses the 
connection between an entity and an element of the external world. It postulates 
that all objects can sustain a number of different and contrasting perspectives at the 
same time, and, in principle, none of these perspectives is more veridical than 
others. My account revolves around a universal entitlement to have a say and a 
norm for decisions to be acceptable – to be an acceptable decision, all available 
perspectives on the issue under discussion must count the same. In this way, I argue, 
the defence of the connection between the subject and the object furnishes a 
normative justification for all individuals to take part in collective decisions, 
regardless of the content of their views.  
 
Now, if we were to think of an imaginary comparison among theories in the 
light of the non-exclusionary desideratum, we would have three fundamental 
subsets with internal scalar variations: exclusionary theories, quasi-non-
exclusionary theories, and non-exclusionary theories. As I shall demonstrate in the 
first two chapters, in the exclusionary subset, we do not only find monism, 
comprehensive liberalism, but also consensus-based liberalism and modus vivendi 
                                                          
38 For someone, the deconstruction of intersubjective exchanges of reasons/considerations into individual 
subject-object relations with objects of disagreement may be problematic. However, in political philosophy and 
in epistemology, both exchanges of reasons and disagreements have an object of concern. For instance, in 
Rawls, citizens exchanges reasons on their conceptions of fair terms of cooperation. See, Rawls 2005. In Gaus, 
members of the public are considering possible moral rules. See Gaus 2010, ch. V. In the literature on peer 
disagreement, epistemic peers disagree on a certain issue, like how much the bill is. See David Christensen, 
“Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy,” Philosophy Compass (4) (2009): 756-67. 
Thomas Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” in Tamar Szab Gendler and John Hawthorne 
(eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 167-96. Jennifer Lackey, 
“What Should We Do When We Disagree,” in Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford 
Studies in Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 274-93. 
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theories. Among the quasi-non-exclusionary theories, there are contemporary 
critical theories of justice. As we shall see, they have challenged existing forms of 
oppression and domination, but they fail to recognize some instances of exclusion 
as problematic. In the quasi-non-exclusionary subset, I also include proceduralism 
and agonism. For this reason, this work will be in dialogue with these proposals. 
Actually, a perspectivist political theory can be seen as an adjustment of quasi-non-
exclusionary theories. To be successful, therefore, my account has to be a non-
exclusionary theory. In other words, a perspectivist political theory must help to 
capture hidden forms of exclusion and empower people with a strong claim not to 
be excluded. Of course, I do not want to argue that a perspectivist political theory 
is the only possible non-exclusionary theory. More modestly, I believe that the 
present account can be the first of a series of non-exclusionary theories, which take 
seriously both the demand for participation and all forms of exclusion in our 
societies.39 
 
 
3. Outline of the chapters 
Therefore, the main thesis of this work is that a non-exclusionary political theory is 
possible. I also argue that existing responses to pluralism are exclusionary. To 
substantiate my claims, I have divided the argument into three parts: a critical part, 
a constructive part, and an experimental part. In the first part, I argue that Rawlsian 
political liberalism and modus vivendi theory are exclusionary. This critical 
argument sets the stage for the constructive chapters of the dissertation. In the 
second part, I shall outline the normative structure of a perspectivist normative 
theory. This implies three interconnected theoretical moves: the translation of 
perspectivism into the language of normative theorising, the development of an 
ideal disagreement that replicates the motives of perspectivism, and the definition 
                                                          
39 This taxonomy does not entail that alternative accounts have the ambition to be non-exclusionary. The non-
exclusionary desideratum serves the argumentative purpose to compare and evaluate the merits of different 
responses to exclusion in contemporary political theory.  
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and examination of the two levels of normativity. This discourse opens to the 
experimental part, where I envisage an ideal society in which all members affirm 
the right to have a say, and institutions are constructed accordingly – the pluralistic 
society.  
Specifically, the argument shall proceed as follows. In Chapter 2, I contend 
that political liberalism is exclusionary. The study of John Rawls’s argument is a 
synecdoche for a larger reflection upon the ways morally laden conceptions of 
reasonableness prevent important pockets of our society to participate genuinely. 
By reconstructing the fundamental normative question at the heart of Rawls’s 
political liberalism, and his response to such an interrogative, I claim that, vis-à-vis 
the fact of reasonable pluralism, political liberalism generates a demarcation 
between citizens and non-citizens and an internal demarcation between reasonable 
citizens and citizens that are not recognized as reasonable. Chapter 3 also offers a 
critical examination of recent arguments for a rediscovery of modus vivendi. The 
recent interest in realism has come together with a rediscovery of modus vivendi as 
the best available response to deep pluralism – the account of modern societies as 
characterised by radical and fundamental disagreement about matters of morality, 
religion, and crucially, politics also. The second chapter offers a critical assessment 
of recent arguments for a rediscovery of modus vivendi theory, in particular the 
arguments of David McCabe, John Horton, John Gray, and Fabian Wendt. Because 
these writers ask how modus vivendi may contribute to the inclusion of illiberal 
doctrines, dissenting minorities and radical thinkers, it seems possible to think that 
they more readily contribute to strategies for securing participation for all citizens 
than alternative accounts. Despite the recognition that human values are plural, 
often incompatible with one another, and almost always incommensurable, by 
expecting convergence on peace, public order and security, in this chapter, I argue 
that modus vivendi theory is more exclusionary than its proponents allow, and in a 
particular way. Modus vivendi has an inherent conservative bias that tends to 
exclude radical challenges to majority view. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are internal 
arguments. They participate in the general ambition to construct a non-exclusionary 
theory, but they try to show that consensus-based liberalism and modus vivendi 
theory are exclusionary in ways that contradict some of their premises. Taken 
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together, chapter 2 and chapter 3 also try to show that, when we take pluralism too 
readily as a fact, the risk is that of overly focusing on ways to manage, overcome, 
contain, and survive such diversity.40 
From these observations, in chapter 4, pluralism denotes also a relation 
which connects several individuals (but not necessarily all of them) who deliberate 
about the same things in different ways. If we think of pluralism as a relation, one 
of the central normative concerns, therefore, is to determine how and why someone 
can access such a relation. With these observations in hand, I introduce a 
perspectivist political theory. In this vein, by investigating important arguments in 
this tradition, I reconstruct two levels of normativity, which, at different degrees, 
all variations of perspectivism have. First, relationships among entities ground on 
an equal-status-granting condition, which enables all individuals to be potential 
participants in disagreements. Second, perspectivism is not a kind of relativism. 
Therefore, all individuals can have a claim on the object of disagreement, but only 
perspectives of the object count, and they count the same. Chapter 5 substantiates 
the translation of perspectivism into a proper political theory. In this chapter, I 
construct an ideal position of disagreement – the many-to-one relationship - where 
abstractly characterized individuals, all with different worldviews, affirm, at 
different moments in time, their unnegotiable entitlement to have a say on a certain 
object of disagreement.41 And, because of such unnegotiable subject-object 
relation, they affirm that, for a solution to be acceptable, their considerations must 
count as much as other considerations on the same object count. The many-to-one 
relationship is fundamental to elucidate the normative discourse of a perspectivist 
normative theory. Chapter 6, then, describes the right to have a say as a general 
standpoint of justice for a non-exclusionary political theory. By contextualizing my 
argument in the debate between redistribution and recognition, I argue that the right 
to have a say epitomizes a demand for having capacities, powers, skills, and 
                                                          
40 In this project, I will not discuss perfectionism explicitly. The liberal prerogative of perfectionism makes its 
ideal account of political organization at least more exclusionary than the arguments that political liberals and 
modus vivendi theorists advance. See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986). See also Steven Wall, Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1998).   
41 I borrow the expression many-to-one relationship from Bou Mou. Bou Mou coined this expression to define 
his conception of perspectivist truth. See Bou Mou, Substantive Perspectivism: an essay on philosophical 
concern with truth (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009).  
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privileges by which a person, regardless of his or her thoughts and beliefs, can have 
a subject-object relation with all external objects. From the second order of 
normativity, chapter 7 develops a theory of legitimacy for a society in which all 
members have a right to have a say. My thesis is that a decision is legitimate when 
all members can recognize their individual subject-object relation in the outcome. 
The combination of the first and the second order of normativity informs an ideal 
procedure of decision-making and a distinctive institutional layout. Chapter 7 
concludes the central part of the dissertation.  
Chapter 8, Chapter 9, and Chapter 10 envisage an ideal society in which all 
members affirm the right to have a say, and the basic structure of the society is 
constructed in agreement with the two levels of normativity. Chapter 8 elaborates 
three main claims. First, it explains the transition from the many-to-one relationship 
to the pluralistic society. Normatively, by reflecting upon what members owe one 
another, and what institutions owe members of a pluralistic society, I study the 
implications of a general and universal entitlement to have a say. Conceptually, I 
show that the pluralistic society is a revisable utopia. Namely, by defending 
individual subject-object relations with objects of disagreement, pluralistic 
institutions also are possible objects of disagreement that members are entitled to 
appropriate. In that, once all members have affirmed the right to have a say, from 
the pluralistic society, they can open new better-than-ideal worlds, which are even 
more non-exclusionary. Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 examine how the pluralistic 
society deals with classical problems of all theories of pluralism. In Chapter 9, I 
investigate hate speech and oppositional politics. From my perspective, even if 
extremely different in their nature, hate speech and oppositional politics are 
practices that affirm freedom of expression. And freedom of expression is one of 
the elements that are functional to the full enjoyment of the entitlement to access 
objects of disagreement in one’s own way. In Chapter 10, I radicalize this analysis 
by exploring possible violations of the right to have a say, and practices of 
resistance. Taken together, this analysis clarifies the nature of penalisation, 
disobedience, and justified violence in a pluralistic society. As I try to demonstrate, 
for a pluralistic society to function, it is fundamental to have members who use their 
right to have a say without hesitations. By doing so, when institutions are pluralistic, 
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members can push them to be more and more non-exclusionary. When institutions 
are not actually pluralistic, if they affirm the right to have a say, members can bring 
the basic structure back to its initial level of normative justification. 
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Chapter 2 
Reasonable citizens and citizens that are not recognized as reasonable  
 
 
 
In 1971, New York City’s Gay Activist Allegiance promoted a public campaign to 
insert “sexual orientation” in the list of protected categories in the local human 
rights ordinance.42 Evidence shows that activists reinterpreted tactics of 
contemporary movements: they turned sit-ins into kiss-ins, they had peaceful 
demonstrations against policy brutality, and they infiltrated local political clubs.43 
Activists also stressed their differences from mainstream culture and heterosexual 
norms by dressing in distinctive and recognizable ways. Activists, someone writes, 
‘used theatrical acts that increased the scope of the conflict, demanding publicity, 
regardless of its potentially dilatory effect on achieving policy change’.44 In other 
words, activists constantly preferred tactics that accentuated the challenge to 
majority culture to strategies that would amplify policy gains.45  
This early stage of New York City’s lesbian and gay liberation movement 
showed that activists chose tactics that strengthened differences from the straight 
majority. Expressive tactics were crucial in creating a sense that 'gay was good' and 
should be expressed with pride. This type of opposition was certainly in line with 
claims for basic liberties and equality but faced a closed polity and repression. For 
instance, New York State retained an antisodomy statute, with the aim of 
criminalising the status of being gay or lesbian.46 The story of the Gay Activist 
Allegiance movement is a guiding thread to illuminate a problematic in the way 
overlapping-consensus-based political liberalism tries to deal with difference in 
                                                          
42 Mary Bernstein, “Celebration and suppression: the strategic uses of identity by the lesbian and gay 
movement,” The American Journal of Sociology 103 (1997), 544. 
43 Bernstein 1997, 544-7.  
44 Bernstein 1997, 545. See also, Toby Marotta, The Politics of Homosexuality (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1981). 
45 Patricia Cain, “Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History,” Virginia Law Review 79 (1993): 
1551-1641. 
46 Cain 1993.  
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modern liberal democratic societies. Theorists in this tradition tend to neglect that, 
from the margins, systematic feeling of discomfort with the dominant cultural 
values does not necessarily mean a threat for stability. Misrecognition, exclusion 
from the definition of terms of cooperation, and possible criminalization of 
differences may exacerbate the scope of conflicts and mistrust legislators. For this 
reason, by relying upon an allegedly majoritarian political culture, I argue in this 
chapter, overlapping consensus is averse to change political common sense, and 
favours internal demarcations within citizenry. These demarcations generate an 
internal problem for political liberalism: that is, they threaten the democratic 
promise that all citizens count the same in the political realm.47  
Now, political liberalism seems the only game in town. The underpinning 
idea is that the free exercise of practical reason leads to reasonable disagreement 
about central religious, philosophical and moral doctrines. Reasonable people have 
a series of cognitive obstacles that prevent them from consent under free conditions. 
Worries about the appropriate conception of reasonableness and its exclusionary 
character are around since the publications of the first articles on political liberalism 
in contemporary political theory.48 Despite the proliferation of an impressive body 
of literature on Rawls and the possible variants of political liberalism, scholars have 
                                                          
47 Someone may object the equation of political liberalism with John Rawls. In the past thirty years, political 
liberalism has been a productive and different philosophical tradition with internal differences and harsh 
debates. I think, however, that my critical take on political liberalism is valid at different degrees for all versions 
of political liberalism that are somehow consensus-based. On this point, see David Enoch, “The Disorder of 
Public Reason,” Ethics 124 (2013): 164-169. Gerald Gaus, who is another champion of political liberalism, 
explicitly restricts the relevant population that can access deliberation on issues of general concern. 
Specifically, he draws the perimeter of the acceptable pluralism, by appealing to mutual intelligibility - each 
can genuinely see the standards of others as providing reasons for the evaluation of moral rules. In his account, 
with psychopats, egoists, Nazis, temporary residents, those people who different from us culturally, temporary 
residents in occupied areas, ‘given our absence of moral relations with them, we have a blameless liberty to act 
as we see fit’. See See Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 
279, 463. On this issue, see David Enoch, “Against Public Reason,” in David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and 
Steven Wall (eds.), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
Noticeably, in his response to Enoch, Gaus does not address this line of criticism. See Gerald Gaus, “On Dissing 
Public Reason: A Reply to Enoch,” Ethics 125 (4) (2015): 1078-95. Gerald Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). For a defence of intelligibility, Kevin Vallier, “In defence of 
intelligible reasons in public justification,” The Philosophical Quarterly 66 (4) (2016): 596-616. The pantheon 
of political liberalism also includes Charles Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), ch. 6. Thomas Nagel, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 
16 (1987): 215-40. Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), ch.7. 
See also Jeremy Waldron, “The Theoretical Foundation of Liberalism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 37 (147) 
1987: 127-50. Common to this account is the presumption that a solution to disagreement is better than none. 
For an analogous point on Gaus, see Steven Wall, “On Justificatory Liberalism,” Politics, Philosophy and 
Economics 9 (2) (2010): 123-49.  
48 Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).  
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paid scarce attention to two fundamental starting assumptions of Rawls’s Political 
Liberalism.49 ‘The person,’ Rawls writes, ‘is seen rather as a free and equal citizen, 
the political person of a modern democratic society with the political rights and 
duties of citizenship, and standing in a political relation with other citizens’.50 At 
the same time, Rawls assumes that there is an implicit public political culture within 
a democratic society. This culture comprises of ‘the political institutions of a 
constitutional regimes and the public traditions of their interpretation (including 
those of the judiciary), as well as historic texts and documents that are common 
knowledge.51 In this way, he contextualizes the search for an overlapping consensus 
on a political conception of justice within a precise social and political tradition.  
Rawls treats the dominant political culture as if all people in a liberal 
democratic society experience it positively and accept it unproblematically. My 
contention is that, in this way, Rawls clarifies the scope of his theory, but, by doing 
so, he also creates internal divisions that exclude some pockets from participating 
fully in the society. These borders divide the citizenry in differentiated units, and, 
by being artefacts of the predominant political discourse, penalize exceedingly the 
most marginalized ones and the political avant-garde.52  
In my view, this problematic turns out to be clear when we look at an 
important conceptual difference. Namely, the difference between “being 
reasonable” and “being recognized as reasonable”. As I shall demonstrate in this 
chapter, the public fund of political values works as an assurance mechanism for 
the recognition of citizens as reasonable, and to allow citizens to be disposed to 
recognize other persons as reasonable. This assurance mechanism solves an 
important collective action problem. Namely, for a political conception of justice 
                                                          
49 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism: expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). For 
a defence of the merits of Rawls’s political liberalism, see Martha C. Nussbaum, “Perfectionist, Liberalism and 
Political Liberalism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (1) (2011): 3-45. Martha C. Nussbaum, “Introduction,” 
in Thom Brooks and Martha Nussbaum (eds.), Rawls’s Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2015).   
50 Rawls 2005, xliii. 
51 Rawls 2005, 13-14. 
52 Within a Rawlsian framework, Freeman emphasises the equal status of citizens as deliberators: ‘Deliberative 
democracy seeks to instill them with a more fitting content. It is guided foremost by the idea that for democratic 
citizens to be politically free they must be governed by laws grounded in reason, not in conflicting interests, 
which they can legislate and endorse in their capacity as equal citizens.’ Samul Freeman, “Deliberative 
Democracy: a sympathetic comment,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (4) (2000), 418. 
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to be stable, people must gain intrinsic utility from taking the cooperative move, 
even if they do not know personally who the other agents are and what they think. 
It is the argument of this chapter that the stabilizing force of this assurance 
mechanism comes at a price: when someone is not recognized as a reasonable 
citizen, de facto she does not enjoy political membership fully.53  
 
The question, then, is whether Rawls ensures that all free and equal citizens 
can participate in the definition of fair terms of cooperation on an equal footing. In 
arguing that this is not the case, I shall focus on Rawls’s transition from A Theory 
of Justice to Political Liberalism.54 After briefly explaining Rawls’s theoretical 
concerns, I will characterize the substance of his response to the observation that 
reasonable pluralism is a fact of democratic society. In section 3, firstly, I explain 
what overlapping consensus stands for. Secondly, I investigate the difference 
between “being reasonable” and “being recognized as reasonable”. Section 4 and 
section 5 substantiate my argument as follows: one criticism concerns the 
conservative bias of overlapping consensus that tends to penalise the most 
innovative and progressive voices of the society. The second is based on the high 
individual costs of adapting to the majority culture. Together, these two sections 
aim to show that not all members of the citizenry are treated as equals in Rawlsian 
Political Liberalism. Section 6 concludes the chapter. 
 
 
                                                          
53 There is a significant body of literature on Rawlsian conception of reasonableness and its problems. See 
James Bohman, “Public Reason and Cultural Pluralism: Political Liberalism and the Problem of Moral 
Conflict,” Political Theory 23 (2) (1995): 235-279. James Bohman and Henry Richardson, “Liberalism, 
Deliberative Democracy, and Reasons all can Accept,’’ Journal of Political Philosophy 17 (3) 2009): 253-74. 
See also Marilyn Friedman, “John Rawls and the Political Coercion of Unreasonable People,” in Victoria 
Davion and Clark Wolf (eds.), The Idea of a Political Liberalism: Essays on Rawls (New York: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2000): 16-33. RJ Leland and Han Van Wietmarschen, “Reasonableness, Intellectual Modesty, and 
Reciprocity in Political Justification,” Ethics 122 (4) (2012): 721-747. Leif Wenar, “Political Liberalism: An 
Internal Critique,” Ethics 106 (1) (1995): 32-62.  
54 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge MASS: Harvard University Press, 1971). See also, John Rawls, 
“Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (3) (1985): 223-251. John 
Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” in Samuel Freeman (ed.), Collected Papers (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A restatement (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2001). 
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2. From A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism 
The prodromes of the theoretical questions that concerned John Rawls in Political 
Liberalism were already present in the last sections of A Theory of Justice.55 At the 
end of his first book, Rawls attempted to show that a well-ordered society would be 
stable only if its citizens, caring little about the advantages they could gain from 
free-riding and other forms of injustice, developed a sense of justice and decided 
that preserving their sense of justice belongs to their good. In Section 86 of his first 
book, Rawls writes: ‘what is to be established is that it is rational … for those in a 
well-ordered society to affirm their sense of justice as regulative of their plan of 
life. It remains to be shown that this disposition to take up and to be guided by the 
standpoint of justice accords with the individual’s good’.56 For Rawls, a 
determining factor for the stability of the well-ordered society, therefore, is the 
congruence between the point of view of justice and the individual conception of 
the good. Specifically, as he continues, ‘the problem is whether the regulative desire 
to adopt the standpoint of justice belongs to a person’s own good when viewed in 
the light of the thin theory with no restriction on information’.57  
Rawls frames his response to this issue along two main trajectories, as a 
collective action problem and as an argument for self-realization. First, he advances 
a publicity-based argument. He contends that principles are public then parties 
acknowledge the moral convictions shared by other members of a well-ordered 
society. In this context, deception also means incurring psychological costs that are 
very demanding for a party to bear over time. In this way, it is not rational to act 
against the public sentiment of justice.58 Secondly, a defection in a system of mutual 
interdependence may cause undesirable externalities, like hurting friends and 
associates along with the rest. By not doing our fair share for the community, it is 
                                                          
55 On this issue, see Johnathan Floyd, ‘Rawls’ methodological blueprint,’ European Journal of Political Theory 
0 (0) (2015): 1-15. Samuel Freeman, Rawls (New York: Routledge, 2007). Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: An 
Introduction (London: Polity Press, 2011). Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberal and Communitarians: 
second edition (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1996. Samuel Scheffler, “The Appeal of Political Liberalism,” 
Ethics 105 (1) (1994), 6.  Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls’s Political Turn (Oxford. 
Oxford University Press, 2013). See also, Paul Weithman, “Legitimacy and the Project of Political Liberalism,” 
in Thom Brooks and Martha Nussbaum (eds.), Rawls’s Political Liberalism (Columbia: Columbia University 
Press, 2015): 73-112. 
56 Rawls 1971, 567. 
57 Ivi, 570. 
58 Ibidem 
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possible, Rawls tells us, to affect our beloved ones disproportionately. Since, in a 
well-ordered society, parties cannot chose who loses by their defections, there are 
strong grounds for preserving one’s sense of justice. Therefore, congruence 
between the sentiment of justice and one’s life plan is likely to avoid undesirable 
costs.59 Thirdly, congruence with the general sense of justice, Rawls argues, matters 
for the realization of one’s own abilities. In order to bring to fruition the latent 
capacities of individuals and to realize rewarding prospects, parties also depend on 
the cooperative endeavours of others. These endeavours necessitate a regulative 
conception for cooperation to be possible, which functions as an enabling 
environment for one’s flourishing. This regulative conception, Rawls claims, is the 
general standpoint of justice. In this way, congruence between desire and the public 
sentiment of justice is rational because it allows parties to make the most gratifying 
use of their talents.60 Fourthly, Rawls gives us a Kantian argument that reads as 
follows: principles of justice are regulative and the desire to express our nature as 
free and equal can be fulfilled only by acting on the principles of right. However, 
by being regulative, these principles extend their reach to other desires. So, in order 
to realize the nature as free and equal, there is no alternative than harmonising 
desires with the standpoint of justice. Such a desire to conduct oneself in a certain 
way above else makes it rational, for parties, to regulate their life-plans in 
accordance with the principles of justice.61  
In its first version, Rawls writes, justice as fairness is a doctrine that extends 
the idea of social contract, and that ‘is no longer open to objections often thought 
fatal to it, and that proves superior to the long dominant tradition of utilitarianism’.62 
Doing so, it also is presented as a comprehensive liberal doctrine, where ‘all the 
members of its well-ordered society affirm that same doctrine’.63 As Rawls puts it, 
‘the problem [of stability] is whether the regulative desire to adopt the standpoint 
of justice belongs to a person’s own good … being rational for one, it is rational for 
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all, and therefore non tendencies to instability exist’.64 In Political Liberalism, 
Rawls finds this univocal reading of the person’s own good particularly 
problematic. As Rawls tells us, in order to acclimate justice as fairness with the real 
structure and composition of the population of modern democracies, the recognition 
of the fact of reasonable pluralism as an intrinsic characteristic of liberal democratic 
societies makes necessary a relaxation of the monistic assumption at the centre of 
his first account. In this way, the collective action problem at the heart of the 
concluding sections of A Theory of Justice remains the same. But, as we shall see 
in the next section, starting assumptions change in such a way that the solution must 
be one that all citizens can agree with despite considerable moral disagreement.65  
 
 
3. Overlapping consensus, reasonableness and a democratic political culture  
So, at the heart of Rawls’s version of political liberalism, there is a fundamental 
question. Namely, in a democratic society, where free and equal citizens are 
reasonable and rational but disagree on fundamental ethical and religious issues, is 
it possible for all these citizens to unite in affirming a political conception of justice 
that ensures fair terms of cooperation over time? For Rawls, a political conception 
of justice that allows for an overlapping consensus is the response to this 
fundamental question.66 Therefore, Rawls constructs justice as fairness as a political 
conception of justice that is valid for all reasonable citizens who are free and equal, 
who recognize, from their own points of view, the need for fair terms of 
cooperation, and advance their interpretation of such terms according to the shared 
fund of values that inform a democratic society. On his view, as well known, a 
society inspired by the principles of justice as fairness is stable because such a 
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conception of justice allows convergence of all reasonable citizens despite ongoing 
disagreements about important ethical, religious and political matters. 
 
In this section, I do not focus on the asymmetry between justice and 
persisting disagreements about the good.67 My focus is internal to Rawls’s theory 
and regards overlapping consensus and its conceptual underpinnings. Rawls 
contextualizes his analysis within the terms of fundamental ideas that he sees as 
implicit in the public culture of a democratic society.68 This culture includes 
political institutions of a constitutional regime, its tradition of interpretation, texts 
and documents that are common knowledge.69 Moreover, in a democratic society, 
the natural exercise of one’s moral personality leads to the consolidation of 
reasonable pluralism as an inherent feature of such societies.70 In this context, 
Rawls aims to square the reasonable pluralism of a democratic society with basic 
institutions through a political conception of justice that free and equal citizens can 
support from their own points of view, which, however, do not reject the essentials 
of a constitutional democratic regime.71 This political conception of justice must 
have two merits. It must allow citizens to pursue their own doctrines, and it must 
ensure that the fundamental democratic framework is preserved when people have 
to decide on issues of general interest collectively. In other words, it must ensure 
stability.72 In Rawls’s own words, the problem is ‘to work out a conception of 
political justice for a constitutional democratic regime that the plurality of 
reasonable doctrines – always a feature of the culture of a free democratic regime – 
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might endorse’.73 Such a political conception of justice, therefore, must specify 
appropriate terms of cooperation, given the assumptions that, if terms are 
appropriate, all citizens have the capacity to be cooperating members,74 and they 
can understand reciprocal efforts because of a an intelligible political common 
sense.75  
 Rawls’s conception of reasonableness is conceived so as to allow for the 
belief that citizens have all the capacities to be cooperating members.76 ‘People are 
reasonable,’ Rawls writes, ‘in one basic aspect when, among equals say, they are 
ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide 
by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so’.77 From this 
definition, reasonable people desire to engage in fair terms of cooperation, and there 
is a condition for this being so. People stand ready to propose fair terms of 
cooperation if they know that other people will do the same. Rawls assumes that 
people can do so. He also assumes that they are willing to do so.78 Consequently, 
the central question is not to determine whether or not citizens will propose fair 
terms of cooperation, but rather Rawls focuses on the most appropriate framework 
for the social world, which we can expect everyone to endorse.79  
 
Engaging with others in the definition of fair terms of cooperation implies 
not only the attempt to offer the most convincing account but also the disposition 
to be convinced by others. In this sense, the perception of what is a convincing 
account may differ, but the desire to engage in cooperation is intrinsically valuable 
from all points of view. These two sides constitute the character of a reasonable 
person. But, without an underlying connection between two or more persons, 
heterogeneity and incommunicability may obfuscate such a positive disposition. 
For Rawls, this is not a big problem. There is a shared fund of implicitly recognized 
basic ideas and principles that ensure that one can expect other individuals to 
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recognize her attempt to propose fair terms of cooperation. Without an established 
public world, with Rawls’s own words, ‘the reasonable may be suspended and we 
may be left largely with the rational, although the reasonable always binds in foro 
interno’.80  
 
To review, Rawls addresses all citizens of a hypothetical democratic society 
with a distinctive political culture. By assumption Claire is a reasonable, free and 
equal citizen.  In order to be recognised as reasonable, however, there must be a 
shared fund of public political values that makes her account of fair terms of 
cooperation understandable. The convergence between this political common sense 
and her account of fair terms of cooperation makes it possible for other citizens to 
reduce her proposal to the communal knowledge that allows everyone to accept the 
same terms of cooperation as fair. So, with a shared fund of political values, free 
and equal citizens, who are rational, can also be recognized as reasonable; and then,  
Rawls argues, they may reach an overlapping consensus, a situation in which all 
citizens, who are recognized as reasonable, unite in affirming the same political 
conception from the perspective of their own comprehensive doctrines.81  
 
Overlapping consensus is a special kind of agreement by which the same 
principles of the political conception are affirmed for different reasons from the 
standpoint of each comprehensive doctrines.82 Through an overlapping consensus, 
citizens, who adhere to different comprehensive doctrines, accept progressively the 
same liberal democratic political outlook from their own perspectives. It is 
distinctive that this process does not come from the outside. The political 
conception of justice addresses all individuals as free and equal without distinction, 
but the process through which citizens of a liberal democratic society support this 
conception takes place from within their own comprehensive view.83 However, for 
Rawls, what is certain is that, no matter the standpoint one takes, ‘the object of 
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consensus, the political conception of justice, is itself a moral conception’.84 And, 
as such, it is affirmed on moral grounds. In this way, ‘an overlapping consensus’, 
he continues, ‘is not merely a consensus on accepting certain authorities, or on 
complying with certain institutional arrangements, founded on a convergence of 
self-or group interests. All those who affirm the political conception start from 
within their own comprehensive view and draw on the religious, philosophical, and 
moral grounds it provides’.85 
 In this way, overlapping consensus occurs across citizens who have 
different doctrines while keeping faith to the form of political life that have enabled 
these doctrines to flourish. How is this possible? Again, this brings us to the process 
of acquiring shared knowledge and understanding through experience. For Rawls, 
a fact to be considered is that a ‘reasonable person desires for its own sake a social 
world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can 
accept’.86 So, we can paraphrase, according to Rawls, citizens think that a 
cooperative move has an intrinsic value. As someone has argued, the value of 
cooperation amplifies when all citizens value being seen as a co-operator but not as 
a defector.87 In this way, the knowledge of what other citizens think (have thought) 
or do (have done) is determinant for having the scaffolding needed as a basis for 
cooperation over time. But, in a large and complex society with reasonable 
pluralism, where it is not plausible to claim that all free and equal citizens know 
each other and their past, how can Rawls ensures such a framing, so strong that it 
informs preferences despite substantial disagreements?  For him, a common 
political common sense functions as this environmental cognitive trigger. In other 
words, it shapes the political posture of persons as citizens in a way that ensures the 
loyalty with the existing and prevalent political culture.  
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 In other words, along their conceptual development in a democratic society, 
Rawls tells us, the doctrines reasonable people support have already constructed 
accounts of possible fair terms of cooperation that are coherent with the enduring 
political structure within which moral agents operate. This being so, for a political 
conception of justice being supported for the right reasons (overlapping consensus), 
the implicit crucial assumption is that all citizens hold reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, which have been permeable to the historically predominant funds of 
shared values. In this way, citizens are not only willing to propose fair terms of 
cooperation, but they can also receive other proposals positively.  
 
Now, as the example in the introduction shows us, it is not clear that we 
should consider a democratic culture as the cure for moral disagreements, rather 
than a cause of them. What is important for Rawls is the point that coexistence 
under the same democratic state shapes the preferences of those who live under 
such conditions. This circumstance constitutes a strong-enough ground to discuss 
fair terms of cooperation that all can accept despite differences. In other words, a 
shared fund of political values allows for reasonable pluralism, but, it also opens up 
room for consensus on the same political conception of justice for moral reasons. 
Rawls treats a democratic culture as if the balance between individual commitments 
and dominant political values were possible for all citizens, andbetter for the 
community as a whole, especially in terms of stability. In doing so, Rawls also 
underestimates the relevance of the differences between being reasonable and being 
recognized as reasonable. Simply stated, Claire can be reasonable, but other citizens 
also can fail to recognize her as such. In such a situation, whether or not she is 
actually reasonable is irrelevant, since what counts is how other citizens ratify her 
fit with the general understanding of reasonableness as a shared practical category. 
In this way, overlapping consensus encompasses only members that the majority of 
citizens already recognize as reasonable. This backward component makes 
overlapping consensus subject to a line of criticism. Overlapping consensus is a 
theoretical device that engages only with recognizably reasonable citizens and, by 
doing so, demarcates citizens in two units: those who can fully exercise their 
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political franchise, and those who are supposed to do the same, but, in practice, 
cannot, unless changing substantially the fundamental reasons of their participation.  
Overlapping consensus overlooks the fact that a consensus so-conceived 
excludes some citizens from democratic society, which means a failure in the 
fundamental democratic promise of treating all members of the demos equally. As 
I shall argue in section 3, such a bias tends to exclude political avant-gardes in 
favour of more conservative and traditional forms of political participation. 
Moreover, as I argue in section 4, this division forces some pockets not to genuinely 
support the terms of cooperation. Together, these two argumentative lines shall 
demonstrate that the assumption of a widespread common fund of political values 
as functional to the reciprocal recognition as reasonable citizens makes overlapping 
consensus vulnerable to a conservative bias which entails supporting the 
preponderant political culture. It overlooks the possibility that such a culture 
excludes and penalizes potential claimants and undermines a core democratic pillar 
– the belief that all citizens can exercise the same franchise without privileges.  
 
 
4. The black swan objection88 
In this section, I argue that Rawls describes the members of a liberal democratic 
society as the kind of persons he needs for his view to be appropriate, in a way that 
excludes the public from overlapping consensus through significant forces that are 
constitutive of democratic societies as we know them. In this way, for an 
overlapping consensus to be achievable, a more-than-insignificant-part of our 
current liberal democratic societies would not be recognised as reasonable. This 
means to say that this group would not take part in the definition of what fair means 
in the construction of fair terms of cooperation that may reach the desired 
overlapping consensus.  
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For Rawls, over time, a liberal democratic culture has engaged in a common 
sense-creating activity. That is, it has transformed doctrines into reasonable 
doctrines, shaping the landscape of societies under liberal democratic regimes. 
Reasonable citizens, Rawls tells us, see themselves as able to hold and revise a 
certain doctrine, to abide with rules of cooperation despite disagreement, and also 
conceive themselves, as much as their fellow members, as free and equal. If we 
think of reasonable people as having a sense of where the moral borders are, then, 
we can also believe that they already have shared premises for seeking agreement 
on basic principles. Essentially, as Onora O’Neill stresses, Rawls describes the 
public for an overlapping consensus as a community of fellow citizens, who already 
understand what it means to be a full cooperative member of such people.89 As we 
have seen earlier, by plugging into his account a shared fund of public values, and 
taking this fund as general, Rawls ensures that, despite disagreement, there are 
reasons for convergence and coordination.90 The difference between everyone 
having the same conception of the good and reasonable people having different 
partially comprehensive doctrines is thereby minimized. Reasonable citizens can 
consent to a political conception of justice because the values underlying this 
conception are internal to the reasons they have.91  
So, the public political culture component in each doctrine is what matters 
the most for theory building. It provides a sound and plausibly universalistic 
justification for people to sustain a political conception of justice from their own 
point of view despite their not having any direct assurance mechanism or peer-to-
peer relationship. As we have seen, overlapping consensus is intended for a society 
that already meets certain political and legal standards. The same standards that, for 
Rawls, unleash the fact of reasonable pluralism. In this way, he locates the member 
of a well-ordered society within the binary of a precise public culture. Therefore, 
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by lowering the level of idealization within the ideational space of a certain liberal 
democratic culture, he is bound to take seriously the particular form of pluralism 
that actually exists within such a distinctive perimeter. And this transforms the 
assumption of a shared fund of public values into a factual aspect of the theory. 
Specifically, in order to provide a plausible account that fits in that context, Rawls 
must consider all the possible doctrines that actually exist (or have existed) within 
a liberal democratic society.  
Such a contextualization within a public political culture, therefore, raises a 
problem of theoretical parsimony. Rawls should incorporate a historical 
sociological analysis of pluralism within liberal democracy, but this is a very 
demanding, and probably contingent, kind of analysis. Simply, population may 
grow, or people can have new ideas. Alternatively, Rawls can act as if his 
conception of a public political culture were so universally descriptive to be 
considered as the relevant assurance mechanism for all moral agents within the kind 
of political regime he has in mind. Understandably, Rawls goes for the second 
option. He assumes us that, in his ideal of a liberal democracy, a vast majority of 
people can recognize each other as reasonable because they all share the same 
public political culture. By doing so, however, he leaves us the space open for 
criticisms about the partiality of the alleged universalism of its theory, even within 
the perimeter of liberal democratic societies.92 
 
As reasonable members of a political society who share the same political 
common sense, in Rawls’s view, citizens find in one another reasons that they allcan 
reconcile with the political part of their set of values, independently from any other 
commitment. If these attributes inform the description of a reasonable person, it is 
clear that the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable cannot aspire to be 
universalistic unless these attributes are universal, but, and this seems to be 
undeniable, they are not. Given so, it becomes crucial to understand how 
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uncommon is to find people that, in our familiar political experience as citizens in 
democratic political forms, would be Rawlsian citizens who would not be 
recognized as reasonable. If, from the outset, Rawls’s account turns out to exclude 
some components of the political life as we experience it, it is plausible to say that 
the resulting overlapping consensus also excludes relevant pockets of society and 
considers some of the existing doctrines that the majority of citizens in liberal 
democracies tend to recognize as reasonable.  
Vulgate says that the criterion of reasonableness and the public political 
culture are not so exclusionary elements of a theory of pluralism for liberal 
democratic societies, which are communal of pretty much all accounts of political 
liberalism.93 All things considered, people tell us, unreasonable people are fanatics, 
whose vocabulary and practices challenge the fundamental assumption that all 
human beings are free and equal.94 However, it is surprisingly simplistic to think of 
people that a Rawlsian citizen would not recognize as reasonable in these terms 
only.95 The partiality of Rawls’s conception of reasonableness turns out to be 
particularly clear when we take the position of hypothetical outsiders – those people 
who would not be not recognized as reasonable. From libertarians to religious 
extremists, passing by subalterns, academics and committed social activists, there 
are many ways to play the role of the unreasonable. Moreover, within the complex 
subset of people who would not be recognized as reasonable, some cases might 
generate troubles for Rawls, because they, and their political actions, seem to be 
constitutive of a democratic culture.96 For instance, consistent empirical evidence 
shows that many individuals who form important elements of such a public culture 
would disagree with some of the most fundamental aspect of Rawls’s conception 
of reasonableness.97 Scholars also think that democracy is simply a neoliberal 
fantasy, and disagreement about democracy is not necessarily a bad thing unless we 
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go as far as equating justice with the democratic political form, which is clearly not 
what Rawls has in mind.98  
The assumption of a democratic public culture as an assurance mechanism 
among citizens who disagree about important matters implies that alternative ways 
to organize collective life are occluded. In this way, Rawls secures overlapping 
consensus and the resulting stability within an array of already given possibility. 
This is not necessarily a problem for Rawls, since the theoretical move is that of 
concealing liberal democratic institutions in front of reasonable pluralism. In so 
doing, I argue, there is a problem. Instead of deflecting the contradictions of the 
predominant culture in favour of innovation and inclusion, the search for stability 
reflects the idea that there is no need to envision a different politics in the future, 
because what we have is the best we can hope for.  At this stage, if we doubt the 
capacity of democratic culture in plural societies, for us to follow Rawls, we need, 
at least, an uncontroversial agreement on what the political consists of. However, 
in liberal democratic theory itself, there is widespread disagreement on the 
perimeter of the political domain, on the way through which a political conception 
of justice ought to be applied in such a space, and on the kind of institutions that 
are actually part of the basic structure of the society.99  
Moreover, harmonisation around a certain conception of a political common 
sense also is likely to silence the most critical and original voices: people that allow 
a certain tradition to evolve and fit within new social demands. In order to modify 
and evolve a certain tradition, one should be able to distance themselves from his 
or her inheritance in order to exercise those critical faculties that can actually 
challenge the contradiction of one’s own society. To do so, however, critical 
thinkers may challenge also the particular form of the political community and 
public culture. By labelling these people as unreasonable, the risk is to think of 
disagreement in plural liberal democracies under the lenses of common sense.100 
This is a bizarre situation in which, for the sake of internal consistency, radical 
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thinkers and innovators are excluded, while people, who appear loyal to the liberal 
democratic public culture while acting too unwisely for the community to live with 
over time, are in a preferential position.  It is not obvious that citizens of liberal 
democracies should continue to express emancipatory aspirations and demands for 
justice in democratic terms, or in terms that other citizens can recognize as 
reasonable. The predilection for democratic terms may divert the attention to the 
ways people perform their claims, rather than taking seriously what these people 
stand for, and the structural conditions of marginalization which, in certain cases, 
fundamentally exhaust their transformative energies.  
 
The series of examples could continue, but what matters for me is the fact 
that, in liberal democratic societies, wherever we turn our heads, we see examples 
of people who would not be recognized as reasonable under a pure Rawlsian 
architecture. But these people do propose possible terms of cooperation despite 
being in disagreement about the distinctive silhouette of their political culture. If 
we bring Rawlsian glasses, we have no eyes for this truth. The consequence is that 
Rawls’s account is unable to see that, in this way, a more-than-insignificant part of 
the population is denied access to the construction of the terms of cooperation. And, 
by assuming the historical significance and tenacity of a shared fund of political 
values, overlapping consensus neutralizes positive transformative forces as if they 
were always destabilizing pressures, or marginal and anti-democratic counter-
powers.  
 
 Now, if we accept these remarks, we see that overlapping consensus 
functions as a vehicle for demarcation and limitation of the space of political 
possibilities. This observation engages our attention on an important point. On this 
picture, if some people do not act as if their worldviews incorporated elements of 
the dominant political culture, such rupture does not constitute sufficient reason to 
doubt the support for the right reasons of the political conception of justice itself, 
but, rather, it is a proof that these people are not predictably reliable to overlap on 
the elementary terms of cooperation. But that means to say that the political comes 
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before the moral, or, to say the same in other words, that political reasons outweigh 
moral reasons to treat all citizens on an equal footing when comes to decide on 
issues of collective concern.  
 
5. The invisible (wo)man objection  
In the previous section, I have argued that, if we follow Rawls’s argument, 
overlapping consensus excludes a significant and progressive part of liberal 
democratic societies with the risk of absorbing positive transformative energies. In 
this section, I shall demonstrate that overlapping consensus also displays its 
conservative bias in another way. Rawls ignores the fact that the dominant public 
political values inhibit potential participants by pressuring them to homologation, 
even if they could have engaged positively with other citizens in their own terms. 
This is not a problem of integrity, which has been a substantial concern in the liberal 
literature since the publication of Political Liberalism.101 Here, I argue that those 
who stand outside the circle of this society’s definition of common political values 
are forced to be like the rest of the society rather than taking their differences, 
making them strengths and contributing to the enlargement of the constitutive 
political values of the society.  
 
Feminist criticism has challenged the elimination of affect from the realm 
of the political. For Carole Pateman, such an exclusion has been consonant with the 
exclusion of women from the political sphere, since women, affect, and love are 
lived as forms of this exiled affect.102 Affects and emotions are seen as elements of 
disruption and antagonism against the requirements of fairness and cooperation.103 
In this view, women become the bearers of certain personal and political disorders, 
and men are the protectors of the ordered political association. It is in such a 
manner, that one may understand the perception of a disorder of women as a 
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synecdoche for the exclusionary character of overlapping consensus. The ideal 
community of reasonable political agents, here, is not a polymorphous large and 
open collection of human beings, who express their moral capacities, but a 
community of men, and women that, in order to count, must act as men. Now, 
whether or not one accepts this critique, Pateman illuminates an important 
aftereffect of overlapping consensus, as Rawls understands it: namely, it may force 
individuals to a divided self-perception as reasonable citizens, and as individuals 
who have lost their most significant imprint.  
 
According to Rawls, the basic structure of the two principles ‘inevitably 
encourages some ways of life and discourages others, or even excludes them 
altogether’.104 The unavoidable effect of what Rawls defines as a ‘fact of common 
sense political sociology’ is that certain comprehensive doctrines, especially those 
that are incompatible with a widespread political culture, may fail to gain adherents. 
For instance, Rawls says, in the favourable context of a general commitment to 
equality and liberty, stable liberal and democratic institutions enjoy adequate 
support to educate children in order ‘to be fully cooperating members of society, 
and enable them to be self-supporting’.105 For Rawls, what indeed matters is the 
reception and the expressive articulation of doing oneself as a reasonable agent, 
which he considers as an inevitable result of a favourable liberal democratic 
environment. My contention is that, in today’s liberal democracies, as we have seen, 
many people may elude Rawls’s standards of reasonableness. If we accept this 
remark, and we assume, as does Rawls, that, in order to be active participants in the 
definition of fair terms of cooperation, citizens must be recognized as reasonable; 
we need to consider an important problem. Namely, the fact of common sense 
political sociology remains blind to the existential costs of negotiating elements that 
people consider significant features of their characters. In this way, Rawls brings 
into being a kind of political association that may not be ostensibly exclusionary, 
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but that forces people to hold an extraneous standpoint. The moral and political 
world, Rawls seems to tell us, is set up in a way that forces individual deeds and 
communicative acts within the semantic space of actions that others can recognise 
as cooperative. By doing so, however, Rawls limits the space of participation for 
marginalized groups and dissent against oppressive powers; especially, when these 
powers are generally deemed liberal and democratic.  
Contestation of superimposed identities and the search for the genuine 
expression of the self in public is a common theme of black literature.106 For 
instance, in the Epilogue of the Invisible Man, the narrator gives us a vivid 
representation of how important for self-realization is the opportunity to be present 
to the others in one’s own terms. After a journey across bigotry, and the effects of 
racial division on victims and perpetrators, the narrator tells us that he is finally 
ready to come to the surface again. Action, he says, has already taken place. By 
telling his own story in his own way, the narrator has advanced a call for change. 
The identification with the very exercise of constituting a sense of the self by 
narrating a story marks his political presence against oppressive background 
conditions.  To see the same moment from the opposite perspective, without the 
space to unfold the individual experience of prejudice and intolerance as it is, 
oppressiveness translates into an imperative of homologation, which inhibits 
political change.  ‘Whence all this passion toward conformity anyway? – diversity 
is the world. Let man keep his part and you’ll have no tyrant states. Why, if they 
follow this conformity business they’ll end up by forcing me, an invisible man, to 
become white, which is not a colour but the lack of one’.107 As he continues few 
pages later, ‘so why do I write, torturing myself to put it down? Because in spirit of 
myself I’ve learned some things. Without the possibility of action, all knowledge 
comes to one labelled “file and forget,” and I can neither file nor forget’.108 When 
you are, with the words of W. E. B. Du Bois, ‘measuring oneself by the means of a 
nation that looked back in contempt,’ or when you are continuously required to 
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reconcile your heritage through the eyes of others, the constitution of yourself as a 
democratic subject through the renegotiation of your worldview may be 
indiscernible from your perception of injustice.109 From this perspective, a revision 
of one’s worldview in agreement with the dominant vocabulary and loyalty of alien 
rules of cooperation suppresses differences and symbolic resources, frustrates the 
potential of political change, and inhibits the performative moment of making a 
claim in public.  
 
The conservative element, which reverberates from the demand of entering 
the moral community in ways that are not one’s own, draws an imaginary line that 
associates several experiences of marginalisation in Western liberal democracies.110 
Think of those people who, since the post-war period, have been emigrating and 
settling in Western liberal democracies. While their legal status is relatively 
assured, in many cases, their experience of citizenship remains ambiguous. ‘The 
majority of these peoples,’ Carlos Forment writes, ‘are by now “dual nationals,” 
“permanent residents,” or “naturalized citizens,” with civic and political 
attachments extending to their compatriots in their homeland and to those in their 
adopted country’.111 If we buy Rawls’s reconstruction of the development and 
affirmation of a public political culture in the Western world, outsiders entered 
liberal democratic public spheres at a moment in time when liberal values were 
constitutive of the political and moral general vocabulary. In Forment’s 
representation, migrants who ‘entered the countries of post-imperial metropole, 
they did more than just exchange passports and currency at the custom office; they 
appropriated liberal stories’.112 Appropriation of the liberal stories, however, 
necessitated a comprehensive re-articulation of the self and a questioning of 
lingering traces of anti-liberal notions. The road to inclusion allowed for the 
constitution of hybrid people who reinvented their traditions in the light of the 
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liberal discourse. ‘Peripheral groups relied on their own historical experiences and 
prudential judgments,’ Forment concludes, ‘to rework the language of liberalism in 
ways neither they nor their tutors had foreseen’.113  
Now, together with the considerations of section 3, these examples support 
my claim that overlapping consensus tends to prize majority view, conformists and 
homologation of dissenters. This is so because Rawls relies upon a certain moral 
development and a distinctive conception of the political – aspects that are 
persistent objects of disagreement inside and outside political theory. In a modern 
liberal democratic society, different religions, long-term residents, women, people 
of colour, and individualistic economic views, all coexist within the same borders, 
and are citizens. These are relatively evident observations, whose implications have 
been largely neglected by Rawls, and the Rawlsian School, which has devoted 
much attention to thinking of the kind of reasons reasonable people can exchange 
with one another, as if reasonableness were an all-encompassing category and the 
public political culture did not play a significant role in the mutual recognition as a 
reasonable citizen. Theorists of a political liberal spirit have largely neglected the 
relationship between exclusiveness and injustice on the assumption that some sort 
of exclusion is an undesirable but ordinary externality for all forms of liberal 
theorizing.114 In order to ameliorate or overcome the paradigm of overlapping 
consensus, the strategy has been that of emptying reasonableness of political 
components,115 substituting consensus with convergence through social 
conventions and cooperation,116 and emphasizing the worth of community for 
surpassing obstacles to stable cooperative enterprises.117 However, many 
experiences of marginalisation show us that accommodating the public political 
culture is a demanding process, which entails moral and political costs. These costs 
may create forms of social estrangement, radicalization of differences, and 
discomfort. They also exclude the most innovative and progressive voices, who, 
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from a liberal perspective, would have good reason in voicing their claims in public. 
If a theory begins by underestimating these costs, one question remains on the table. 
For increasingly diverse and complex liberal democracies, what value is an ideal 
political community if, in its starting assumptions, it does not recognize the crude 
effects of exclusion on the individual, and the negative impact of common sense 
political culture on the ideational capacity of the political community at large?   
 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I held that an apparently idealizing assumption like that of a 
widespread common fund of political values does the important work of enabling 
citizens to recognize one another as reasonable. In my view, the dependence on this 
kind of political common sense epitomizes the conservative bias of overlapping 
consensus, which is the result of exchanges among reasonable people. Specifically, 
they recognize one another as reasonable citizens, who propose fair terms of 
cooperation, in agreement with the predominant and undisputed political 
framework of ideas. This line of criticism is sympathetic with the number of 
external critics that have highlighted the defects of Rawls’s answer to (reasonable) 
pluralism of modern societies.118 However, my argument also wants to unveil an 
internal inconsistency in the conceptual architecture of Rawls’s response to the 
moral disagreement of citizens in modern societies. As I have illustrated with many 
examples, the conservative bias of overlapping consensus undercuts the democratic 
idea that, within the same citizenry, all citizens enjoy the same political franchise. 
To be more precise, citizens do have the same status as possible participants, but, 
in fact, it is as if they do not, since, besides the core differentiation between citizens 
and non-citizens, there is also an internal and informal demarcation – between 
reasonable citizens and citizens that are not recognised as such. This second 
demarcation is the consequence of a person’s fundamental capacity to acclimatise 
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with the shared fund of political values. Despite being informal, from the 
perspective of the misrecognized citizen, this demarcation denotes a violation of 
the allegedly secure political status as a co-citizen, and a discriminatory practice, 
which contradicts the special relation that citizens have with one another in 
democratic political regimes.  
My belief is that this point is not marginal for Rawls and strict political 
liberals. As I showed in section 2, the public fund of political values functions as 
an assurance mechanism: it enables cooperation and mutual recognition as a 
reasonable citizen. In Rawls, this shared fund of political values is logically prior 
to reasonableness and independent from the kind of political conception of justice 
that obtains an overlapping consensus. Actually, this fund limits and informs the 
spectrum of possible forms that fair arrangements can have. So, in complex and 
divided societies, a realistic utopia of a just society, like that of Rawls and strict 
Rawlsian, should be able to take seriously into account the fact that disagreement 
with the political common sense often hides important demands of justice and 
inclusion. The same demands that the principles of the theory aim to address in the 
first place.  
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Chapter 3 
Why modus vivendi theory is exclusionary 
 
 
 
Black revolution’, Robert Scheer wrote, ‘is the statement of an alternative system 
of values, the move to acquire power to assert those values, and the express 
willingness to respond with revolutionary violence to the violence inherent in 
established power’.119 As Mary Bernstein puts it, the construction of an identity 
based on differences from the majority was a critical step toward economic 
independence and political power for Black Nationalism.120 At the cost of putting 
forward unsettling demands, and making enemies among potential allies, identity 
movements may resort to unconventional practices as a form of strategic action to 
pursue long-term goals.121 In order to challenge dominant cultural patterns or gain 
recognition for new social identities, they also may cause widespread feelings of 
instability and insecurity.122 Conversely, peace and security are critical problems 
for the body of research on modus vivendi. In circumstances of deep pluralism, 
where people disagree fundamentally on political, religious, and economic matters, 
modus vivendi political theory values political arrangements for their capacity to 
maintain peace and security – sufficient, it says, for a decent life in conditions of 
values conflicts. In this chapter, I aim to show that because of such a pronounced 
commitment to peace and security, modus vivendi has an inherent conservative bias 
that tends to exclude challenges to majority view. 
Modus vivendi came back to the attention of political theorists when John 
Rawls introduced it as a counterfactual to specify the moral character of 
overlapping consensus. Essentially, from Rawls’s writing, we can deduce what 
modus vivendi is by analogy with what overlapping consensus is not supposed to 
be.123 As Patrick Neal has suggested, modus vivendi largely ‘remains a creation of 
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its critics’ which is often employed to show the superiority of other normative 
responses (1997: 191).124 For Rawls, modus vivendi is not meant to be a valid 
option, but instead serves an argumentative purpose to clarify the merits of 
overlapping consensus and stability for the right reasons. According to Rawls, a 
modus vivendi is the prudential acceptance that, under present circumstances, all 
citizens cannot live as their comprehensive doctrines dictate. Hence, a modus 
vivendi is an unstable balance of power that is vulnerable to changes of 
circumstance. There are several elements that make modus vivendi particularly 
unsatisfying in Rawls’s eyes. Modus vivendi is not only inherently unstable but also 
founded on mere group interests. Moreover, by accepting modus vivendi as the best 
available option we also abandon the hope for a stronger form of political 
community. Modus vivendi is also the outcome of bargaining and negotiations 
where social unity is only momentarily assured by second-order reasons.125 
Recently, a burgeoning line of literature has started reading modus vivendi 
in a new fashion. Such a rediscovery of modus vivendi stems from the desire to 
enhance or criticize Rawls’s account of consensus, which leaves out key aspects of 
what politics is, and overlooks, they say, the deep conflicts of values at the heart of 
today’s societies.126 Modus vivendi arrangements are seen as better responses to the 
complexity of the fact of pluralism, whose prerogative is to accommodate diversity 
by political means. 
There are three distinctive kinds of modus vivendi political theory. First, the 
so-called Modus Vivendi Liberalism: namely, a middle way between Rawlsian 
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political liberalism and liberalism à la Judith Shklar (Modus Vivendi Liberalism). 
David McCabe tries to extend the justificatory constituency of mainstream political 
liberalism by replacing the overlapping consensus on moral reasons with a kind of 
compromise on the liberal state.127 Second, a distinctively realist literature, which 
has tried to unveil the philosophical potential of modus vivendi for the study of 
legitimate political power in conditions of deep pluralism (Realist Modus 
Vivendi).128 Third, Fabian Wendt has recently attempted to make a strong claim for 
a modus vivendi that is compatible with moral claims about justice, justification, 
and other values (Modus Vivendi with a Moral Standing).129 These three accounts 
begin with the assumption that deep pluralism characterises modern societies, and 
this is something that the political order must take into account. 
In this chapter, I argue that all of these three typologies display an inherent 
conservative bias, using modus vivendi as a device to manage deep pluralism. This 
is not to say that political theorists should dismiss modus vivendi as being an 
implausible device. My aim is to show that modus vivendi political theory must 
take this bias seriously in order to advance in the search of political arrangements 
that accommodate the deep pluralism of modern societies. However, this chapter 
does not offer any alternative to modus vivendi. The ambition is to point the debate 
to an important problem that deserves consideration from modus vivendi political 
theorists. Specifically, I argue that modus vivendi helps McCabe to extend the 
justificatory constituency of the liberal state but this comes at the price of progress, 
especially when the demand for progress comes from minorities and political avant-
gardes. Second, a Realist Modus Vivendi, I argue, leaves room open for a tyranny 
of majority, which penalizes marginalized groups. Third, Modus Vivendi 
Arrangements with a Moral Standing overemphasize the higher good of peace. As 
a result, there is a risk in offering a monistic theory, and containing forms of protests 
and atypical appropriations of the political space. In the following, I shall 
substantiate these three claims. 
 
                                                          
127 McCabe 2010, 126-36. 
128 Gray 1995 2000. Horton 2010 2010b 2011. 
129 Wendt 2016.  
53 
 
 
2. Liberal modus vivendi 
Fundamental to the many varieties of political liberalism is the idea that the liberal 
order must be justifiable to all those subject to it, and such justification must be 
affirmed by free and equal citizens through the use of common human reason.130 In 
this philosophical milieu, David McCabe has argued that modus vivendi may offer 
a tenable response to what he calls the justificatory requirement. In his view, 
mainstream liberal accounts are inadequate because, in the case of citizens who 
hold illiberal doctrines, they are unable to meet the universal character of the 
demand for justification, and remain confined within the limited range of people 
who support fundamental liberal ideals.131 For McCabe, it is instead possible to 
advocate the liberal order to illiberal people by thinking of such order in terms of a 
modus vivendi. In other words, rather than as the consensual point of convergence 
among different doctrines, the liberal order must be defended as the optimum 
second best compromise among people who hold radically different moral and 
political worldviews.132 
At first, it is important to recall what was said in the introduction. Modus 
vivendi theories begin with an account of modern societies as characterised by 
profound and enduring disagreement on moral, political, and religious matters. If 
this is the account of modern societies, we must consider liberalism and the 
justificatory requirement as but one competing morality. In this vein, the 
justificatory requirement responds to a particular demand that is coherent with a 
specific account of the moral person. When reflecting on the justificatory 
requirement in these terms, we can notice that such a requirement is not the 
normative question that traditionally modus vivendi tries to answer. Modus vivendi 
and the justificatory requirement are two alternative responses to the same demand 
for legitimation of a political order. Each of these responses assume specific 
accounts of moral agency, which circumscribe their domain of applicability. If one, 
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therefore, is committed to the contextual assumption of deep pluralism, like modus 
vivendi theorists, in theory, the conceptual priority of the justificatory requirement 
over modus vivendi should be questionable. But, without wanting to delve into this 
dispute, for the present purpose, it is suffice to keep in mind the observation that 
the justificatory requirement is a response to a moral demand, given a precise moral 
theory. Variants of liberalism differ on exactly what the justificatory requirement 
demands, but the basic account of the legitimate political power is undisputed. In 
the examination of McCabe’s account, I also shall assume that all relevant parties 
endorse the justificatory requirement in the relevant sense. 
In this framework, David McCabe’s Modus Vivendi Liberalism begins with 
two considerations. First, many citizens endorse a normative framework that 
sustains illiberal models of political association. Second, such citizens see the state 
as an unchangeable fact of modern societies or as necessary to have important 
goods.133 For McCabe, in liberal states, the political environment shapes the 
preferences of a large part of the population, even when some people have illiberal 
inclinations. Upon these considerations, McCabe argues that an ‘agreement to 
liberal terms might thus emerge as a compromise among citizens who recognize the 
value of ordered political life but realize that the political vision recommended by 
their distinct normative framework cannot be achieved’.134 An ordered political life 
consists of a series of ideas that inform a minimal vision of decent life. These ideas 
are as follows: ‘liberal democracy is the only legitimate form of government, that 
capital punishment is cruel, that political institutions should be resolutely neutral 
regarding religions … that rulers ought in some way to be accountable to the ruled, 
that punishment should be appropriate to the crime, that no person should be forced 
to worship in a manner they reject’.135 Modus Vivendi Liberalism, then, as he 
continues, ‘tries to identify those terms of cooperation that all citizens will find 
acceptable under common conditions’.136 
For McCabe, the appeal to modus vivendi solves the task of funding 
arrangements that can be broadly justified to all citizens in western liberal 
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democracies. He claims that due to the appeal to modus vivendi, we are able to 
defend the idea that critics – citizens who, despite affirming the justificatory 
requirement, have illiberal inclinations – also are in the position to identify with the 
general terms of cooperation. To do so, McCabe combines two theoretical moves. 
On the one hand, he understands public justification as a scalar. A regime is not 
either “justified” or “unjustified”. Between the two poles, there is a series of 
satisfactory options that are more or less tolerable from the point of view of the 
citizens, even if they are critics.137 On the other hand, McCabe disaggregates moral 
reasoning. In his view, practical reasoning does not entail an all-encompassing 
response to the moral question “what should I do?”, but, rather, it involves several 
pieces of practical reflection on what should be done under circumstances that are 
mutable and intrinsically contingent.138 This second component holds the greater 
normative weight. It postulates an ad-hoc situation for parties to accept terms of 
cooperation, despite these terms not being fully justified under their eyes. 
Specifically, McCabe writes, ‘while the critic may regret that the liberal state is the 
best solution attainable under conditions of moral diversity [the specific context], 
he may nonetheless believe that supporting it is what he has most reason [scalar 
justification], morally, to do’.139 
Two observations are in point. McCabe describes justification as scalar only 
in the intensity range between the “unjustified-pole” and the “justified-pole”. 
Specifically, variations also are considered only in the direction that goes from 
“unjustified” to “justified”. Within such a range of discrete variations, as McCabe 
argues, a state can be “not-fully-justified,” “partially-justified,” “quasi-justified,” 
and the like. At the same time, by turning the direction upside down, it can be “not-
so-unjustified,” “quasi-unjustified,” and the like. In the first series of variations, it 
is plausible to think that critics also may have reasons to support the present terms 
of cooperation. For instance, given the practical impossibility to turn the political 
order into an illiberally ordered political life, they may judge the present political 
system as the best available option. In the second series of variations, however, it is 
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reasonable to affirm that some pockets of society are not ready to support the 
political system whatsoever, even if radical changes are practically impossible. If a 
critic considers the existing political order as “not-so-unjustified” or “quasi-
unjustified”, there must be an additional explanation to justify the observation that 
he or she has reasons to support a political system whose moral and political values 
he or she in practice rejects. In this case, McCabe seems to confuse the fact of living 
in a liberal state – with practical constraints to rise against the liberal order – with 
having reasons to support it. Moreover, unlike McCabe, justification might be scalar 
beyond the two fundamental poles, “justified” and “unjustified”. For instance, one 
might find a state “extremely unjustified”, another might be an enthusiastic 
supporter of the liberal state. If one  finds the state either as “unjustified”, “more 
than unjustified” or “extremely unjustified”, it is not clear what Modus Vivendi 
Liberalism can do for the balancing of generally acceptable terms of cooperation, 
other than taking as a relevant constituency the subset of citizens who find the state 
“very justified or so” to those who find it “quasi-unjustified or so”. 
 The problem that, sooner or later, critics and very harsh critics, who think 
of the liberal state as unjustified or so and, in their discrete moral reasoning, find 
reasons to support the liberal state within their baggage of reasons, is answered by 
mainstream political liberalism  by saying that a liberal democratic state exercises 
soft-power on its citizens. This is a common fact of political sociology (Rawls 
2005). In these terms, the appeal to modus vivendi would only tell us that, for a 
liberal state to be justified, it is enough to influence its illiberal members up to the 
point in which they have, in a certain moment, at least one discrete moral reason to 
support such liberal state. Then, if the idea is to say that citizens may support the 
liberal state because of reasons that are diverse and competing, mainstream political 
liberalism contends that this is possible but insufficient for a liberal state to be stable 
(Rawls 2005). In this vein, if the ambition of Modus Vivendi Liberalism is to show 
that, in front of contingent and evolving circumstances, all citizens happen to have 
reasons to support the existing liberal state; then, the effort to enlarge the 
justificatory constituency sounds like a defence of the political status quo. 
Together, these observations draw attention to a problem in Modus Vivendi 
Liberalism. Modus vivendi is a form of cease-fire resolution on parties in values 
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conflict. It is not necessarily the end of hostilities but it is a way to push conflicting 
parties to stop fighting. If we think of McCabe’s explicit reliance on Claudia Mills’s 
conception of modus vivendi, it seems to be a plausible reading of modus vivendi 
as a preparative stage for consensus around the liberal political order.140 But this 
conservative bias comes at the disadvantage of people, like the critics, who disagree 
with the mainstream and are likely to give greater weight to the continuation of 
disagreements. For McCabe, critics may have different reasons to support the 
liberal state. Actually, for Modus Vivendi Liberalism, what matters is that critics 
have at least one moral reason to prefer this order to all the available alternatives, 
except the one that replicates closely their moral and political doctrines, which, 
nevertheless, is unlikely to get enough support from the other members of the 
justificatory constituency. McCabe tries to make the liberal state acceptable to 
critics without including their distinctive moral reasons. In this way, he plays with 
the belief that, by disaggregating practical reasoning, alternative prospects might 
not be so bad. On this view, unsure critics may accept the system that they in 
principle oppose. In this way, for critics, there is no tangible opportunity to renovate 
some aspects of the liberal state. Actually, by picturing the liberal state as a modus 
vivendi that they have some reason to accept, McCabe reduces the room that critics 
have to resist what they may perceive as an illegitimate coercion. Specifically, if 
critics have a moral reason not to oppose the liberal state, the liberal state can act 
as if it is fully justified to their eyes. 
McCabe demonstrates that the liberal state is justifiable to the critics, but it 
is unclear, for the critics, what is to be gained through inclusion in the justificatory 
constituency. When effects of social impositions and the general political interest 
sensibly constrain the output of their political agency, critics are never actually in 
position to see the liberal state as a second best. They have no credible alternative 
                                                          
140 Ivi, 153. Mills argues that modus vivendi and overlapping consensus focus on two different aspects, which 
are not incompatible. By focusing on the quality of life we have under certain circumstances, modus vivendi 
allows a gradual allegiance of the living together. Overlapping consensus, she argues, focus on the quality of 
endorsement of shared rules only. One does not exclude the other, but, rather, modus vivendi can set the stage 
for consensus in the long-run. Claudia Mills, “Not a mere modus vivendi: the basis for allegiance to the just 
state,” in Victoria Davion and Clark Wolf (eds.), The idea of political liberalism (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2000), 198.  On a sceptic outlook of the use of modus vivendi within the paradigm of political 
liberalism, see Enzo Rossi, “Modus vivendi, consensus, and (realist) liberal legitimacy,” Public Reason 2 (2) 
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other than submitting to the liberal state, or, in extreme cases, bearing the high costs 
of their dissidence. If the liberal state is not open to negotiation, when understood 
as a compromise, we need to reassess it not as fixed unit but to break it up into the 
interaction of concessions. One side, like the critics, may make all, or almost all, 
the concessions; and the other side may fail to reciprocate. If this is the case, the 
extension of the justificatory constituency does not mean to say that members of 
the relevant public have adequate or sufficient reasons to actively endorse a 
coercive proposal. Those critics who end up endorsing the liberal state may be 
simply resigned to the limitations of practical possibility. 
By doing so, McCabe finds an elegant way to rescue the coercive action of 
the liberal state against critics. However, at the same time, his argument also shows 
a limit of modus vivendi as a response to the pluralism of values. Modus vivendi, I 
argue, expresses a certain aversion to change, and if applied to the justification of 
political power, this disposition to maintain existing views and institutions means 
to defend a kind of liberalism that is based on social stability, stressing established 
institutions, and preferring the existing situation to change, as if change were per se 
marked by instability and turmoil. Modus vivendi does not demand political 
philosophers to take the moral doctrines of critics seriously. As a mode of living, it 
allows conflicting parties to coexist in peace for the sake of contingent conditions 
that put pressure on their preferences. From this perspective, modus vivendi does 
not really help mainstream political liberalism to be broader in orientation and 
scope. As a strategy of justification, it is an instrument for establishing a provisional 
state of affairs. In this state of affairs, despite the presence of radical opponents, the 
liberal state has a legitimate claim to coerce all opponents without being incoherent 
with its conception of the moral person. McCabe’s problem, then, is this: he aims 
to open the justificatory constituency to critics, but this move is based on modus 
vivendi, which plugs into his account a disposition to contain and avoid instability. 
From a liberal perspective, McCabe is right in saying that it would be wrong for a 
liberal society to intervene on its own standards, if these standards are partially 
justified. But the modus vivendi centred argument for extending the justificatory 
constituency is presented to the critic in a way that actually reduces his or her space 
for dissenting. By saying so, I do not mean to rule out the effort to enlarge the 
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justificatory constituency, I simply mean to point out that the way in which modus 
vivendi informs McCabe’s account can justify the liberal state to a larger audience, 
but this tends to defend existing institutions against the possibility of change and 
progress.   
 
 
3. Realist modus vivendi 
John Gray and John Horton have thought of modus vivendi as the best form of 
settlement possible in a context of deep pluralism.141 A fundamental premise of their 
version of modus vivendi is that ‘the liberal problem' – which is that of specifying 
terms of peaceful coexistence among exponents of rival, and perhaps rationally 
incommensurable, world views is no less pressing than in early modern times’.142 
Moreover, ‘the hope of resolving [the liberal problem] by refounding morality as a 
universally compelling basis of reasons,’ Gray writes, ‘has faded irrecoverably’.143 
These circumstances, Gray says, demand theoretical and political solutions that 
abandon the faith in the promises of consensus liberalism in favour of political 
arrangements where interests and conflicting values can be negotiated. Within this 
general feeling of pessimism, the best philosophical aspiration we can therefore 
have, Gray argues, is not consensus on certain principles, but rather common 
political institutions that mediate the conflicts between adversary values.144 
Political institutions convey a state of hostility between competing values in volatile 
balances among goods and evils that cannot be achieved once and for all. This 
ongoing achievement, continuously reaffirmed in practice, is modus vivendi and 
the important feature of any regime is how well it enables such conflicts to be 
negotiated.145 
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The argument for modus vivendi consists mainly in drawing the perimeter 
of political possibilities in the light of two initial considerations: value conflicts and 
the reality of deep pluralism. First, Gray argues that the liberal culture is not 
predominant any more. Like the time of religious conflicts mushrooming in Europe 
during the Modern Age, Gray observes that the spirit of our time is filled with 
irreconcilable divisive issues.146 Why should cultures that are not secularised accept 
the norms of the liberal society? They need a reason to do so, which is not to be 
found in the liberal canon. At the same time, when we realize that the once dominant 
liberal culture is now one among many cultural forms in liberal states, the political 
problem alters. When liberalism was a culturally hegemonic force, coexistence in 
pluralism was an internal issue. Now, the political problem consists in the trade-off 
of two cultural forms, liberal and non-liberal.147 Liberalism, therefore, does not 
possess universal justification, but rather it should be conceived as a particular form 
of life, one among many other forms of life that can find precarious equilibrium 
with one another in order to avoid insecurity, intolerable choices and desperate 
situations, which are assumed as universally agreed summa mala.148 
Second, Gray and Horton assume deep pluralism as factually true and such 
truth supervenes all claims for universality. This polysemy is an attribute of social 
life where different moral systems, political doctrines and practices coexist and, 
often, are in conflict with one another. On grounds of this factual observation, deep 
pluralism disallows any universalist principle to arbitrate value conflicts. Unlike the 
traditional liberal argument, rather than supporting liberal universalism, deep 
pluralism actually undermines it; that is, pluralism entails the possibility of different 
rankings of values. Since the truth of deep pluralism is taken as granted, then, the 
liberal ranking of values is one such ranking among others, without claim to 
superiority.149 For Gray, then, the liberal order of values can have no claim on 
                                                          
146 For Horton, historical considerations on liberalism are not as central as in Gray. Horton stipulates deep 
pluralism, and he develops his own account on this premise. 
147 Gray 1995, 85. 
148 Crowder argues that Gray’s version of liberalism misreads liberalism and its connection with the descriptive 
notion of pluralism. See George Crowder “John Gray’s Pluralist Critique of Liberalism,” Journal of Applied 
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149 For the traditional liberal argument, see William Galston, Liberal pluralism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). See also William Galston, The practice of liberal pluralism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
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reason that cannot be contested, and a post-liberal state cannot be other than an 
agonistic form of politics in which liberal values are in competition with other 
values.150 For Horton, the response to deep pluralism is a pragmatic approach that 
mobilises whatever resources are available to effect a workable political settlement 
that is broadly acceptable to the contending parties.151 
Taken together these two conditions, despite diversity and their different 
scopes, it is plausible to say that, in the two accounts, we find the same underlining 
concern and an analogous political response to such worries. Specifically, for a 
political order to begin with deep pluralism, political arrangements must be 
anticipated by socio and political practices that disclose a form of collective interest 
that all individuals may have despite such an ineradicable diversity. In conditions 
of deep pluralism, Gray argues, the only good that people, regardless of their 
worldviews, may accept is the higher political good of peace and security. 
Essentially, parties reach compromises regarding those values on which they 
disagree for the sake of a primary interest in peace, which they see as instrumental 
in the pursuit of their form of life.152 Therefore, ‘the task,’ Gray writes, ‘is to seek 
terms of peaceful coexistence among different cultural forms without the benefit … 
of the universalist perspective’.153 In this sense, toleration can be presented as an 
integral part of modus vivendi.154 Specifically, if there is any truth to deep pluralism, 
Horton also says, we acknowledge that differences of perspective cannot be 
resolved from a vantage point or by harmonisation.155 A central feature of modus 
vivendi, then, is the seriousness with which it takes differences among worldviews, 
and the shared need to live in peace and security as a necessary condition for the 
pursuit of a decent life. 
A politics of modus vivendi, therefore, aims at being in principle compatible 
with many different practical instantiations including some that may not be liberal. 
So long as a political settlement finds a way of preserving peace and security that 
is broadly acceptable to those subject to it, then it approximates the condition of a 
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modus vivendi. In Gray and Horton, however, we find some additional 
requirements for a peaceful settlement to be judged a modus vivendi in conditions 
of deep pluralism. (1) Uncoerced acceptance must be widespread. A modus vivendi 
must be broadly acceptable to those who are part of it. The reasons for this 
acceptance can be different. Under this view, people may build their acceptance 
upon different factors, but, from the point of view of those subject to a modus 
vivendi, despite differences, it must ensure peace and security, as these are the 
goods that are important for everyone, everyone being better off with peace and 
security rather than without.156 Specifically, a peaceful situation preserved through 
suppression, or by deliberate exclusion, is not a modus vivendi. Whereas the control 
of dissenters by an elected government is a modus vivendi, because, by being 
elected, the government satisfies the minimal criterion of broad acceptability. (2) 
The settlement must enable people to live minimally worthwhile lives.157 For 
instance, a modus vivendi encompasses all resources that can be brought to bear in 
given situation to secure a political accommodation parties can live with.158 In the 
pursuit of different political means, a tolerable and secure political order is the 
minimum desideratum for avoiding levels of disruption and violence. (3) It follows 
that a minimal consensual component is integral to modus vivendi. Modus vivendi 
arrangements are legitimate insofar as there is widespread recognition that they 
ensure peace and security. So, (4) modus vivendi is contingent to social and political 
reality. All through history, no framework of ideas has totally controlled violence 
and ensured peace. Moreover, (5) a politics of modus vivendi is a politics of which 
negotiation, compromise and bargaining are integral parts.159 A modus vivendi, as 
Horton writes, is ‘a practical accommodation that can be built around any number 
of factors and be accepted for a variety of reasons by those who are parties to it’.160 
In this sense, (6) a realist modus vivendi can be thought as a second best. It is not 
the best we can hope for according to our worldviews, but is instead enough to live 
a minimally decent life and avoid human evils. 
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While a realist modus vivendi is built upon the assumption of deep 
pluralism, I argue that the six elements required for an arrangement to be a modus 
vivendi undermine the claim for an accommodation of the substantive framework 
of pluralism. To reach such compromise, modus vivendi theorists presuppose two 
order of reasons: first, our deep moral reasons that bring about values conflicts; and 
second, common good reasons to avoid levels of disruption and violence, which are 
seen as a serious threat for the flourishing of first-order deep moral reasons. 
Compromise among competing forms of life is ensured by such two-fold moral 
personality, according to which people may have both individual reasons (the 
variety of moral reasons they can have) and social interest (the good of peace) to 
negotiate on relevant moral aspects. Whether they do so in the light of prudential 
reasons, religious reasons, moral reasons, it does not matter from the point of view 
of modus vivendi. It is not relevant what brings people to accept a modus vivendi, 
but, rather, it is important to demonstrate that such an equilibrium ensures the 
expected level of security and peace. However, it is implausible to think that, in 
conditions of deep pluralism, all individuals make peace and security the most 
important considerations. It is indeed not so difficult to think of examples of 
resistance and public violence in which individuals are eager to give up the 
enjoyment of peace for other political goals.161 
Moreover, the realist account of deep pluralism epitomises a selective kind 
of realism. For modus vivendi theorists, then, modern societies are characterized by 
pluralism, disagreement and adversarial relationships that need to be stabilized. 
Surprisingly, modus vivendi theorists focus only on the horizontal antagonistic 
relationship among different cultures and traditions as if all individuals in the 
society were able to negotiate their worldviews on an equal footing. In so doing, 
they neglect another decisive component of the fact of pluralism as it is in our 
societies: namely, not all individuals are in the same position to make their values 
count in a public negotiation, and compromises are practices that require parity 
among the contracting parties. In this sense, the language of modus vivendi fails to 
notice that a compromise is appropriate when agents are of a relatively equal power, 
meaning that each agent cannot force their views onto the other. For a compromise 
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to be generally acceptable, as modus vivendi theorists wish, there must be a system 
of mutual concessions. When citizens have relatively equal powers of negotiation, 
compromise may be an inclusive activity in which different agents come to an 
agreement by mutual concessions given the variety of different worldviews and 
conflicting interests. When this is not the case, the minimum conditions for peace 
and security might be foreign impositions like other forms of sectarian consensus 
or top-down political ordering. 
A look at the face of modern societies, however, demonstrates that the fact 
of deep pluralism also means structural inequalities, asymmetries of discursive 
power, and powerlessness.162 Bargaining and negotiation are not open to all kinds 
of values in fact. In such state of affairs, the power of the stronger, or the tyranny 
of the majority, is more likely to win the game. Gray and Horton overlook this 
dimension of the fact of pluralism. For many, the goal is chiefly that of having their 
values recognized as relevant in values conflicts. For Gray and Horton, however, it 
is as if all individuals with different values are already in the position to negotiate 
with one another as full partners in social interaction. Modus vivendi theorists see 
modern societies as characterized by a horizontal sphere of multiple systems of 
beliefs and practices, where different, and sometimes incommensurable, values 
must coexist. Pluralism, however, is also a sphere of competing values, where not 
all values are treated as equally relevant in the articulation of the terms of 
coexistence.163 Without taking this element seriously, the emphasis on the 
dimension of negotiation among peers seems a description of how the society 
should be, rather than the authentic portrait of the deep pluralism of modern 
societies. And the consequence is that of reproducing exclusionary practices that 
may penalise greatly dissenting minorities and those who start from a weaker 
bargaining position. 
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The last observations echo my concern with the conservative bias of modus 
vivendi. Realist modus vivendi also is more exclusionary than Gray and Horton 
allow. Modus vivendi is a device that does not have inclusion of new voices as its 
driving force. What matters is the preservation of peace and security as necessary, 
for the majority of people, to pursue individual ends in conditions of deep pluralism. 
All the normative weight of modus vivendi lies on the kind of life it is able to ensure 
as well as on the perception of negotiators that they are living such a life. If there is 
a common perception that the higher good of peace and security ensures a decent 
life for a majority of people, this widespread feeling immunizes modus vivendi 
against the push of people with alternative cultural and ethical lives. In this case, 
the need of political institutions to ensure security may trump the invitation to 
accommodate deep pluralism. In this sense, security and peace may translate modus 
vivendi itself into an important collective value to protect through majoritarianism, 
and the pragmatic appeal to the widespread perception that no better alternative is 
available. Meanwhile, critics and detractors, who contest the prioritizing of modus 
vivendi, may be dismissed as noxious. In this way, majority has a right to make 
decisions that affect the whole society, even if some pockets disagree not only with 
the specific policy proposals, but also with the very legitimating reason for which 
such decisions can aspire to have general validity – the feeling that the present state 
of affairs grants the pursuit of a decent life. 
This a problem for Gray and Horton, and their ambition to offer a political 
response to value conflicts in conditions of deep pluralism. Modus vivendi affects 
the reflexivity of a political order, but it also turns the routines of political 
disagreement into imperfections. Just to mention some examples: religious fervour, 
feeling of communality in associations and groups, political loyalty, antagonism, 
individualism and ultra-libertarianism and the commitment to guard one’s own 
family interest are prominent manifestations of deep pluralism in modern societies, 
which might cause instability without being expressions of wickedness, despotism 
and hate that we might have some reasons to exclude. If modus vivendi 
arrangements come at the price of closing up internal dissonance, Gray and Horton 
should tell us what exactly are the worldviews that allow to negotiation and why. 
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However, this seems to be a breach in the promise to take the reality of deep 
pluralism more seriously than consensus-based liberalism tends to do. 
So, the priority of the good of peace and security taints the imaginative 
potential that a society, in conditions of deep pluralism, can have. In the intentions 
of Gray and Horton, modus vivendi should be responsive to the specific demands 
of diverse social and political contexts.  There are, however, a number of types of 
relationship between elements of the political whole that hardly find their space in 
a society ordered upon modus vivendi arrangements. The majority view that a 
settlement is appropriate enough to ensure everyone a decent life may filter 
contextual, heterodox and unusual expressions of diversity. It also ensures that the 
majority controls public political language. When the case for modus vivendi is 
acknowledged by the majority of individuals, but rejected by newcomers and 
dissenting individuals; modus vivendi depends on a sweeping assertion that all 
individuals somehow benefit from what the majoritarian group considers as 
sufficient conditions for pursuing a decent life. Therefore, the problem is that even 
in the sophisticated accounts of Gray and Horton, the notion of modus vivendi 
depends on too simplified and immaculate a notion of collective interest in 
conditions of rival value systems. In this sense, modus vivendi may govern deep 
pluralism, but it is vulnerable to the objection that it tends to exclude challenges to 
majority views. This is likely to make society blind to new voices that are 
constituent parts of the normality of political exchanges in open, modern, and plural 
societies. 
 
 
4. Modus vivendi with a moral standing 
In a recent attempt to make a case for modus vivendi arrangements without stressing 
the realist contour, Fabien Wendt has advanced an original account of modus 
vivendi arrangements as second-best moral arrangements that secure peace.164 
‘Even if a realist,’ he writes, ‘were to argue that justice is completely irrelevant to 
politics, he will have to adhere to some values that inform this judgement about 
what the morally best modus vivendi arrangement would be in a given situation, at 
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least if he wants to do normative theorising at all’.165 Any theory that involves 
criticism of current states of affairs, critics have argued, is not as realistic as it claims 
to be.166 This seems to be an appropriate objection from two points of view. First, 
the claim that collective arrangements should be found by mapping onto adversarial 
political relationships encapsulates a fundamental normative claim, which directs 
the philosophical gaze towards values conflicts, and it assumes that negotiation and 
bargaining can lead to appropriate collective arrangements. Second, the claim that 
political theory should approach “politics for what it is” seems to be a normative 
claim too. It expresses a normative dimension, according to which “getting politics 
for what it is” is a norm about what we should take political theory to be about. 
When we theorize modus vivendi, Wendt argues, ‘it is not very plausible to bracket 
justice considerations’. As he continues, ‘one may sometimes have good moral 
reasons to try to get a modus vivendi that comes as close as possible to what justice 
(or other moral values) would demand, that is, a modus vivendi that comes as close 
as possible to the morally best arrangements’.167 
Parties, he argues, accept these institutional arrangements by combining two 
moral levels. On the first level, in the light of their moral value, a person configures 
what the best arrangement would be. On the second level, they ponder reasons to 
accept arrangements that fall short of what one regards as the morally best 
arrangement. At this level, public justification, which Wendt conceives as an 
important moral value, determines the spectrum of possible arrangements that, 
despite being different from the individual best arrangement, are acceptable to 
everyone. By accepting one of these arrangements, a person accepts a second-best 
option, which we can call modus vivendi if and only if it secures peace (2016: 357-
8). From the perspective of the party, then, the moral standing of modus vivendi, 
Wendt says, depends on how closely it comes to the morally best arrangements. As 
a result, not all possible second bests are modus vivendi arrangements. If 
institutions violate the values at the first moral level, they do not qualify as modus 
vivendi arrangements. The first level of morality is normative by being evaluative. 
“The arrangement X would be better like Y” might be correct whether or not it has 
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practical import in the public acceptance of one of the second-best options Y1, Y2, 
Y3 and the like.  In other words, modus vivendi arrangements are not alternatives 
to the first-level moral values. Instead, they can be seen as approximations to the 
relevant standard of moral evaluation.168 
For an arrangement to be a modus vivendi, it must secure peace, and it must 
be acceptable.169 Specifically, modus vivendi arrangements, Wendt argues, are 
institutions that people accept because they enable us to live in peace, despite 
disagreement and pluralism. In a pluralistic society, the search for peace motivates 
the constitution of institutions that all can accept. Peace, as the end of collective 
agency, mobilises moral agents to accept one of the second best options; and, once 
modus vivendi arrangements have been established, peace determines an 
intersubjective criterion to judge the value of institutions, and the need for reforms. 
This is because, as Wendt writes, ‘peace is in the interest of (almost) all for several 
reasons’.170 Essentially, Wendt seeks to address the challenge of deep pluralism by 
restricting the required field of uncontroversial agreement to a normative premise 
that he assumes to be endorsed by all persons. However, a question remains: why 
should the pluralist form of our societies be identified more especially with interest 
in the good of peace, rather than with other goods, such as freedom, equality and 
fairness? Here, Wendt’s response recalls John Gray. Namely, all ways of life have 
some common interest in the pursuit of a peaceful life. Individual persons accept 
modus vivendi because they see it as functional to the pursuit of other values, which 
are distinctive of each negotiator’s form of life. In this way, in the philosophical 
deduction of modus vivendi, the dissonance among first person points of view is 
inessential to the affirmation of the communal settlement. The animating purpose 
of the emphasis on deep pluralism is to unleash the normative potential of the only 
kind of argument that matters for modus vivendi to exist: the interest in the good of 
peace. 
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These features, however, make modus vivendi arrangements rely upon a 
strong social ethos rather than on the actual power of citizens to negotiate the terms 
of coexistence from their own perspective. Moreover, the perception of insecurity 
can be employed instrumentally by the majoritarian view to renegotiating the terms 
of modus vivendi arrangements in their favour.171 In the name of widespread 
feelings of insecurity, modus vivendi arrangements can be changed, but the 
majoritarian group is likely to articulate a new modus vivendi, which curtails some 
of the minority group’s existing rights and benefits.172 
Imagine a government, which has been elected through legitimate 
procedures. Imagine also that some minority forces try to resist because such 
government persecutes them in the name of general security, stability, and social 
peace. Against such a clear expression of insecurity, new terms of coexistence 
among different forms of life are to be negotiated. A reading of Wendt suggests that 
majority and minority should articulate second-best arrangements, which are 
publicly justifiable, and ensure a peaceful and stable environment. The horror of a 
life of insecurity and disorder functions as a normalizing mechanism that gives 
everyone a choice. Such choice brings a degree of moral responsibility into the 
acceptance of modus vivendi arrangements, which exceeds the perimeter of one’s 
form of life, and its disposition to accept collectively binding arrangements. 
Individuals realize that the union of different traditions and practices under second-
best publicly justifiable arrangements also relies upon their compliance with the 
equilibrium. Even if parties always have the opportunity to defect, a modus vivendi 
arrangement so conceived tells us that an interest in peace is powerful enough to 
make cooperation work, making, in the end, cooperation the only available option. 
Therefore, a life of insecurity brings about an all-encompassing normativity that 
groups individuals around a kind of ordered life in which all members, as people 
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who accepted modus vivendi arrangements individually, abide by the resulting 
obligations. 
In this way, the worry with internal threats to security, real or perceived, 
occupies a privileged place for modus vivendi to be sustained over time. 
Identification of critical security threats becomes crucial for the strengthening of 
modus vivendi institutions as the best available ongoing sites of negotiation. Either 
in the form of social constructions or as tangible threats, radical challenges may be 
a continuous presence of modus vivendi politics as a direct outcome of the security-
based argument for legitimacy. Peace and security contribute to the construction of 
an intergroup identity among individuals who share such a concern. This common 
argument may provide additional justification to contain forms of resistance against 
the mainstream imagination.173 
In politics, evidence shows that subordinated subsets often find it difficult 
to get their issues recognized as collectively relevant. When most of the relevant 
constituency considers amendments to the existing arrangements unnecessary for 
the collective interest, the risk is that of perpetrating a kind of mechanism that 
leaves some social pockets behind. This problem is not prerogative of modus 
vivendi, but modus vivendi may make reasons for such fracture stronger by drawing 
upon a diffuse, but still partial, self-representation of peace and insecurity. From the 
perspective of modus vivendi with a moral standing, we can expect small 
improvements to collective arrangements when these arrangements do not 
adequately accommodate the contingent and temporary preferences of its 
constituency, but significantly improving substantive elements of modus vivendi 
arrangements requires that previously excluded groups accept widespread 
conditions for peace and security. However, this is often one of the most pressing 
objects of disagreement. This suggests that, even in Wendt, modus vivendi inserts 
a conservative bias in the attempt to accommodate the fact of deep pluralism. It 
neglects that perception of insecurity is an arbitrary feeling, which, if used as source 
of legitimacy for political power, may tend to exclude not only radical challenges 
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confrontation, social movements need to consolidate their oppositional consciousness, which sustains enduring 
mobilization, challenges to those in power, and, sometimes, threats for widespread security (Costain 1992; 
Gamson 1975).  
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and minorities, but also avant-gardes that, despite progressive intents, use heterodox 
political practices. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that there is an under-investigated conservative bias 
in modus vivendi as a device to accommodate the fact of deep pluralism. In the case 
of Modus Vivendi Liberalism, I have argued that modus vivendi is a valid stratagem 
to make the liberal state justifiable to the eyes of critic citizens that are subject to it. 
However, this same theoretical move may silence their demands for change, and 
legitimize coercion that they in practice reject. Wendt advances a sophisticated 
version of modus vivendi arrangements, which enables us to identify neatly the 
moral ground for acceptance of these institutions. However, the idea that the 
protection of security and peace is a sine qua non of modus vivendi arrangements 
sustains a normalizing ethos. Given the fact that Wendt wants to provide us with a 
general framework to examine modus vivendi arrangements, such a remark is not 
necessarily problematic for him. However, from my point of view, it strengthens 
the argument that modus vivendi arrangements have an inclination to exclude 
radical challenges to mainstream views. 
For long time, however, modus vivendi has been a realist prerogative. 
Realist political theory treats the antithesis between liberal orders of values and 
non-liberal orders of values as a synecdoche for political relations in modern 
societies that are deeply plural. Such agonistic components, they say, must be 
managed and balanced through modus vivendi solutions. Otherwise, apparently 
intractable value disagreements may percolate into ordinary social relations and 
they may ruin society altogether. This way of containing disagreement, however, 
exposes some population to exclusion and maybe repression. If some individuals 
are powerful enough to simply dominate the negotiation, modus vivendi will not be 
only the equilibrium among analogous competing reasons, but, rather, the 
monopoly of certain sectarian values and the prudential reasons that are inspired by 
those values.   
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Modus vivendi theorists seem to tell us that social and political 
arrangements cannot ground on a universal normativity because there is too much 
diversity in our society and that modus vivendi is the best that we can have. They 
defend arrangements that find their legitimacy in the social peace they are able to 
guarantee. However, perception of peace and security is partial and dependent on 
one’s standpoint. If the standpoint of the majority is simply moved, from the 
articulation of principles to the perception of how satisfying a life is according to 
modus vivendi, there is not so much to gain from modus vivendi in conditions of 
deep pluralism. The contingent and evolving character of modus vivendi would also 
remain in the hands of those people who already have stronger powers to negotiate. 
In this way, the problem to specify the terms of peaceful coexistence is translated 
into an equilibrium that leaves contestation and resistance at the margins. 
Otherwise, in order to ensure a modus vivendi that secures a peaceable political 
accommodation of pluralism, modus vivendi theorists must presume that all parties 
are prepared to mediate with one another. Nevertheless, in the assumption of all the 
varieties of modus vivendi (deep pluralism), we see that the political environment 
in which parties are asked to balance their values is exactly the kind of domain in 
which at least one party is not prepared to mediate his or her own interests. 
In this chapter, it has become increasingly evident that an overemphasis on 
peace and security has the consequence of significantly empowering majority views 
at the expense of not only despotic and authoritarian worldviews, but also 
marginalized groups, and dissenting individuals. An investigation of the connection 
between the assumption of deep pluralism and the transversal commitment with 
peace and security suggests that modus vivendi political theory should more 
carefully examine the influence of modus vivendi arrangements on minorities. 
More generally, we can argue from the chapter, this burgeoning body of research 
should supplement the focus on compromise and negotiations with a structural 
analysis of the conditions in which modus vivendi arrangements are made. 
Reconstructing patterns of political inclusion and exclusion is key to understanding 
whether and how modus vivendi accommodates the deep pluralism of modern 
society. This chapter concludes the first part of my dissertation. So far, I have 
argued that both consensus-based political liberalism and modus vivendi theory are 
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exclusionary. Common to the two approaches, there is the idea that pluralism is a 
monolithic factual element in the theory. For Rawls, this way of approaching 
pluralism leads to two demarcations: between citizens and non-citizens, between 
reasonable citizens and citizens that are not recognizably reasonable. For modus 
vivendi theory, the emphasis on the conflicting character of the fact of pluralism 
neglects unbalances of power, hidden forms of marginalization, and it is likely to 
have a majority bias. With this critical work in mind, in the second part of this work, 
I shall construct a non-exclusionary political theory, by drawing upon the 
philosophical tradition of perspectivism. 
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II 
THE RIGHT TO HAVE A SAY 
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Chapter 4 
Perspectivism in political theory 
 
 
 
The aims of this chapter are to investigate the philosophical rationale, normative 
architecture and political prospects of a perspectivist political theory. A certain 
amount of construction is required to talk of “perspectivism” or the “perspectivitst 
tradition”, as most of the theorists to whom we tend to refer do not understand 
themselves to be part of such a unified theoretical movement. The term 
“perspectivism” groups, under the same theoretical category, philosophical 
endeavours, which are different in their spirit, ambition and field of inquiry. If we 
go back to the Renaissance, as well documented by Erwin Panofsky in Perspective 
as symbolic form, the term ‘perspectivism’ denotes all those attempts, from 
Leonardo to Albrecht Durer and Leon Battista Alberti, to theorize a technique for 
representing how an object or set of objects would appear if viewed from a single 
point of vision.174 Now, “perspectivism” is a buzzword which means general 
scepticism about the search for a single truth.175 Meanwhile, common usage 
associates “perspectivism” with the idea that objects look different depending upon 
the perspective from which they are viewed.176 The term “perspectivism” also 
indicates a group of philosophical accounts that try to find plausible ways to 
combine individual differences without compromising the distinctive aspects of 
each perspective.177 On this view, which, as I argue in this chapter, is well-typified 
                                                          
174 See Leon Battista Alberti, On Painting (London: Penguin, 1991). See also Jane Campbell Hutchinson, 
Albrecht Durer: a guide to research (London: Routledge, 2000). 
175 See Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as a Philosopher (New York City: Columbia University Press, 2005). For a 
critique to this interpretation and an excellent overview of perspectivism, see James Conant, “The Dialectic of 
Perspectivism I,” SATS 7(1) (2005): 5-50. See also James Conant, “The Dialectic of Perspectivism II,” SATS 
7(1): 6-57. 
176 Conant 2005. 
177 This label groups a variety of different accounts in philosophy of sciences, epistemology, metaphysics and 
phenomenology. In the philosophy of science, see Ronald Giere, Scientific Perspectivism (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2006). In epistemology, see Bou Mou, Substantive Perspectivism: an essay on philosophical 
concern with truth (Heidelberg: Springer, 2009). However, central to the understanding of perspectivism are 
the works of G. W. Leibniz, the late Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. G.W. Leibniz, Discours de 
Métaphysique (Paris: Vrin 2016). Nicholas Rescher (ed.), G.W. Leibniz’s Monadology (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh 
University Press, 1992). See also Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: an introduction to phenomenology 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960).  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception (London: 
Routledge, 2002).  
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by Leibniz’s metaphor of the city, the construction of objective representations is 
the sum of individual attempts to access the same external object. 
 
Is it possible to think of a political theory that is consistent with the same 
argumentative line?  This research question, which I shall address in this chapter, 
regards the demonstration that such kind of theorizing may have its dignity in 
contemporary political theory. This is certainly not a very powerful claim. However, 
a positive answer includes a challenge to a commonplace assumption of today’s 
liberal and democratic political theory:  no theories of how to deal with deep 
differences can include each and every difference. If persuasive to the reader, a 
perspectivist political theory is an account that argues for including each and every 
difference. Specifically, a perspectivist political theory has a distinctive normative 
architecture that implies an equal-status-granting condition and a condition for 
inclusion. In this way, all potential perspective-holders, regardless of who they are, 
the knowledge they know to have, and what they say, are granted access to objects 
of public concern – irrespective of the nature of such objects. 
 
So, the right to access an object is crucial. This claim has two components. 
First, the fundamental normative worry regards the juncture in which a person tries 
to have a say on public affairs of her concern. This means to think of arrangements 
that allow a person to approach public affairs in her own way when other 
individuals, maybe with contrasting perspectives, can do the same. Second, the 
subject-object relationship is central. The entitlement to access external objects 
does not, for example, imply that, irrespective of their referent, the same 
perspectives count the same vis-à-vis different public issues. A perspectivist 
political theory holds that the equal-status-granting condition is conditional on a 
person having a perspective towards the object of public concern, and that this 
perspective regards that specific object. 
 
Viewing pluralism through the lens of perspectivism has a distinct 
advantage: by focusing on the individual relationship with public affairs, a 
perspectivist political theory commends processes giving participatory standing to 
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all those who have a concern with a public issue. It also disputes existing barriers 
and borders that frustrate participation. To substantiate this argument, the chapter 
shall proceed as follows. In the next section, by deconstructing the term “fact of 
pluralism”, I shall define the philosophical rationale for a perspectivist political 
theory. When we take pluralism too readily as a fact, the risk is that of overly 
focusing on ways to manage, overcome, contain, and survive such diversity. But 
pluralism denotes also a relation which connects several individuals (but not 
necessarily all of them) who deliberate about the same things in different ways. If 
we think of pluralism as a relation, one of the central normative concerns, therefore, 
is to determine how and why someone can access such a relation. By elucidating 
the architecture and the political prospects of a perspectivist political theory, section 
3 and section 4 shall give the perspectivist response to such a concern. Whereas the 
almost universally accepted view thinks that pluralism is an expression that includes 
all the worldviews that are present in a society, a perspectivist political theory to the 
contrary doubts this assumption, and makes the opportunity to make one’s  visible 
difference an object of normative concern. Section 5, eventually, shall conclude the 
chapter. 
 
 
2. Pluralism as a fact, pluralism as a relation 
The issue in question is the “fact of pluralism”. The “fact of pluralism” is a complex 
and multi-layered expression that plays an important role in contemporary political 
philosophy. A commitment with pluralism is, Richard Flathman writes, ‘however 
transitory or transitional, as a descriptive/analytic theory involves the belief that, 
here and now, such a multiplicity cannot be explained away’ (2005: 1).178 Often, 
this multiplicity is the sum of competing and conflicting values. Therefore, as Peter 
Lassman adds, pluralism is not only the descriptive thesis that values are plural but 
instead has a fundamental adversarial connotation: namely, ‘the worry here is that 
cases of value conflict are often strongly resistant to clear-cut or rational resolution’ 
(2011: 4).179 Pluralism, people argue, affirms that values are incommensurable, but 
                                                          
178 See also, John Skorupski (1996: 101). 
179 See also, Peter Lassman (2005). On this point see John Gray (2002). 
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also that there is a perpetual rivalry among them. Disagreement, therefore, is the 
indication that there are different moral outputs in the same society. Such a 
disagreement can be “reasonable”, “ineradicable”, “agonistic”, “ongoing”, and the 
like. However, regardless of its connotations, political philosophers think of 
pluralism as a compelling problem because it challenges hypothetical unanimity of 
opinion and moral harmony.180 
In this vein, the observation that a person lives together with a 
heterogeneous and diverse constellation of moral agents serves the philosophical 
argument according to which ongoing disagreement is a distinctive feature of our 
societies. The philosophical investigation on pluralism therefore becomes the study 
of the best ways to deal with the modes of this fundamental disagreement.181 The 
possibility that there are different values is not the first centre of analysis, instead 
the nature of the combination of different values in the same space, and the 
organization of the consequent mix of interests, beliefs, thoughts, and deeds has 
been the canonical objects of investigation in Western contemporary political 
theory. As a result, pluralism works as an assumption. Under these lenses, political 
theory begins with pluralism as an obvious element that a theoretical argument must 
consider. ‘The experience of conflict of evidences,’ as Stuart Hampshire writes, ‘is 
universally shared and cannot be avoided. … Alongside the undeniable evils of 
domination and of procedural justice denied, other moral values are in principle 
open to challenge in liberal societies, even those that are strongly supported by the 
public opinion of that time’.182 In this sense, to borrow from John Rawls’ famous 
words, pluralism is a fact.183 
 
Something can be a fact in many ways; firstly it can be factually true. 
Namely, it exists and the relevant audience knows such a thing to be undeniably 
                                                          
180 It is important to notice that such a challenge does not have necessarily negative consequences. For a number 
of theorists, the search for consensus sanitises the poietic character of adversarial disagreement. See Bonnie 
Honig (1993). See also Chantal Mouffe (2003). 
181 It is important to notice that disagreement may occur also in a monistic order, which tries to reduce all goods 
to the same metrics. Hierarchical ordering of values can be source of conflicts even if all human beings conform 
to the same framework.   
 
182 Richard E. Flathman, Pluralism and Liberal Democracy (Baltimore, NJ: Johns Hopkins Press, 2005), 65-6. 
183 See Rawls 2005, 24, 36, 63-4. See also Larmore 1987, 43-44. Against the connection between pluralism and 
liberalism from a conservative point of view, see Kekes 1992a, Kekes 1992b and Talisse, 2010. 
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true. A fact can also be a contingent occurrence in a series of other events, which 
do not necessarily link with one another. In this connotation, usually, we employ 
fact a posteriori. A fact is something that happened that we want to tell others about. 
A fact is also a proof, which people may use as evidence for a certain judgement. A 
fact also is an occurrence that we study for its historical consequences. From a 
different point of view, a fact is the result of common sense, like a socially 
constructed belief that we accept without questioning. Vis-à-vis such a variety of 
connotations, what do we mean by saying that pluralism is a fact?  For Western 
contemporary political theory, the “fact of pluralism” stands at the intersection 
between two different observations. First, it is something that exists, so visible that 
we accept it without questioning. Second, the fact of pluralism is a construction of 
people who live, as free and equal, in a democratic society.184 Isaiah Berlin stresses 
that pluralism seems a true and mundane feature, true because it describes that 
human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry 
with one another.185 The fact of pluralism marks, Rawls also tells us, democratic 
society.186 Such a plurality of different doctrines is the result of the work of public 
reason over time under free institutions.187 As he puts it, ‘the political culture of a 
democratic society is always marked by a diversity of opposing and irreconcilable 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines’.188 
 
So, pluralism is a fact because people constructed it by expressing the 
outcomes of moral deliberations freely up to the point in which such a diversity has 
become so evident to be taken as undeniably true. As a fact, pluralism is something 
that no potential readers of a theory can deny. It plays the role of a conceptual 
artefact that describes an aspect of the reality, one that a cogent theory must take 
into account. It is an observation of the state of affairs, which is considered to be so 
                                                          
184 Rawls 2005, 63-4. 
185 Isaiah Berlin, “The Pursuit of the Ideal,” in H. Hardy and Roger Hausheer (eds.), The Proper Study of 
Mankind (New York: Ferrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003). Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: 
Chapters in the History of Ideas (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013). See also Steven Lukes, 
Liberals and Cannibals: The implication of Diversity (London: Verso Books, 2003). 
 
186 Rawls 2005, 63-4. It is important to notice that Rawls clearly differentiates between the fact of pluralism as 
such and the fact of reasonable pluralism. This distinction does not undermine my considerations on the factual 
character of pluralism. Rawls 2005, 36. 
187 Ivi, 36.  
188 Ivi, 64. 
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obvious to be like a fact. It is the result of the exercise of human faculties. People 
also see it as the output of a kind of human development that is an inherent part of 
liberal societies. Regardless of the point of view you decide to take, it is important 
to notice that the myriad of versions of the fact of pluralism recognizes descriptive 
power to this notion. Such a descriptive power can take into account different 
connotations and can serve specific normative ambitions. However, since all these 
accounts consider pluralism as a fact, they also rely upon a common underlying 
assumption: that pluralism is something that truly exists. People, who have different 
interests and conceptions of the good, think, believe, and act differently. 
 
Through individual thoughts, beliefs, and deeds, pluralism turns out to be 
an evident attribute of the liberal democratic society under consideration. When we 
think that pluralism exists because members of a certain society affirm their views, 
we notice that pluralism, in order to be a fact for all possible members of society 
and readers of a theory, must have a perceptible articulation. This means to say that, 
beyond the abstract usage as a term of art, philosophers consider pluralism to be 
visible. It is actual and real, so vividly clear that political theorists can take it for 
granted. Nevertheless, if we focus on the visibility-dimension of the fact of 
pluralism, we can observe another fundamental aspect. The term “fact of pluralism” 
expresses the differences between all worldviews that people display to one another. 
For instance, despite, in moral philosophy, it may fall under the rubric of pluralism, 
the internal deliberation of the person, who ponders the variety of goods that are 
worthy in the pursuit of a satisfying human life, seems not to be a sufficient 
condition for pluralism to exist as a fact. We can have many moral agents who 
deliberate on different values simultaneously. If they do not make the result of their 
deliberations noticeable to other people, and these results are different from one 
another, it is implausible to think of pluralism as a fact. Meanwhile, without this 
difference having the quality of being actual and recognizable, someone may deny 
the non-disputable-character of “the fact of pluralism”. 
 
The confidence that pluralism is a fact alludes to the idea that the experience 
of diversity is a natural phenomenon of this world. Here we find the idea that the 
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term “fact of pluralism” should rest, so far as possible, on our individual experience. 
However, the compresence of different worldviews is not only a combination of 
doctrines in a given time, It also denotes the quality of being present together.  
Additionally it denotes a state of affairs in which at least two social, religious, ethnic 
and racial groups maintain their special interests, and these interests cause 
differences in opinion on relevant matters. There is, therefore, one good reason to 
reserve the term pluralism for meaning the relation for which individuals with 
different worldviews engage with similar problems, so that their differences are 
something that we can experience unquestionably as an inherent feature of the 
society where we live. 
 
The reflection on the ostensible character that pluralism takes for us in a 
given time is not simply a point of descriptive clarity. For this chapter, what is really 
of significance is that the belief in pluralism as a fact has arisen from a series of 
disagreements in which individuals with different worldviews have made their 
thoughts explicit so that, for all potential philosophical audience, their diversity is 
so obvious as to be undisputable. Inherent in this observation there is another 
important point; some individuals may have worldviews that never have had the 
chance to be visible. These two observations emphasize a guiding thread of my 
argument. Namely, in political theory, it is common place to assume that the “fact 
of pluralism” and the public airing of all possible worldviews in a society are the 
same thing. This is, however, not the case. By considering pluralism as a relation, 
we are able to cast light upon this important mismatch. The term “fact of pluralism” 
rests essentially on recognizable differences among worldviews that have disagreed 
with other worldviews at least once in the history of the society. However, for such 
a holistic philosophical expression, to be descriptive, the set of worldviews should 
include all those forms of life, including silent, marginalized, undiscovered, or 
voiceless forms of life.189 It is not obvious at all that, since people with different 
worldviews happen to live in the same society, they are necessarily among those 
                                                          
189 This claim does not hold true for conceptions of pluralism as “reasonable,” which explicitly circumscribe 
the range of action within reasonable people. Rawls 2005, 36.  In such a case, to be descriptive, reasonable 
pluralism as a fact should include all reasonable comprehensive doctrines. On this point, see Enoch 2015.  
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worldviews that we consider as constitutive components of pluralism. Some 
worldviews may remain hidden at the margins of pluralism as if they did not exist. 
This is often the claim of social movements and marginalized people that oppose 
downgrading, ostracism, and the exclusionary character of collectively constructed 
common-sense-narratives.190 
 
Therefore, when deconstructing the term “fact of pluralism” we 
acknowledge that this expression does not describe a succession of worldviews 
only, but, rather, it epitomizes a specific relation. Pluralism is a relation that brings 
together several people because they have made their differences with each other 
visible. It does so in a way that makes them like a group of related parts, which, 
even if divided by irremediable disagreements, through their interaction, are 
functional for the consolidation of the perception of pluralism as a fact. 
 
So, individuals with different worldviews do not create pluralism 
voluntarily. As beings in the world, people interact with one another and they 
happen to advance their own perspectives on matters. By doing so, they exchange 
ideas, thoughts and beliefs on common objects of concern. When these exchanges 
reveal differences between individuals, and these differences persist in several 
interactions about other issues, they contribute to give the impression that this 
contrast is a part of the society. In relational terms, therefore, pluralism denotes that 
two or more people, who would otherwise stand as single entities, are in 
disagreement on certain issues. 
 
By stressing the relational element, we are able to see how the perception of 
pluralism is contingent to the development of a certain social reality, and its 
manifestation as a visible fact is a resultant of the configuration of interactions 
within a certain society. At the same time, as a relation, pluralism is the result of 
multiple forms of agency. People enter into the relation by expressing their 
                                                          
190 Rajeev Bhargava, “Overcoming the Epistemic Injustice of Colonialism,” Global Policy 4(4): 413-17. Frantz 
Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York City: Grove Press, 2008). Gail Omvelt, Dalit Visions: the anti-
caste movement and the construction of an Indian Identity (Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2006). See also Spivak 
2012. 
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worldview in public. They expand the relation by listening to new worldviews. 
They also struggle to take part in such a relationship when other members seem not 
to be willing to recognize someone else as a relevant part in the business of giving 
and receiving beliefs and thoughts.191 The efforts to determine one’s own identity, 
the pursuit of self-rule, and exchanges with other worldview-holders broaden the 
relational galaxy of pluralism. 
 
When we consider pluralism as a relation, we move the critical focus of 
inquiry. In contemporary political theory, predominant efforts try to reconcile the 
phenomenal observation that pluralism is an unavoidable element of our lives with 
suitable principles of coexistence. However at the heart of these attempts, there is 
the assumption that people are active components of such a heterogeneous unity. It 
is simply that, if individuals want, they can participate in symmetry. Much of the 
philosophical concern is then devoted to finding ways to build a balance between 
institutions and individuals according to such diversity.192 By beginning with the 
belief that pluralism is a relation, in turn, I am questioning the assumption that all 
individuals are somehow active components of pluralism. As I have argued in this 
section, pluralism is a transitory result of the interaction of those people who have 
had the opportunity to make their worldviews, and the relative differences between 
them, explicit to one another, and to us. But such an opportunity is not 
unquestionably accessible for all. Specifically, I have argued that in the 
consideration of pluralism as a factual assumption, political theorists tend to 
underestimate another factual element. Namely, some individuals cannot make their 
differences visible, and, consequently, the “fact of pluralism” is a term that has a 
partial descriptive power. 
 
With this problem in mind, I have defended the idea that, before 
constructing political and social arrangements that are in agreement with the fact of 
pluralism, it is important to defend an a priori normative entitlement. This 
entitlement should grant all individuals access to a public issue of their concern. On 
                                                          
191 Elizabeth Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?,” Ethics 109 (2) (1999): 312-3. Young 1990. 
192 Horton 2010. Horton 2011.  
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this observation, in the next sections, I argue that a perspectivist political theory has 
the normative architecture to entitle a perspective-holder to access all objects of 
public concern without distinction. Such a standpoint enables me to illuminate an 
important normative juncture. From the exchanges among people with different 
worldviews, the focal point of normative theorizing about pluralism, then, shifts to 
the moment in which a person tries to become visible by approaching an issue of 
public concern in the light of the worldview he or she knows to have. 
 
 
 3. What is perspectivism 
In the following section, I am going to suggest that a perspectivist political 
theory can offer a normative argument that systematises dissolution and formation 
of the boundaries of pluralism. In political theory, as we have seen, there is a 
widespread idea of what pluralism means. As such, the most important problem is 
not that of identifying its genesis and changes but instead constructing sound ways 
to manage a situation in which different worldviews are together in the same 
society. However, if we confine ourselves to this kind of philosophical inquiry, and 
leave out the many incidents that shape pluralism as we see it, pluralism is almost 
supposed to be a monolithic and unproblematized assumption – a fact. By resisting 
such a diffuse understanding, I aim to focus on disagreements. Disagreements are 
caused by people having different opinions about something, and, as we saw earlier, 
they cause such difference to be visible and, for some theorists, ineradicable. It is 
the assumption of this chapter that, for pluralism to be visible and recognizable as 
a fact, there must be an observable difference among worldviews.193 From this 
starting point, I shall explain why the perspectivist approach to disagreements 
justifies a distinctive normative argument about pluralism. Perspectivism defends a 
general entitlement to access objects of disagreement. Consequently, all kinds of 
exclusion from accessing such objects are violations of this fundamental normative 
requirement. But the defence of this claim is for later. Now, we have to be clear 
about what perspectivism is. 
 
                                                          
193 Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch. 7. 
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The classic definition of perspectivism as the philosophical view that all 
ideations happen from particular perspectives is often taken to imply radical 
relativism about truth and scepticism concerning grand theorizing in general. It is 
all too easy reading perspectivism in this way and getting the impression that reality 
is fictional, objective facts are constructions and beliefs are so contextually 
embedded not to be worthy of comparison with one another. In such reading, 
perspectivism comes to characterize a naïve philosophical tradition according to 
which different things are true for different people at different times. An alternative 
reading shows that perspectivism is essentially a philosophy of disagreement, 
whose fundamental concern is to defend the compresence of different perspectives 
of the same thing despite their fundamental differences. What matters is the idea 
that disagreements seem capable of sustaining a number of different and contrasting 
perspectives simultaneously.194 On this view, as a philosophy of disagreement, 
perspectivism recognizes the singularity of the individual and the partiality of his 
or her position in the world as the starting point for the representation (construction) 
of a referent that is shared by more than one entity, which has an active (perhaps 
only potentially active) role or produces a specified effect. 
 
The essence of perspectivism is best captured by two widely known passages 
from Leibniz’s Monadology, which have inspired much of the work in this tradition 
all over the twentieth century. Cities and points of views, simplicity and 
multiplicity, diversity and harmony were very much on his mind since as early as 
1669.195 ‘Now,’ Leibniz writes 
This interlinkage or accommodation of all created things to each other, 
and of each to all the others, bring it about that each simple substance 
has relations that express all the others, and is in consequence a 
perpetual living mirror of the universe.196 
 
The discourse continues in the immediately following paragraph:. ‘And as one and 
the same town viewed from different sides looks altogether different,’ he says 
                                                          
194 Giere 2006. 
195 For a historical reconstruction, see Maria Rosa Antognazza, Leibniz: An intellectual biography (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). Christia Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics: its origins and development 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Massimo Mugnai, Introduzione alla filosofia di Leibniz 
(Torino: Einaudi, 2001). 
196 G.W. Leibniz, Monadology (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1991), §56.  
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And is, as it were perspectivally multiplied, it similarly happens that, 
through the infinite multitude of simple substances, there are, as it were, 
just as many different universes, which however are only the 
perspective of a single one according to the different points of view of 
each monad’.197 
 
We can count as many as sixty-nine picturesque analogies in the 
Monadology.198 A work that, according to Leibniz, should be a rational exfoliation 
of the geometric mode of reasoning. Nevertheless, his way of bringing to mind a 
fabric of analogies as systemic structures filled with mathematical rigor is a 
remarkable illustration of the Baroque era’s predilection for unity in diversity, folds, 
coherence and complexity.199 It is also, first and foremost, a resource of 
comprehensive, detailed and self-standing explanatory systems.200 This helps to 
investigate the two passages, as synecdoche for perspectivism as a whole, in 
isolation from the rest of Leibniz’s metaphysical discourse, with its own several 
open questions. 
 
Following Leibniz, ‘I experience the world,’ Edmund Husserl writes, ‘as an 
intersubjective world, actually there for everyone … And yet each has his 
experience’.201 If read in continuity with the two passages from the Monadology, 
Husserl helps me to clarify why perspectivism is a philosophy of disagreement. 
Perspectivism is a way of rethinking the compresence of different perspective-
holders in the light of their relationship with the referent they have in common. If 
we pause on the analogy between the town viewed from different sides, the different 
perspectives of the same universe, and the experience of the intersubjective world, 
they all have in common the same line of argument. The plurality of perspectives 
does not generate an undesirable relativism because the compatibility of different 
perspectives is understood as a consequence of all observations being observations 
of one identical thing. Moreover, in Leibniz’s usage of the analogy of the city, the 
                                                          
197 Ivi, §57. 
198 Nicholas Rescher, “Leibniz’s use of analogies and principles,” in Nicholar Rescher (ed), G.W. Leibniz’s 
Monadology (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1991), 37-44. 
199 Gilles Deleuze, The Fold. Leibniz and the Baroque (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992). 
200 Rescher 1991. 
201 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An introduction to phenomenology (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1960), 91. 
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visual object is there and, through its multiple facets, works as a common 
denominator that is included in all perspectives.202 So, there is a referent, which 
several perspective-holders will have a perspective on. All perspectives are equally 
valid representations of the same thing, which seems somehow different when 
viewed from separate point of view. 
 
If we pause on the representation of several perspective-holders that have a 
perspective of the same city, it is not difficult to think of this as an image of 
disagreement. The core of the perspectivist project is the idea that different viewers 
as producers of perspectives disagree about aspects relevant to their picture of the 
referent. In this vein, when returning to Leibniz and Husserl, what really matters is 
the balance between the belief that disagreement is a relation capable of sustaining 
several perspective-holders with different perspectives of the same thing 
simultaneously and the individual presumption of having the correct representation 
of the object. For Leibniz, it is as if all representations were of many different 
universes. Namely, from each individual point of view, the resulting perspective is 
what the universe stands for. The city multiplies because for each viewer his or her 
perspective is the only correct perspective of the city. However, all these accounts, 
with Leibniz’s words, ‘are only perspectives of a single one’. The word “only” 
emphasises the variation between what individual perspective aims to be (the 
correct representation of the entire universe), and what they actually are (a partial 
component of a general representation of the same universe). From a perspectivist 
point of view, the point is to demonstrate that we cannot outline a univocal way to 
look at an object, and that the objective referent translates the subjective attitude 
towards something into an element of a general attempt to experience the external 
world as it is. The truthful representation should be something when collectively 
constructed, by associating different and partial perspectives with one another, 
transcends the contextual constraints of each perspective.203 This means to construct 
a combined and non-natural complex representation in which the inherent finitude 
                                                          
202 Robert M Adams, “Phenomenalism and Corporeal Substance in Leibniz,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8 
(1) (1983): 217–257. Donald Rutherford, “Leibniz's ‘Analysis of Multitude and Phenomena into Unities and 
Reality,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 28 (1990): 525–552. 
203 Giere 2006. Timothy D. Hackenberg “Realism without Truth: A Review of Giere’s Science without Laws 
and Scientific Perspectivism”, Journal of Experimental Analysis of Behavior 91 (3) (2009), 393. 
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of each perspective (spatially and temporally situated) is surpassed by putting 
different perspectives one after the other as if there were a continuity across them. 
In this way, different perspectives are like a portion of an all-encompassing 
architecture and, as such, they are functional for one another, despite their intrinsic 
differences. 
 
So, perspectives show different aspects of how-things-are and each 
perspective of a city may be a viewer’s best attempt to get this city as it is from her 
vantage point (Bouquiaux 2006; Stengers 2006). The city, in other words, is an 
example of a worldly state of affairs that can act as the best example of the presumed 
way to get things right from a particular point of view. In this way, my argument 
has been that perspectivism is a particular kind of philosophy of disagreement. It 
involves not only an object of disagreement but also the belief that different and 
maybe competing perspectives of the same object have the same claim for validity. 
The account offered so far supports the claim that a perspective-holder-referent 
relationship is constitutive of this tradition. But stressing this nexus against 
scepticism does little to establish its content as a political theory. In the next section, 
I argue that perspectivism has a characteristically normative architecture that 
substantiates everyone’s claim to access external objects. In its most basic form, the 
idea is that a perspectivist political theory provides all possible perspective-holders 
with an entitlement to claim their due position in the disagreements that are of their 
concern. 
 
 
4. Perspectivism in political theory 
Popular philosophical knowledge says that, according to philosophers in this 
tradition, all perspectives of the external world are determined by what an agent 
knows, his or her position to know, and available knowledge. Less commonplace 
knowledge among political philosophers is the normative justification for such 
compresence of different, and sometime conflicting, perspectives of the same thing. 
In reality, at the heart of perspectivism, there is an equal-status-granting condition 
and a condition for inclusion. The combination of these two conditions sustains the 
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belief that, when perspective-holders have the same referent, there is no possible 
perspective that can count more than others do. In this way, perspectivism is built 
upon the interplay of a condition of entitlement (“all perspective-holders can 
participate”) and a condition for inclusion (“all perspectives that count must have 
the same referent”). In this section, I argue that a perspectivist political theory is a 
political theory that defends these two conditions. 
 
Before reconstructing the two conditions, let me pause on the definition of 
perspective. A perspective is a way of rendering an object that is intended to capture 
a certain aspect of this object (O), and to explain the object in terms of the qualities 
of that aspect. It is important to notice that this conventional definition of 
perspective does not provide us with a single criterion of appropriateness. It 
describes a relation that links a referent with an act of cognition, whose agent-
relative content depends on something that is already integral to the agent – what 
the agent knows that she knows. Specifically, John has a perspective on O when he 
has a particular attitude towards something. John’s perspective on O denotes one 
way of rendering the object, and does not exclude the possibility of other agent-
relative particular attitudes towards O. In this way, P is a perspective of O for John 
if John knows that P pertains to O, or has agent-relative evidence that P pertains to 
O. Considering that this attitude is relative to one’s relationship with O, it might be 
the case that these individual attitudes contradict with one another. So, several Johns 
may have such an attitude at the same time. Moreover, this definition of perspective 
makes another familiar idea explicit. A perspective does not depend on all the 
knowledge there is but only on the knowledge that John knows himself to have. 
There is, therefore, knowledge that falls outside a perspective P, or that is implicit 
to it, but this does not fall within a perspective-relative reason unless the agent 
knows that such knowledge is within P. Such knowledge is not part of John’s 
relevant knowledge to P, but it might be part of other people’s relevant knowledge 
to P1, P2, and the like. At the same time, the knowledge that John knows himself 
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to have may be unavailable to other people, even if it is fundamental for his 
perspective on O.204 
 
With these preliminary observations in hand, in what follows I try to 
substantiate my claim that perspectivism is built upon two fundamental conditions. 
To do so, I return to the two passages of Leibniz’s Monadology. Infinite simple 
substances, Leibniz tells us, can occasion infinite versions of the same universe. 
Despite being different, he continues, these infinite versions are ultimately 
representations of the same thing that are comparable with one another because, 
without distinction, all these representations are universes. In other words, out of 
metaphor, A) perspectives are perspectives of the same thing, and B) all 
perspectives are different because they express a characteristic relationship between 
substances and the universe. Together, A and B offer us a description of the 
relationship that connects different perspectives and their referent in those accounts 
that we tend to classify under the rubric “perspectivism”. Specifically, all subjects 
can access the referent in their own way, and the resulting perspectives are different 
from one another in a relevant way. This feature, however, leaves unproblematized 
the conceptual precondition that sustains this kind of argument. By bringing to light 
such an implicit layer, we are able to single out the first condition. 
 
It is, therefore, necessary to begin with a fundamental question. Why, 
despite having the different knowledge that they know to have, can perspective-
holders access the same referent on an equal footing? In fact, if all perspectives are 
different relationships between a perspective-holder and the external referent so 
that, in the case of Leibniz, all simple substances can characterize the same universe 
in their own ways, there must be a prior justification for these perspectives being 
together around the same referent regardless of what the perspective-holders know 
of the universe. What follows is the normative postulation that characterizes 
perspectivism quintessentially: an equal-status-granting condition ensures all 
potential perspective-holders stipulate a relationship with external objects inspired 
                                                          
204 For an analogous definition of perspective, see Jonathan Way and Daniel Whiting, “Perspectivism and the 
Argument from Guidance,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 0(0) (2016): 1-14. 
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by what they know themselves to know.  In other words, there are several 
perspectives of the same thing, and these perspectives are different and count the 
same, because Leibniz, and perspectivism in general, assumes as a normative 
precondition that each perspective-holder can access each object, regardless of the 
kind of knowledge he or she knows themselves to have. 
 
In this way, such a normativity does not define what a perspective should 
look like, but the idea is that of creating a general justification for opening a certain 
object to the largest possible spectrum of potential perspective-holders, who, each 
according to the knowledge he or she knows themselves to have, has an agentive-
relative attitude towards the object. In the vocabulary of political philosophy, the 
above means to concentrate the normative attention on the individual relationship 
between a person and an external issue rather than considering how to combine 
several perspectives that have different contents. When all perspectives are taken to 
be dependent on the knowledge a person knows herself to have, it is notoriously 
problematic to draw any clear line between kinds of perspectives that are 
supposedly more compatible with one another and those are not. For perspectivism, 
it can be decently supposed that there is no legitimation for such a line. It is 
precisely because it is crucial to begin with the normative precondition that all 
potential perspective-holders are entitled to access external objects, make their 
perspectives available to others, and, consequently, mark their differences. 
 
The discovery of the equal-status-granting condition shows that, at the heart 
of perspectivism, deeper than the claim in favour of knowledge from everywhere, 
there is an implicit normative assumption to entitle different perspective-holders so 
that they can access external objects without arbitrary distinctions. All this, of 
course, is equally true for a perspectivist political theory. Actually, the thought that 
all perspective-holders have an identical and unconditional entitlement to access 
the object of disagreement contradicts with one of the fundamental stipulations of 
today’s political theory. Namely, the confidence that no theories regarding how to 
deal with deep differences can include any and every difference. Against such a 
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belief, the reconstruction of the equal-status-granting condition leaves room for an 
argument of the following form. 
 
A perspectivist political theory is a normative account that organizes 
individuals, as different perspective-holders, in the light of a fundamental condition. 
Such condition stipulates that all potential perspective-holders must be able to 
stipulate a relationship within certain objects in the light of the knowledge they 
know themselves to have. To do so, firstly we should give up the assumption that 
pluralism is a monolithic conceptual component and concentrate on unities of 
disagreement between people who are less than the population of a state. Secondly, 
as we said earlier in this chapter, such unities must be intended as relationships in 
which people can enter, and from which they are often excluded. With these 
conceptual observations in hand, a perspectivist political theory says that, if we 
want to construct an inclusive political theory, such theory should sustain the 
construction of arrangements that allow all potential perspective-holders to access 
objects of public concern, disagree in the light of the knowledge they know 
themselves to have, and make their differences visible to us. Consequently, for an 
argument so-conceived, all attempts to silence and exclude potential perspective-
holders contravene the basic normative precondition, and are one-sided. As such, 
when applied to political theory, the equal-status-granting condition requires a 
reconsideration of political arrangements in the direction of the full entitlement for 
all individuals, as potential perspective-holders, to access objects of disagreement. 
 
Now, according to the normative architecture of perspectivism, once all 
potential perspective-holders have been granted the entitlement to access objects of 
disagreement in accordance with the knowledge they know themselves to have; in 
each disagreement, only those perspectives that are actually of the same object are 
counted, and they must count the same as each other. As I have stressed in this 
chapter, the relationship between a perspective-holder and the object is the essential 
trait of perspectivism as a philosophy of disagreement. Clearly, several perspective-
holders can have a perspective of the same object simultaneously. Meanwhile, by 
having different knowledge they know themselves to have, perspective-holders 
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have different perspectives that, if made public, start a disagreement. As we have 
seen in the previous section, in order for perspectivism to overcome the partiality 
of the knowledge that perspective-holders know themselves to have, the solution to 
such a disagreement links with a general entitlement that justifies the incremental 
addition of new and different perspectives to the cluster of available existing 
perspectives. 
 
This entitlement is distinctive, but offers an incomplete description of the 
normative architecture of perspectivism. By stopping here, we would badly 
misunderstand the emphasis on the perspective-holder-object relationship only as a 
form of responsiveness to all possible differences. Less fundamental than the 
entitlement upon which a perspectivist political theory builds the access to objects 
of disagreement, there is another fundamental stipulation. Namely, in each 
disagreement, among all the possible perspectives, all perspectives that count must 
have the same referent. This is what I call the condition for inclusion. 
 
We can reconstruct the condition for inclusion by going back one more time 
to the two passages of Monadology. Simple substances have different points of view 
and they produce different accounts of the same thing. All these representations are 
finite and are in some way different from one another. So that, following Leibniz, 
if we imagine different people who are looking at the same city from different sides, 
we can say that the same city looks different to them, while also being the same. 
But also, implicit in such a metaphor, there is the claim that, in order to reach a 
complete account, we need knowledge of all perspectives that exist on the same 
object. There is, therefore, a constitutive requisite: perspectives are in disagreement 
as different perspectives of the same referent. 
 
It is important to note firstly that for all potential perspective-holders being 
entitled to access objects of disagreement, a perspective cannot be ignored unless 
someone proves the missing connection with the object of disagreement. To the 
reader, the occurrence of a perspective of the object that is not actually of said object 
might seem implausible. This is so because the perspective language is not 
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particularly helpful in this case. Let me, therefore, clarify this point with an 
example. In a local assembly, members (perspective holders) disagree about the 
funding for a special taskforce against rapes (object of disagreement). When it is 
her turn to make an argument on the taskforce (a perspective of the object of 
disagreement), one of the members, who took a seat in the assembly as a potential-
perspective holder, simply says “Fat lady”. Later another member says “the 
members of this assembly are clearly corrupt”. Additionally someone else says 
“They are all terrorists!”. The three members have the entitlement to participate 
(equal-status-granting condition), but, since their speeches to an audience did not 
make any recognizable reference to the object of disagreement (the condition for 
inclusion), other members of the assembly can avoid considering their perspectives, 
unless the three members reformulate their statements in ways compatible with the 
object of disagreement. As we can now see, the entitlement for all perspective-
holders to participate is not under discussion. The condition for inclusion applies to 
the explicit public manifestation (perspective) of one’s attitude (the knowledge one 
knows to have) on a certain object of disagreement. Its normativity should push 
potential perspective-holders to have a perspective that is a recognisable 
perspective of the object of disagreement. 
 
  Moreover, if we look at the condition for inclusion from the within the set 
of perspective-holders whose perspectives have the same referent, all perspectives 
are together because of a certain object of concern, which favours the manifestation 
of the differences among the knowledge that each perspective-holder knows herself 
to have. Consequently, when the object changes, the relationship and differences 
among perspective-holders change too. As I have said so far, the contingent 
relationship between two or more perspective-holders (let us say A, B and C) 
depends on their having perspectives of the same object. The presence of B for A, 
C for A, A for C, etc. depends on the object. Precisely, it depends on the fact that A, 
B and C express the knowledge they know themselves to have on the object. It does 
not depend on any specific cognitive characteristic or moral attribute that the 
perspective-holder is supposed to have. For the equal-status-granting condition, 
there is no reason for A not to be present rather than for B or C to be present. In 
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agreement with the condition for inclusion, once A, B, and C display the 
demonstrable connection with the object of their perspectives, their perspectives 
should count the same in the construction of the resolution on that specific object 
of disagreement. It does not matter if perspective-holders remain divided by 
important differences in the knowledge they know to have, what brings them 
together is a communal object of investigation, and, in that specific respect, what 
they are for one another depends on the object.205 The compresence of their 
perspective around the same object of concern makes their difference visible, and 
pluralism recognizable to us. This is an open relationship because, if other 
perspective-holders have a perspective on the same object, they can also make their 
distinctive traits visible, and the like. 
 
So, for a perspectivist political theory, it should not be relevant what a 
certain perspective stands for. From what is inside a certain worldview or the moral 
attributes an individual is supposed to have in order to positively exchange 
consideration with other people, when these people have different moral or political 
doctrines; the focus of the study of pluralism shifts to the way different individuals 
can make their distinctive worldviews visible through objects of public concern. 
For this reason, a perspectivist political theory begins with an explicit normative 
standpoint that aims to ensure for all potential perspective-holders the entitlement 
to access objects of disagreement. It also defends the normative belief that, as 
expressions of the distinctive relationship between the knowledge a perspective-
holder knows to have and an object, all perspectives of the same referent must be 
valued the same. If there were not such an additional condition, the defence of a 
general entitlement to access objects of disagreement would be meaningless in 
practice. For instance, without the condition for inclusion, some perspective-
holders may find ways to dominate disagreements, and this could mean to make 
other perspectives invisible. A perspectivist political theory, in turn, must always 
guarantee that all perspectives of the same referent are equally visible, and that the 
same referent is accessible to all other possible perspective-holders simultaneously. 
                                                          
205 This is not an ontological position. I want only to stress the idea that an object originates new and distinctive 
relational typologies. And each object influences these typologies in a distinctive manner.  
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Now, it may be true that with a huge variety of perspectives that are valued 
the same, different perspective-holders may be unable to put together all available 
perspectives in one genuine construction. It may also be true, however, that a greater 
degree of inclusion does not merely sum to a greater diversity but may turn out to 
help to solve differences between one another. However, for a perspectivist political 
theory, the normative concern is otherwise understood. Crucially, no matter what 
disagreements denote, and the kinds of perspectives at stake, it is imperative to take 
into account all the available perspectives, and to create patterns that allow 
perspective-holders to make their perspectives available without constrictions. 
Whether or not it is desirable is left to the reader. For the present purpose, suffice it 
to say that a perspectivist political theory, by entitling all potential perspective-
holders to access object of disagreement, is one of the ways to avoid exclusionary 
practices that are consequent of a too easy understanding of pluralism as a fact to 
be governed and managed. At the heart of the present line of argument, there is the 
idea that an acritical acceptance of pluralism as a fact may reinforce the division of 
the population into two units. On the one hand, it is important to consider the 
majority of individuals, whose different worldviews are recognizable components 
of pluralism as fact. Individuals within this unit can (more or less) claim their share 
in the definition of the benefits and burdens of the society, and political institutions 
that must be accountable to them. On the other hand, the rest of the population 
remains invisible. They may be newcomers, dissenting individuals within ethnic 
and religious groups, “silent” persons, and the like. For a perspectivist political 
theory, such an imaginary boundary is an artificial construct. Therefore, the 
philosophical eye should look at the relationship between each individual, as a 
potential perspective-holder, and public issues. The normative eye should construct 
arrangements that, irrespective of what a worldview stands for, ensure participation 
in disagreements for all perspective-holders on the same footing. The political eye 
should question practices and arrangements that inhibit such participation. 
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5. Conclusion 
A shared premise of today’s liberal theory literature is that pluralism is a fact. I have 
argued that pluralism has both a factual and a relational component. As a fact, 
pluralism is visible and recognizable. Namely, there is a perceptible difference 
among worldviews and interests. As a relation, pluralism denotes the quality of 
being present together. Under these lenses, I have argued that it is possible to 
observe a mismatch between the worldviews that we see and all worldviews that 
there are in the same society. On this view, if we assume pluralism as a fact without 
problematizing such a mismatch, the risk is that of conceiving normative 
arrangements that are inherently exclusionary. 
 
Against such a risk, my suggestion has been that of a perspectivist political 
theory. A perspectivist political theory tries to deal with deep differences without 
assuming that theories of how to deal with deep differences cannot include each 
and every difference. As I have examined through the study of Leibniz’s famous 
metaphor of the city, perspectivism has a distinctive normative architecture which 
combines an equal-status-granting condition and a condition for inclusion. Central 
in this normativity, there is a fundamental protection of the relationship between a 
possible perspective-holder and an external object. 
 
Taken together, this analysis indicates what we can expect from a 
perspectivist political theory: the idea is that, when inspired by such a normativity, 
political arrangements must entitle all potential perspective-holders to access 
external objects. For now, suffice it to say that the philosophical and normative 
aspects of perspectivism suggest a shift of importance within the literature on 
pluralism from reasons, arguments and considerations people exchange with one 
another to the individual relationship with public objects of concern. They also help 
us to think of the initial demarcation between who counts and who does not count 
in a society where people have different worldviews. If political theory has reasons 
to follow this direction, as I argue in the next chapters, it is to challenge the belief 
that some sort of exclusion is an undesirable, but ordinary, externality. 
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Chapter 5 
The many-to-one relationship 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I try to answer what I consider as an important question for all 
diverse and complex societies, which aim to be non-exclusionary. When all parties 
have different worldviews, I ask, is there a normative conception that parties can 
affirm without compromising their moral commitments? In order to answer this 
question, I shall design an ideal model of relational disagreement – the many-to-
one relationship. Thanks to this model, I shall elaborate the two orders of 
normativity, which are distinctive of a perspectivist normative theory. My ambition 
is to idealize a situation with the highest degree of disagreement among people who 
have different ideas about all the conceivable aspects that decide how to organize a 
life in common – including the very ambition to live together. Methodologically, 
this framework requires us to represent the set of circumstances in which abstractly 
characterized parties live, and the faculties that inform their ways of mastering the 
external world.206 I am aware of the risk that this attempt can cause a reified account 
of social relations. However, for those who are reluctant to go ideal in normative 
theorizing, I say that my scope is not to freeze existing instances of marginalization 
and social exclusion, but, rather, I aim to stress diversity up to a point in which a 
general normativity seems unachievable. It is my intuition that, by finding a general 
normativity at such a level of idealization and disagreement, I construct one among 
many other possible frameworks that might be valid for our world too.207 
This attempt tries to define a normative scheme that can reflect the diversity 
of ends and values, while incorporating a ground that functions as a common 
                                                          
206 Usually, in ideal theorising, an abstraction from the reality as it is comes together with a normalization of 
pluralism among the parties who construct the norms of coexistence. This kind of ad-hoc idealization has been 
harshly criticised in the literature for well-grounded reasons. However, my idealization follows the opposite 
directions: that is, I try to stress those elements that make pluralism problematic for political theorists in order 
to discover normative grounds that can aspire to generality. On this issue, see David Enoch, “Why Idealize?,” 
Ethics115 (4) (2005): 759-87.  
207 On ideal theories as possible evaluative standards, see David Estlund, “Utopophobia,” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 42 (2) (2014), 121. 
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perspective across differences. This shall be the foundational elements of a 
pluralistic society, as a society in which all members have a right not to be excluded 
from decision-making procedures of their concern.208 The construction of a 
normative order for a plural society is bound to be a partial endeavour. Here, 
however, I am fully aware of this objection. No longer is a common normative 
account alone the chief object of concern, for the conditions of possibility to express 
one’s own diversity represents a normative problem in its own right. I do not look 
for agreement across different worldviews, but, rather, I investigate the normativity 
that abstractly characterized parties affirm in a suitably constructed disagreement. 
At the very least, I stand back from reflection about consensus and agreement to fix 
the kind of normativity that makes possible to establish relations with external 
objects of disagreement.209 
Since the situation of disagreement I build must serve to construct principles 
in a variety of contexts, my reasoning must follow a general and abstract fashion. 
In so doing, I shall characterize parties in ways that avoid assuming notions that can 
be deemed contextual or partial. I shall also try to construct exchanges among 
parties in ways consistent with what happens in a world characterized by pluralism 
and diversity in ideas, social positions and means of expressions. With these 
observations in mind, this chapter shall proceed as follows. Section 2 shall describe 
the features of the idealized parties in the many-to-one relationship. In section 3, I 
shall reflect on the object of disagreement and the relationship between such an 
object and the parties. Section 4 shall clarify the idealizing assumptions that make 
possible exchanges in the many-to-one relationship. In section 5, I shall construct 
the two levels of normativity. Section 6 shall conclude the chapter, and, by 
anticipating some remarks, it shall open to the rest of the argument.  
                                                          
208 Here, I assume a substantial conceptual difference between “plural” and “pluralistic”. I take the word 
“plural” as an attribute for societies with people holding different worldviews. I consider, in turn, “pluralistic” 
as an attribute for societies that are plural and non-exclusionary. Therefore, plural society do not have 
necessarily pluralistic institutions; while pluralistic institutions may exist in societies that we do not considered 
as plural   
209 The point of the argument is not to define how and why principles (or a certain way out of disagreement) 
can claim legitimate authority over people having different worldviews. For such an approach, see Jeremy 
Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). My ambition, instead, is to define 
a normativity that puts parties with different worldviews in the position to disagree, and it also ensures that 
parties have actual possibilities to affect the outcome of disagreements in the light of how they get things right. 
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2. Reasonable and rational persons with different worldviews 
The most ambitious goal, therefore, is to elaborate a peculiar conception of the 
abstractly characterized parties. Even if it is difficult for some to think of such an 
irreducible pluralism, this idealizing component has a strong heuristic power. It 
helps us to rely only on a normativity that all parties are in the position to affirm, 
even if they have different worldviews. Clearly, in this way, as we shall see, the 
range of possible normative frameworks turns out to be very limited. Specifically, 
for my model, this means to assume that abstractly characterized agents happen to 
live in the same island without necessarily sharing a vocabulary of normative and 
evaluative terms. These individuals have different worldviews that are 
characteristic dispositions to cognize, evaluate and change world features. To push 
idealization further, in order to bring the discourse to a higher level of complexity, 
I also assume that parties arrive to this land in different times, each of them bringing 
a different story.210 Some parties are indigenous, other parties were forced to go 
there by their countries of origin, and other parties went there to look for new 
opportunities. Whatever is the reason that justifies their presence in the island, for 
my purpose, it is relevant to notice that they have a fully developed worldview. In 
this context, parties, therefore, are likely to disagree when they stand opposed to 
one another. However, let us assume that the island is vast enough to let parties co-
exist without conflicts. Under this perspective, the fact of pluralism is something 
that we can see as external spectator, but it is not something visible to the people 
who live in this territory unless they meet with one another.  
For diversity being visible, the assumption that parties have different 
worldviews necessitates to build into abstractly characterized parties practical 
faculties, which enable them to carry out such worldviews in the external world. 
                                                          
210 The discourse could be extended to animals, plants, land, water, resources, and air that are in the territory 
where indigenous and colonizers live. For the sake of simplicity, I have to leave this option aside. For the 
present purpose, I admit that our idealization of the abstractly characterized parties is evidently humanized. To 
my knowledge, present disputes about the fact of pluralism are all about human beings. This reason seems 
strong enough to leave the discourse about non-humans to another place. As a provisional suggestion, I can 
anticipate that such an endeavour would require a relaxation of the characterization of parties as rational and 
reasonable. For an effort to extend the practice of disagreement to non-speaking beings in the contexts of 
disputes on abortion, see Antonella Besussi, Disputandum Est: la passione per la verità nel discorso pubblico 
(Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2012), 197-8. Such an extension of the space of disagreement to non-speaking 
beings, however, ends up epitomizing one of my worries: the inclusion of non-speaking being is likely to read 
them not for what they are, but, rather, for the way we can engage with them as if they were speaking beings.  
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Minimal rationality helps us to make manifest the existing diversity of 
worldviews.211 If we survey the history of moral philosophy, it seems that, in 
practical contexts, the response to questions like “What should I do?” also 
presupposes considerations about the identification of a certain end, the evaluation 
of the appropriate means for realizing this subjectively given end and conformity 
of a specific action to a worldview. In this sense, rationality rests on persons’ 
capacity to form, to revise, and to pursue a conception of the good, and to deliberate 
in accordance with it. It comes without surprise that my usage of rationality, as it 
was for Rawls, does not go very far from the traditional conception in social 
theory.212 ‘A rational person,’ to borrow from Rawls, ‘is thought to have a coherent 
set of preferences between the options open to her. He ranks these options according 
to how well they further his purpose; he follows the plan which will satisfy more 
her desire rather than less, and which has the greater chance of being successfully 
executed’.213 Under these lenses, one acts on a rational ground when what she does 
can be explained within a specific connection between ends and suitable means. 
While the capacity to act and choose means in the light of the ends set by a certain 
worldview is taken to be universally shared, what is the actual content of this action 
is relative to the specific worldview of a person.214 Let us explain this point in order 
to stop criticisms about prudential reasons and instrumental rationality before 
happening.  
Rationality may seem to plug into my idealization of an ad hoc means/end 
balance component. A minimal degree of rationality, in turn, helps us to explain 
why a person acts in one way or another for the sake of his or her worldview. This 
qualification implies mainly conformity with a course of action that is inherent in 
one’s worldview in a certain time and given contingent external conditions. I do not 
assume that, after calculations, persons will act according to the best strategy 
available. I simply presuppose that they will undertake some agential patterns 
                                                          
211 I am aware of the concerns connected with an acritical use of rationality, especially in its social theory 
connotation. I ask the reader to take this condition cum grano salis, without stressing too much its relevance 
for the whole discourse. In the absence of a better term, I do not use rationality in a normative sense, but, rather, 
I use rationality to describe a feature of individual action in my model.  
212 Rawls 1971, 142-50. 
213 Ivi, 143. 
214 Rainer Forst, The Right to Justification (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 14.  
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because they think these are the best ways to advance a claim consistent with their 
worldview. Specifically, the conception of rationality employed in this chapter 
incorporates both preferences, standards of evaluations, and general beliefs about 
the world. A rational party is one who combines his or her beliefs about the external 
environment in ways that are coherent with his or her worldview. Parties do not 
necessarily act in accordance with the overall best calculation of costs and benefits. 
Rational parties behave in agreement with what they consider as the best response 
to the outside world, given their peculiar disposition toward the outside world. For 
this reason, in contrast with other accounts, I focus only on the ‘top’ of a preference 
ordering, which is embedded in one’s distinctive worldview.215 Even if they are not 
fully informed, parties think that the way they act in the light of their worldview is 
the best they can do against the present circumstances.216 So, not all parties are 
rational in the same way, but I say that parties pursue the things they regard as 
important. Specifically, this may include whales, empathy for the family, charity, 
and the like. The world of preferences and rational beliefs, as Shepsle puts it, is 
eminently an interior world. A party does not ‘wear her preferences’, therefore I 
have to make assumptions about her preferences in order to model particular social 
settings.217 In this way, the same moral agent may translate the same worldviews 
into different ways, all of them rational from the perspective of his or her 
worldview.  
Now, should I describe the profile of all the possible worldviews at stake? 
Hypothetically, in this vast land, where different individuals live, we can find all 
possibly conceivable worldviews, and a myriad of related top-preferences for each 
contingent situation. If the many-to-one relationship were a situation of rational 
choice making, such a diversity would demand an articulation of each possible 
worldview, and, given the fact that several worldviews may go alongside with 
individual experience, this diversity would mean no assurance to cover the entire 
                                                          
215 See Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), ch V. 
Generally, all convergentist accounts of public reason rely upon the person having more than one preference at 
his or her disposal at the same time.  
216 For instance, this conception of rationality also includes adaptive preferences. See Jon Elster, Sour grapes: 
studies in the subversion of rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
217 Kenneth Shepsle, Analysing Politics: Rationality, Behaviour, and Institutions (London: Norton, 2010), 15. 
See also Andrew Hindmoor, Rational Choice (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2006). 
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spectrum of possibilities. What we need is not to know the sort of worldviews that 
each party will bring in public; but rather, it is sufficient to say that parties will draw 
upon a certain worldview in a given moment, and that such a worldview draws a 
camp within which the party elaborates the way he or she appropriates the external 
reality.  
Parties are also reasonable. This deserves clarification, especially 
considering the widespread use of this concept in political theory. Unlike Rainer 
Forst, reason is not taken as ‘Ratio, raison, reason … as the ability to account for 
one’s beliefs and actions; rationem reddere in Latin, logon didonai in Greek,’ but 
rather as a prolific faculty of active and individual thinking.218 Inevitably, this 
marks a departure from the mainstream usage of this term in political theory. Often, 
practical reason stands for the ability to answer practical questions with responses 
that can be upheld at the intersubjective level (account for).219 ‘Practical reason,’ as 
Forst continues, ‘can be understood as the basic capacity to respond to practical 
questions in appropriate ways with justifying reasons within each of the practical 
contexts in which they arise and must be situated’.220 This kind of reasonableness 
is circumscribed to cooperative contexts, where a person has a disposition to make 
concessions to the other, when the other persons is prepared to do the same.221 For 
instance, in Rawls, a reasonable person is a person who is ready to agree on 
mutually beneficial forms of cooperation. In this sense, reasonableness embodies 
something like a proper use of practical reason, autonomous deliberation and 
actions in line with principles that are acceptable by all.222 According to another 
account, reasonableness implies a specific kind of reasoning, which is competent, 
well-pondered, and in good-faith.223 From such a perspective, a reasonable person 
is one that takes the due time to reason, consider the available evidence, and 
advance a consideration accordingly. Such competence, as McMahon puts it, ‘is 
exercised in the identification of the considerations relevant in a given context and 
                                                          
218 Forst 2012, 14. 
219 Rawls 2005, lecture II. 
220 Forst 2012, 18.  
221 On this point, Christopher MacMahon, Collective Rationality and Collective Reasoning (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 92-3.  
222 Rawls 2005, 48-54. 
223 Christopher McMahon, Reasonable Disagreement: A Theory of Political Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
105 
 
in the assignment of relative weights to them. This is the sense of “reasonable” 
employed in the standards of proof in a criminal trial’.224 
In this work, I use a different account of reasonableness. The two 
alternatives compromise a moral faculty with an intersubjective dimension that may 
put pressure on the idealization of abstractly characterized agents as participating 
differently in the fact of pluralism. Nevertheless, these two options do not exhaust 
the set of philosophical alternatives at our disposal. Without going too far in the 
history of moral and political philosophy, I can appeal to an abstract and neutral 
conception of reasonableness. Reasonableness, Charles Larmore writes, is ‘the free 
and open exercise of the basic capacities of reason … they may be reasonable in 
Rawls’s sense as well, if they are concerned to reason about how best to be fair’.225 
Such a view does not ask persons to fashion their judgements in some appropriate 
ways, but rather it suggests that reasonableness is a moral quality that all human 
beings have qua beings with practical reason, who are capable of elaborating natural 
inclinations.226 
By combining ineradicable pluralism, rationality, and reasonableness, I am 
in the position to picture a generalizable account of the practical identity of people 
who live in the island. According to the present account, parties, therefore, are 
moral agents, who appropriate the external world in accordance with their 
worldviews, which they have assimilated and articulated over time, thanks to the 
basic capacities of reason. The upshot of my analysis is that the diversity among 
abstractly characterized agents fractures the landscape into different landscapes 
with people acting in light of different worldviews and searching for competing 
goals, which all of them find rational from their own point of view. Such a diversity 
                                                          
224 Ivi, 18-19.  
225 Charles Larmore, “The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism,” The Journal of Philosophy 96 (12) (1999): 
601-2. See also his The Morals of Modernity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
226 Despite departing from contemporary Kantian constructivism, I think that such an account of reasonableness 
might be acceptable to Kantians too. See expressions like Gesetzgebung, selbst-gesetzgebend and 
allgemeinegesetzgebenden. Kant, B, 740. Groundwork, 431, 432, 436, 446, 448, 452. On this point, see 
Christine M. Koorsgaard, “Introduction,” in Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), xxix. See also Ernst Cassirer, Kant’s Life and Thought (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). Augusto Guerra, Kant (Bari-Roma: Editori Laterza, 1998), 130-33. See 
also Dieter Henrich, The Unity of Reason (Cambridge MASS: Harvard University Press, 1994), 89-122. Paul 
Guyer, Kant (New York: Routledge, 2014), 252-60. Allen W. Wood, “What is Kantian Ethics?” Allen W. 
Wood (ed.), Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals (Yale: Yale University Press, 2002), 157-81.  Kant, 
Groundwork, 446, 452.  
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may hamper the ways through which parties communicate with one another.227 At 
the same time, how parties access the external world may be a fundamental 
component of their overall practical identity. Parties have different beliefs about 
what constitutes a communicative act that reverberates their distinctive practical 
identity. Therefore, a modular description of their communicative action would 
reduce the terms, for a party, to the realization of its worldview. With these remarks 
in mind, in order to describe exchanges that will happen in this model, I use 
“considerations” rather than the more common “reasons”. I want to leave open the 
space for emotional attachments, partiality, and biases. In this vein, 
“considerations” emphasize the subjective character of one’s appropriation of 
external reality, without shrinking the importance of individual reflection for 
effective communication.228 The full significance of my usage of considerations 
should be understood by looking at the dual movement of a person upon the world, 
as a rational being, and in herself, as a reasonable being. A rational being finds the 
best way to advance insights from what the reasonable component has articulated 
over time. Under the lenses, a consideration C is a communicative act through 
which a person P imposes her own meaningful mark on an element X of the external 
world. C specifies the relevant features of X for P, given the fact that P and X exist 
independently from one another. Through C, P puts X in relation with a distinctively 
individual set of meanings and beliefs upon which P builds an account of the world 
that she feels as her own.  Therefore, C implies a distinctive relation between P and 
X, which does not necessarily entail exchanges with other persons P1, P2, P3, and 
the like. P1, P2, and P3 may have considerations C1, C2 and C3 on X (and other 
parts of the world X1, X2, X3) without knowing anything about other persons doing 
the same. Because of X, P1, P2, P3 and the like might also acknowledge the 
differences between one another.  
 
                                                          
227 As I shall see in the next section, it is not necessary to postulate that considerations are mutually intelligible. 
Here, a reasonable and rational party stipulates a relation with the object of concern. Under this reading, 
intersubjective relationships are derivative. 
228 For instance, Joshua Cohen defines reasons as considerations. See Joshua Cohen, “Procedure and 
Substance,” in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 
95-119. See also, Sharon Krause, Civil Passions: Moral Sentiment and Democratic Deliberation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008), 146.  
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3. The binding situation  
In the previous section, I have argued that parties lives in the same territory, but this 
territory is so vast that they do not realize the presence of other abstractly 
characterised agents with different worldviews. Now, I try to speculate about the 
place where disagreement begins in this context.  I assume that parties will discover 
one another because of a binding situation.229The communal problem, in this way, 
stipulates a threshold of reciprocity among the parties. The binding situation brings 
about a semantical space in which one enters into a non-natural relationship with 
other agents that are doing the same for their own sake. It is non-natural because it 
exists in conformity with an object and through the object. The object causes a 
partial suspension of the ordinary relation among agents – or it initiates a new one 
if this is not the case - that, once invited together by a communal referent, turns 
parties into holders of a specific consideration on the object of disagreement.  
Now, this point encourages reflections about the nature of such a 
disagreement. It should be clear that I do not idealize a kind of epistemic 
disagreement. In that case, all parties would agree with the course of action. As a 
result, disagreement would revolve around collective or individual reasons to justify 
such a collective goal. Here, the object of disagreement brings about a paradigmatic 
case of practical disagreement. Such a disagreement concerns with the content of 
the course of action.230 It is, to borrow from Herbert George Wells, a disagreement 
about first and last things.231 This disagreement encompasses two dimensions. On 
the one hand, the object of disagreement encourages parties to think of those actions 
that are permissible, commendable, deplorable, and the like. In conjunction with 
this level of moral reflection, the object of disagreement pushes parties to internal 
deliberation concerning what counts as a valid consideration in that context, and 
                                                          
229Two things deserve clarification. First, disagreement about things that matter for those affected embodies an 
essential tension between the individual power of creation and the innate vulnerability of opening to the 
cognition of others. Such a cognition casts light upon the finitude of one’s self-differentiating act vis-à-vis 
several and different responses to the same object. For the subject, this does not imply a schizophrenic division 
of the self, but rather it casts lights upon the multiple ways through which the same consideration can be 
assimilated and remodelled by those to which it is addressed. Second, it should be clear that individual 
considerations resist the possible corporal retreating of the party. In that case, they linger in the exchange among 
the others. In this way, the party is still present in all those cognitions that aim at retracing what is special of a 
certain perspective besides the communal referent. 
230 On this issue, see Emanuela Ceva, “Religione, Rispetto e Guerra: contro la visione canonica della ragione 
in politca,” Etica e Politca/Ethics and Politics 8 (1) (2016): 35-48. 
231H. G. Wells, First and Last Things (London: Echo Library, 2006). 
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what I mean by saying that the object of disagreement exists for us. In other words, 
the object of disagreement is so important, for the parties, to be like a matter of life 
and death. It discloses moral differences at many levels so that parties do not have 
any other shared framework of reference but the object of disagreement itself.232 
Therefore, it is important to notice that, in this binding situation, individual 
considerations project non-negotiable aspects of one’s life onto the object of 
disagreement. This means to say that a compromise may be beyond the moral 
capacity of abstractly characterized parties. Too often, in order to solve deep moral 
disagreements, people have resorted to apologies of moral compromises. 
Compromises might offer ready-made normative tools to construct flexible and 
less-problematic ways out of disagreement than pure consensus.233 However, 
despite being such an appealing theoretical instrument to get rid of moral impasses, 
compromises presuppose a problematic reading of moral agency in the context of 
moral disagreement. If not problematic, it is, at least, a kind of moral agency that 
needs to be supported by psychological evidence or a comprehensive moral theory, 
which, among other things, gives a certain priority to prudential reasons.234 For 
instance, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson argue that one should find the 
justification that minimises disagreement with opposing views. This means to find 
out policies that are morally defensible, while minimizing the rejection of the 
position they oppose.235 Henry Richardson also defends deep compromises. They 
are processes in which parties reformulate their ends in order to make agreement 
possible.236 
                                                          
232On this issue, Besussi 2012, 22-23.  
233On compromise, see Christian Rostboll and Theresa Scavenius (eds.), Compromise and Disagreement in 
Contemporary Political Theory (London: Routledge, 2017).  
234 For instance, see Enzo Rossi, “Consensus, compromise, justice and legitimacy,” Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (4) (2013): 557-72. Vis-à-vis persistent pluralism, he argues 
that compromises are easier to obtain and more frequent.  
235Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), 134. See also “Moral Disagreement in a Democracy,” Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1) (1995): 
87-110. 
236 On compromise, see also Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism: Towards a Politics of Compromise 
(London: Routledge, 1999), 103-5. Robert Goodin, Reflective Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 183. 
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This sort of argument, however, relies upon the idea that a number of 
different moral reasons are available to the parties in disagreement.237 They also 
presuppose that at least one of the party in disagreement is able to give up his or her 
strongest reason for action in favour of one of the other available reasons. On the 
other hand, arguments for compromise seem to put pressure on parties in 
disagreement as if a solution to disagreement is always better than disagreement 
itself for all the parties who take part in the practice of disagreement.238 Under these 
lenses, therefore, when disagreement survives extended debate, it is because parties 
are searching for the best compromise. To be so, I should have some basis of 
evidence to demonstrate that parties engage in morally demanding disagreements 
for the sake of compromise, rather than for defending their position as it is. For all 
these reasons, I assume that the binding situation is one-dimensional. Parties do not 
have room for compromise. In this way, there is less room for trade-offs among 
first, second, and third order preferences. One-dimensionality implies, therefore, a 
very rigorist account of the parties as moral agents. However, to us, it seems 
counterintuitive to argue that certain normativity can be general when the parties 
who constructed it see such a result as a compromise. One-dimensionality gives 
also the due weight to the public sharing of considerations, and to the importance 
of some disagreements for an entire project of life. When I postulate that parties 
have the same object of disagreement, and the consequent considerations are non-
negotiable, I also have to admit that a combination of all possible perspectives as a 
way out of disagreement might also be source of disagreement for some of the 
parties in our island.  
The idea that an object of disagreement can convey different perspectives is 
not new in political theory.239 Recently, Ryan Muldoon and Gerald Gaus also have 
used perspectives to build flexible, open and liberal social contracts.240 Both the 
                                                          
237 Bellamy 1999, 103-5. Robert Goodin has suggested that a way out of one-dimensional disagreement is an 
agreement on a second-best option. See Robert Goodin “Political Ideals and Political Practice”, British Journal 
of Political Science 25 (1995): 37–56. 
238 The preference for a solution of disagreement seems an important assumption of modus vivendi theory and 
its defence of moral and political compromises.  
239 See Scott Page, The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and 
Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
240 See Ryan Muldoon, Social Contract Theory for a Diverse World: Beyond Tolerance (London: Routledge, 
2016), ch.3, ch.6. See also Gerald Gaus, The Tyranny of the Ideal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 
ch.4. 
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political intent and the theoretical resources make my approach different from the 
work of Muldoon and Gaus.241 However, there is a common denominator, which is 
inherent in all approaches that try to appeal to the language of perspectives inside 
and outside the domain of political theory. Such a component helps us to explain 
the nature of the binding situation. Specifically, Muldoon also captures the point 
that, even if perspectives have different accounts of the same thing, they still have 
a common social object about which they could negotiate. If two agents divide state 
space in different ways, as Muldoon puts it, they are seeing the same thing, but just 
interpret it differently.242 In the same way, in my case, the assumptions that parties 
have different worldviews and considerations on the same object of disagreement 
do not imply that considerations share nothing. Clearly, since they are 
considerations about the same object of disagreement, they are both partial 
characterizations of the object, and they are modes of the same thing.243 
This point forces us to open a digression on the scope of the many-to-one 
relationship. Here, I construct an ideal situation of disagreement, whose central 
normative question is to construct a normativity that enables parties to bring their 
worldviews in public, regardless of the content or the context. Unlike, Gaus and 
Muldoon, I do not aim to find the best combination of different worldviews. Lying 
behind this picture is the idea that parties in moral disagreement typically does not 
guarantee convergence on a single understanding of what is fair, because such a 
disagreement is deep. 
 
 
                                                          
241 Muldoon and Gaus try to avoid normalization in political philosophy as the practice, in social contract 
theory, that defines a certain perspective as the correct perspective. In response to this attitude, they advance 
two different, but similar, kinds of open and dynamic social contracts. They remain explicitly within a 
distinctive the liberal tradition. ‘Our problem,’ Gaus writes, ‘is creating an overarching “liberal” framework for 
“republican” communities of moral inquiry and experimentation’. Gaus 2016, 174. ‘An open and just liberal 
society,’ he continues, ‘would simultaneously like to maximize its accommodation to both types of diversity, 
being respectful of current perspectives while being open to new one’. Gaus 2016, 175.    
242 Ryan Muldoon, “Justice without agreement,” unpublished manuscript. However, Muldoon relies heavily on 
a procedure of mutual bargaining in which parties conceive a social contract as a mutually beneficial, somehow 
pragmatic, achievement. Muldoon 2016, ch. 6. Such a move comes at the price of a coherent reading of the 
object-perspective relation. The point is not to construct an always modifiable interperspectival union of all the 
available perspectives, but, rather, by stressing the singularity of each perspective on the same object, we should 
focus on why this being so.  
243 Gaus 2016, 164-9. 
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4. Three idealizing assumptions 
Exchanges among abstractly idealized parties in the light of a binding situation 
follow three idealizing assumptions. Now, it is important to admit that, seen as a 
whole, this system of conditions and assumptions tries to replicate the ordinary 
point of view from which I understand and respond to diversity as living 
communicative selves at the ideal level.244 1) Parties, I assume, have a finite account 
of the world, which is informed by their worldview, and they are living in an island 
characterized by a plurality of other finite views, which are equally informed by 
partial worldviews. For this reason, each abstractly characterized party experiences 
the binding situation in his or her own way. That is, two parties cannot have 
undistinguishable considerations on the object of disagreement, and all parties 
thinks of his or her consideration as true.  
The second assumption arises from the idea that parties are agents with the 
sense of being someone capable of participating in everyday talks with statements 
that others should accept – they think that their consideration is the universally valid 
consideration. After all, when there is an issue of transversal concern, people quite 
often assess and compare different worldviews and empirical evidence. What, then, 
makes these comparisons possible? I assume that, insofar as the consideration 
signals a connection with the object of disagreement, validity claims cover both the 
rightness of norms and the truth of assertions. i assimilate these two types of claims 
by saying that, around the binding situation, through the assessment of the 
connection with the object of disagreement, abstractly characterized agents 
adjudicate both factual claims and moral claims as if the two were truth claims. 
Since we lack any robust characterized property for a moral statement to be true, 
here, I take that truth is a mere expressive expedient, useful for purposes of 
generalization, comparison and semantic agency.245 By appealing to truth, parties, 
                                                          
244 This can be seen as an alternative account of Gaus’ significant but realistic level of idealization. ‘At the end 
of the day,’ he writes, ‘you and I wish to know whether the morality we live under is publicly justifies and so 
sustains the rational moral emotions; the depiction of the Members of the Public must be such that their 
deliberations enlighten us about this regulative moral and philosophical worry.’ Gaus 2012, 275.  
245 This implies a cognitivist approach to morality. For the sake of my argument, I maintain that moral 
judgments can be judged as true or false. I acknowledge that, in moral philosophy, this position is disputed. 
However, the many-to-one relationship aims to reproduce a situation of deep disagreement among abstractly 
characterized people, not abstractly characterised moral philosophers. In the common practice of disagreement, 
to me, it seems to be a common habit to assess other moral judgments as true and false.   
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on the one hand, falsify other arguments and formulate truth-functionally 
compound statements where different considerations are combined. On the other 
hand, by appealing to truth, parties may subject their considerations to norms of 
epistemic appraisal.  
Now, it is possible, at least theoretically, that by appealing to truth, each 
party refers to a precise conception of truth, which radically differs from what other 
parties have in mind. It can also happen that parties have thoroughly different 
understanding of what means to be true. For a theory of pluralism, these occurrences 
must be taken in due consideration. I have, therefore, to defend individual capacity 
to articulate or agree with the definition of truth each party finds more appropriate 
or suitable for her argumentative strategy. This implies a rather open – minimal – 
understanding of truth, which, nevertheless, seems to be convenient to keep 
procedures of public discussion open.246 For instance, in the department where I 
work, philosophers, who are taken to be the most informed concerning issues of 
truth and falsity, and political scientists often have long disputes on rather 
controversial issues. I know, from their works, that some of us have a rather realistic 
stance, others are hard-core relativists, someone is sympathetic with deflationary 
accounts of truth and many do not have a strong epistemological position. In these 
disputes, ‘false’ and ‘true’ are, possibly, two of the most used words. Everyone may 
understand and evaluate what the others are saying according to his or her 
epistemological position, without declaring his or her specific commitment. This 
diversity, nevertheless, is hardly a conversation-stopper. That is probably why these 
kinds of disputes never reach a conclusion. By utterances like “It is true, but…” or 
“No, of course not. That’s not true, look at…”, people seem to postulate the 
possibility of an ultimate true response, but, in the process of discussion, they apply 
to truth in a very flexible way. We are, thus, not able to postulate that, for the mere 
reason of appealing to truth, parties have a well-defined epistemological position; 
moreover, the acceptance of a univocal epistemological across the various points of 
                                                          
246 For a minimal conception of truth, see David Estlund, “The Insularity of the Reasonable: Why Political 
Liberalism Must Admit the Truth,” Ethics 108 (2) (1998): 252-275. See also, David Estlund, “The Truth in 
Political Liberalism,” in Andrew Norris and Jeremy Elkins (eds.), Truth and Democratic Politics (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012). 
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view seems a partial operation, which undermines the purpose of preserving 
pluralism.  
This may open to the objection that parties can pretend to appeal to truth, 
while using truth only as a communicative expedient to challenge other 
considerations. In that way, all the constructive procedure would be built upon 
something like bad communication and misunderstanding. This would be the case, 
if parties were not assumed to be rational and to use their top preference in the 
many-to-one relationship. Equally, their being reasonable ensures their substantial 
commitment in bringing forward considerations that are the actual result of one’s 
self-reflection. So, whose view of truth will be operative? If parties see truth 
differently, how does true function as a medium, without being informative in any 
way? Truth does not directly involves anyone’s view of the truth, but only how 
parties appeal to truth in the exchange of consideration. In this way, the intuition 
that a minimal account of truth may constitute a valid communicative medium 
across difference clarifies the second assumption. 2) Parties vindicate their moral 
reasons by appealing to whatever conception of the truth. I avoid, in this way, to 
make restrictive presuppositions regarding both epistemic literacy of the parties and 
about evidential equality. Parties bring in the public their considerations as true 
even if they have a finite perspective on things and, therefore, an incomplete 
knowledge on the given issue.247 
In connection with the first two assumptions, I also assume that 3) parties 
know that they are epistemically vulnerable. Nothing is new in this last assumption. 
Once we return on what we said or thought in the past, in case we have to answer 
objections and even when we rebut what other people are saying, we assume that 
considerations may be credited as false.248 Now the assumption I shall refer as 
epistemic vulnerability adds nothing essential to Mill’s account of fallibilism.249 
                                                          
247 In epistemology, perspectivism is taken to be a form of relativism about truth. More recently, a burgeoning 
literature has highlighted the realist nature of perspectivism, as a theory that presupposes the existence of an 
object out there. I try to leave the dispute aside and to take a neutral position in this debate. As many people 
have noticed, my use of truth as a communicative medium among agents, given the significance of the object 
of disagreement, links with what each party believes is the correct account of the object of disagreement.  
248 See also Stuart Hampshire, Justice is Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 8-9. 
249 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 24. ‘The beliefs which we 
have most warrant for have no safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them 
unfounded. If the challenge is not accepted, or is accepted and the attempt fails, we are far enough from certainty 
still; but we have done the best that the existing state of human resource admits of; we have neglected noting 
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Parties see their considerations as true. Still, their amount of certainty may vary, 
strengthened when other parties adopt the same considerations, undermined by 
good counter-considerations and nullified by strong falsifying objections. Even if 
parties presume their considerations to be true, it is assumed that parties have no 
additional assurance to their limited knowledge about the issue and the framework 
of possibilities inherent in their worldviews, from which they single out a 
consideration as the best way to appropriate the object of disagreement. In this way, 
parties are in the position to contradict and disprove other considerations as if 
considerations publicly displayed are, with Mill’s words, “invitation to the whole 
world to prove them unfounded”.250 Parties, therefore, who want their 
considerations to be relevant in public, have strong incentives to get the most out 
of what other parties are saying. By doing so, parties are in a better position to 
disprove other arguments and to frame their limited set of considerations in a way 
more suitable to those things other parties are disposed to bear.  
I can supplement this explanation with the following chart. It represents a 
partial description of the ways through which the three idealizing assumptions 
interact with the basic characteristics of the parties in the binding situation. 
 
 
 
 Reasonable Rational 
Finite perspective Parties are not fully aware of what their 
worldview implies at the 
intersubjective level  
Parties act according to their worldview 
in a given moment 
 
Truth-apt validity Parties bring forward considerations as 
if they were truth-claims 
Parties select considerations that make 
sense across the whole range of both 
explanatory and life uses 
Epistemic vulnerability Parties live falsification as a violation 
of their moral integrity 
Parties try to get the most from the 
considerations of other parties251 
                                                          
that could give the truth a chance of reaching us: if the lists are kept open, we may hope that it there be a better 
truth, it will be found when the human mind is capable of receiving it,; and in the meantime we may rely on 
having attained such approach to truth, as is possible in pur own day. This is the amount of certainty attainable 
by a fallible being, and this sole way of attaining it’.  
250 Ibidem 
251 Parties are fallible, therefore, in order to minimize the chances not to be falsified, they try to have the best 
picture of other considerations. In this way, they can customize their own considerations accordingly. 
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The description of the practical identities of the parties, together with the 
analysis of the object, and the examination of three idealising assumption conclude 
the description of the fundamental traits of the many-to-one relationship. Before 
delving more closely into the phenomenology of this ideal episode of disagreement, 
I can summarize the foregoing discourse as follows. For each fundamental 
component of my idealization, I list relevant consequences for the articulation of 
the many-to-one relationship. 
 
1. Parties live in a vast island  
I. Parties may leave the many-to-one relationship 
II. There is a finite number of possible worldviews at stake 
 
2. Abstractly characterized parties 
I. Parties have well-formed worldviews 
II. Parties act in accordance with the finite set of options inherent in their worldview 
III. Parties may adopt comprehensive modes of argumentation 
 
3. Idealizing assumptions 
I. Parties can falsify considerations of other parties 
II. Truth can function as a semantical medium of communication  
 
4. Binding situation 
I. The disagreement among competing worldviews is made explicit 
II. Threshold of reciprocity 
III. Considerations are non-negotiable 
 
 
5. The many-to-one relationship 
In my choice of illustration, I cannot do better than borrow from a general example 
of deep moral disagreement. In the island, where members have different 
worldviews and can live in isolation, abstractly characterized parties are presented 
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with a binding situation that, at different moments, invites them to translate their 
worldviews into considerations on the object of disagreement.252 Abstractly 
characterized parties gather up their considered judgments, they reflect upon the 
imperatives of their worldview, they opt for an individual consideration. In their 
view, this consideration enables them to appropriate the object of disagreement in 
a way that is distinctively theirs. All parties conclude the process of internal 
deliberation with a distinctive consideration.253 Such a consideration is coherent 
with their worldview and, for them, it voices the only way that connects the object 
of disagreement with their worldview.  
For instance, Karl is a Catholic extremist. Donald is a Marxist. Karl and 
Donald have strong worldviews that inform their actions in the external world. Karl 
has a moral imperative to pray loudly in the morning. Donald also has a moral 
imperative to read passages of Theses on Feuerbach loudly. For Karl and Donald, 
failing to do so means to disregard an important command. Unfortunately, they 
discover the same shanty house, which they claim to be their safe space. Karl must 
pray between seven and eight in the morning. Donald must do his readings at the 
same hour. Ordinarily, the two men might come together and arrange to find a 
schedule that fits with their needs.254 But, from their perspective, this is not the right 
solution. It does not take into account the strength of their preference for performing 
an action in a certain time and place. How they live their connection with the object 
of disagreement may depend on many other intangible things. To mention some, it 
depends on how desperately they need a proper place to exercise the moral 
imperatives, on the emotional attachment with that specific place, on the 
                                                          
252 The use of the island as a device of representation may seem futile. However, it serves to emphasise the 
point that parties could withdraw from disagreement and go back to their life in isolation. Despite this 
opportunity, parties keep participating because the object of disagreement is important for them. In this way, 
the island is not only a contextual feature, but it serves to characterize the existential character of the binding 
situation.  
253 This process resembles that of a narrow reflective equilibrium. See PB Lehning, John Rawls: An 
Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 123. Unlike Rawls, parties end up with different 
considerations. Scholarship on Rawls has acknowledged this possibility, but, they admit, Rawls has to hope 
that, despite their different standpoints, individuals will not end up with different reflective equilibria. On this 
issue, see Thomas Pogge, John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
170. Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 156-7. Johnathan Floyd, 
‘Rawls’ methodological blueprint,’ European Journal of Political Theory 0 (0) (2015): 1-15. 
254 Social contract theories and accounts, which defend compromise, share this observation. For them, the idea 
is that disagreement must lead to an agreement. In my model, I examine why parties can claim to participate in 
disagreement, which is a different normative question.   
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forcefulness of such a discovery for the quality of their life in the island, on prior 
experiences of exclusion and oppression, and, by no means least, by their 
ideological rigidity.  
Time after time, other abstractly characterized parties aim to appropriate the 
object of disagreement in their own ways. For instance, David, a nationalist, who 
spends most of his time close to the place under disagreement, claims that he has 
an irrevocable right on everything is in his range of action. Tricia, a young woman 
of colour, aims to appropriate that place as compensation for centuries of injustices. 
Direct experiences of injustice strengthen her commitment not to give up. Before 
coming to the island, as a single and black mother, she was denied rents by several 
landlords. Banks were reluctant to lend her money. Rental agencies prevent her 
from buying houses in predominantly white neighbourhoods. In this antagonistic 
environment, resilient prejudices also make some parties impervious to stimuli for 
cooperation. This is so because commitments have been made, but also because 
certain issues make people excluding elements from consciousness, if they do not 
fit their consideration. So, the aim of disagreement, is to appropriate the same object 
of disagreement that other parties want with energy. In my example, I can describe 
the logic of action in the following way. Karl, Donald, David, Tricia, and other 
newcomers have a strict preference only for their own consideration. If we 
disaggregate their considerations, however, regardless of their actual content, we 
can recognize that two aspects remain invariant no matter how the preferences are 
assigned, provided that the commitment to one’s worldview remains constant. First, 
parties claim to have access to a certain disagreement where they have a 
consideration to advance. Second, they have a common referent, which is the object 
of disagreement.  
Let us explain. The negative experience of seeing one’s consideration 
falsified by other parties with a simultaneous incompatible consideration on the 
object, and the posturing towards the object of disagreement that all newcomers 
hold unveil the condition of possibility for such a disagreement to happen. At 
different moments of their engagement with the object, abstractly characterized 
parties, who have a consideration on the object, assume that they have a right to 
appropriate the object in their own ways. By saying so, I do not mean to say that 
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other entitlement cannot be found in the course of due reflection. I only argue that 
such an entitlement is the first trans-subjective level upon which parties justify their 
appropriation of the object of disagreement.255 Moreover, abstractly characterized 
parties may affirm this entitlement at different stages of the many-to-one 
relationship. What I defend, in fact, is the observation that, sometime in the 
disagreement, an abstractly characterized party affirms his or her entitlement to 
participate, while he or she advances a consideration that epitomizes a reasonable 
and rational process of self-reflection. Let us clarify this point by recalling Karl, 
Donald, Tricia, David, and all the newcomers.  Karl and Donald claimed to access 
the object of disagreement, and their disagreement was exactly about whom, 
between the two, deserved such an access, given the fact that both Donald and Karl 
were affirming the same entitlement, despite having different worldviews. When 
Tricia and David came in, they did on the presumption that they had an entitlement 
to access the object. For them, if other parties were in disagreement about a certain 
object of concern, there was no reason to leave them aside, since they felt to have 
the same entitlement on the same object. When other parties tried to participate, 
they substantiated their act of appropriation with the presumption that they were 
entitled to do so, no matter how Donald, Karl, Tricia and David were trying to 
appropriate the object. The substance of the argument is that I have found a first-
order of normativity that all parties affirm from their own worldview when they 
access disagreements that matter for them. Parties do affirm an entitlement to have 
a say in that specific respect on the ground that, from their own perspective, they 
have at least the same status that other participants in the many-to-one relationship 
have.  
Abstractly characterized parties, who affirm the same entitlement to have a 
say from their own point of view, appropriate the same object of disagreement in 
different ways. During their exchanges around the object of disagreement, 
abstractly characterized parties challenge and falsify considerations of other parties 
who affirm the same entitlement to have a say. All parties have different claims on 
the same thing, this means to say that their considerations are different, but they are 
                                                          
255 With trans-subjective, I mean to say that all parties do so from their own perspectives. And they happen to 
affirm the same entitlement from their own point of view.  
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just interpreting the same problem in different ways. As there is no semantical pre-
configuration of such a disagreement, each party can insist that her or his 
consideration on the object is better than other considerations. At the same time, 
parties cannot take the union of all perspectives and presume that all participants 
will affirm such a general consideration, when participants bring forward a non-
negotiable preference. Even though parties are not able to agree on a collective 
solution to disagreement, we can expect them to share another fundamental 
normative claim. Namely, abstractly characterized parties affirm that, qua 
considerations on the object of disagreement, their considerations must count at 
least as much as the considerations of other parties count.  
If we go back to the island, we can imagine that Karl, Donald, Tricia, David 
and the rest of the interaction community are still arguing against one another. This 
n-person disagreement is about considerations on the shanty house itself. It is a 
disagreement about considerations over the same element of the world, which 
determines what the parties are for one another in that specific respect. Note that, 
from the initial disagreement, David and Karl can originate another disagreement 
around the official religion of the island. Their considerations on the shanty house 
and the considerations on this derivative disagreement are not interconnected. In 
the two respects, David and Karl, together with all other parties who try to 
participate, advance different considerations on different objects. In these two 
contexts, as well as in many other, David and Karl affirm their entitlement to have 
a say; then, during the interaction, they affirm, from their own perspective, that their 
considerations on the object of disagreement count the same (or more) than other 
considerations, which are on the same object of disagreement.  
In the many-to-one relationship, therefore, abstractly characterized parties 
affirm two levels of normativity from their own worldviews, no matter the content 
of such worldviews. First, they affirm that they are entitled to access the many-to-
one relationship without distinction. Second, they affirm that their consideration on 
the object of disagreement must count at least as much as other considerations on 
the same object count. Now, it is important to notice that this two-order normativity 
does not exhaust all the possible kinds of normative solutions that parties affirm 
around different objects of disagreement. My account clarifies the fundamental 
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basis upon which parties can sustain their presence in the interaction community. 
Specifically, the first order normativity tells us that all parties must be in the 
position to affect an object of concern that matters for them. The second order of 
normativity clarifies that, within a certain interaction community, only 
considerations on the object of disagreement count, and they must count the same. 
The second order of normativity also implies a validity test. Those considerations 
that count the same must be considerations on the identical object of disagreement. 
This brings us to the last point of this section. As someone may notice, a certain 
consideration, as a distinctive way of appropriating an object of disagreement, 
epitomises a potential translation of the existing object of disagreement into a new 
and diverse object of disagreement. This may give rise to a new binding situation, 
which occupies a place in a long history of objects of disagreements, solutions that 
are new objects of disagreement, and the like. So, disagreement continues despite 
the possibility of momentary solutions. From the point of view of the two levels of 
normativity, each disagreement is an opportunity for the party to reaffirm his or her 
position in the society.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
I have covered quite a bit of ground in this chapter. Everything can be summarized 
in a series of simple intents. First, my general enterprise has been that of presenting 
an ideal situation of disagreement in order to construct a normative account that 
enables parties with different worldviews to act upon objects of disagreement 
without conditions concerning the character of their moral commitments in public. 
Second, I have identified a specific conception of an abstractly characterized party. 
Such a conception aimed to replicate that of people in un-negotiable moral 
disagreement. Third, I have isolated three assumptions in order to make exchanges 
among parties as close as possible to ordinary situations in complex and diverse 
societies. To do so, I have appealed to a minimal account of truth. Such an account 
could be blamed by several epistemologists of truth, but I remain convinced that it 
best serves the scope of reproducing communicative exchanges in a world where 
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many people think differently, and they have a strong interest in pushing their own 
truth to the others. Fourth, I have explained the causational aspect of the model – 
the binding situation. Fifth, and perhaps most controversial of all, I have put 
together all these aspects in order to develop an ideal model of deep disagreement 
– the many-to-one relationship, which has brought abstractly characterised parties 
to affirm, from their own point of view, two lexically ordered levels of normativity.  
 Such a procedure of construction informs my response to a basic question: 
Is there a normativity that all people with different worldviews can affirm without 
compromising their moral commitments? My answer is that such a normativity 
exists. According to such a normativity, parties are entitled to have individual 
subject-object relation with all possible objects of disagreement, and their 
considerations must have at least the same weight that other considerations on the 
same object of disagreement have. As I shall elucidate in the next chapters, this 
combined normativity constitutes a standpoint of justice and a theory of political 
legitimacy.  
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Chapter 6 
The right to have a say 
 
 
 
Exclusion has many faces. From blocking the entrance in a particular place and 
systematically obstructing access to opportunities, to selectively hiding objections 
to common sense and people who appear to deviate from mainstream norms, 
exclusion means to undermine individuals’ claims to have a meaningful mark on 
certain aspects of external reality. In other words, without a substantial change in 
some of their distinguishing features, excluded people cannot have what the rest of 
the society has. Political theories, as we have seen in the first part of this work, also 
may be exclusionary. They fail to capture fundamental power discrepancies. They 
generate demarcations within the society. They restrict their field of application to 
an idealized community of abstractly characterized citizens. They argue that 
exclusion is somehow an undesirable externality of all normative projects.  
In the last two chapters, I have gestured towards the construction of a 
perspectivist political theory, whose intent is to show that a non-exclusionary 
political theory is possible. The scrutiny of social, economic and political relations 
in our societies also have been central in the program of the critical theories of 
justice of Axel Honneth, Nancy Fraser, and Rainer Forst.256 All these accounts 
converge on the view that the fundamental standpoint of justice has a fundamental 
intersubjective justification. This common denominator might seem to suggest that 
whatever kind of general normativity we are looking for, it follows from an 
eminently intersubjective domain. The thesis of this chapter is that a perspectivist 
political theory deconstructs these intersubjective exchanges into simultaneous 
individual relationships with the external world. This change of perspective helps 
                                                          
256 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition (Cambridge MASS: MIT Press, 1996). Nancy Fraser and Axel 
Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition: a political-philosophical exchange (London – New York: Verso, 
2004). Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). Rainer Forst, “First 
Things First: Redistribution, Recognition and Justification,” The European Journal of Philosophy 6 (3) (2007): 
291-304. See also, James Tully, “Struggles over Recognition and Distribution,” Constellations 7 (4) (2000): 
469-82.     
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to illuminate a basic right claim. It also suggests that the right to have a say may be 
the grammar of a critical theory of justice. From an evaluative perspective, it 
captures the ways in which existing social practices, economic and political 
arrangements cause exclusion. From a normative perspective, this standpoint of 
justice says that a just society is a society in which all persons have aggregate 
capacities, powers and means to affect objects of disagreement.  
To substantiate my argument, I shall proceed as follows. Section 2 identifies 
a common problem in contemporary critical theory of justice: recognition, 
participatory parity and justification do not capture all possible forms of social, 
political and cultural exclusion. In section 3, I argue that, in order to tackle cases of 
social, political and cultural exclusion, it is necessary to recursively reconstruct the 
basic claim at the hearth of all claims for participation: that is, the claim to have an 
effect on external reality. On this ground, I isolate the right to have a say as the 
fundamental standpoint of justice for a perspectivist political theory. Section 4 and 
section 5 describe the specific characteristics of this right. Eventually, section 6 
concludes the chapter. 
 
 
 
2. Recognition, participatory parity and justification  
Axel Honneth argues that recognition is an all-encompassing conceptual category 
with both explanatory and normative value. That is, recognition allows us to make 
claims about how things ought to be done, how to value them, and which actions 
are right or wrong in all circumstances of human life – from identity-formation 
problems, maldistribution of economic resources, patterns of self-realization and 
advocacy on the behalf of others in the political arena.257 
 
So, recognition is both an enabling relation and a normative standpoint to 
evaluate and rethink social, economic and political relations in our societies. As an 
enabling relation, recognition describes the communicative exchanges between a 
                                                          
257 Fraser and Honneth 2004.   
124 
 
“would be recognized person” and other human beings (“the recognizers”) that 
leads to the affirmation of the recognized person as the author of one’s own laws.258 
What is at stake, therefore, is autonomy - and a connected account of positive 
freedom. This brings to a defence of recognition that roots in an idea of the self as 
one that has internalized patterns of social interaction. ‘The individual subject,’ 
Honneth writes,‘becomes independent by internalising patterns of interaction, by 
means of which a kind of space of communication can develop within the 
psyche’.259 In the encounter with other human beings, a person affirms herself as 
free through the actual exercise of his or her agential capacity. From an inward 
domain, Honneth locates the practical relation to the self at the intersubjective level, 
where relations of love, institutionalized relations of respect for the dignity of the 
person, shared values and networks of solidarity cultivate three essential modes of 
relating practically to the self: self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem.260 
Relations of mutual recognition, therefore, mark the texture of one’s belonging to 
societal reality in two ways. On the one side, they make possible conditions of self-
realization. Conversely, when claims to recognition are rejected, the feeling of 
disrespect and outrage are so great to motivate contestation to the authority of 
existing social arrangements.261 
These two sides bring us to the understanding of recognition as a normative 
category. When the self is conceived as an interactive entity, Honneth argues, acts 
of recognition, which put persons in the positon to see one another as peers, denote 
full membership in the society. Among peers, acts of recognition certify one’s 
distinctive capacities. Now, if we read these two moments in continuity, it is 
possible to understand the reason why, for Honneth, recognition is the universal 
normative structure of social life. First, recognition guarantees the legal and social 
precondition for being a participant in the society. Second, in the society of equals, 
recognition makes it possible to distinguish oneself from the others. Self-
                                                          
258 Honneth 1996.  
259 Axel Honneth, “Postmodern Identity and Object-Relation Theory: On the Seeming Obsolescence of 
Psychoanalysis,” Philosophical Explorations (3) (1999), 235. 
260 Alike Charles Taylor, Honneth reads recognition as a positive (enabling) concept. See also Charles Taylor, 
Sources of the Self (Harvard University Press, 1989). For a negative conception of recognition, which draws 
upon the same Hegelian framework, see Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
261 Fraser and Honneth 2004, 137. 
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realization, then, results from the combination of these levels, which define the 
necessary preconditions for realizing life goals. Then, the normative orientation of 
a theory of justice, where the connection between the self and its social interaction 
is so stringent, is equivalent to the ability of securing conditions of mutual 
recognition, a demand of justice that can emerge in every social reality anew, or, 
with Honneth’s own words, ‘from the plurality of all particular forms of life’.262 
For Honneth, recognition, therefore, is a resilient normative category. If the 
general applicability of recognition holds true, we can consider debates about 
economic redistribution as disputes concerning the recognition of certain forms of 
contributions to the economic and social processes. Not only recognition enables 
us to envisage how autonomy-based social relationships should be, but also it 
facilitates the assessment of existing social relations and forms of injustice.263 
Under his perspective, since all human beings depend on some sort of social 
interaction, and such interactions depends on mutual recognition, recognition can 
be a valid and universal normative standpoint of justice. From this perspective, then, 
justice means to secure adequate conditions for mutual recognition. And just 
societies are societies that ensure institutionally affirmed forms of legal recognition 
at all required levels.264 
As we have seen, Honneth conceives recognition as the affirmation of 
certain qualities of other human beings. Simply stated, a recognizer recognizes 
something in the recognized person, who, thereby, progresses in the way towards 
self-realization. However, this conception of the relationships of recognition 
prevents Honneth from considering the undesirable consequence of normative 
structures constructed around the idea that one’s affirmation depends on the positive 
acceptance of other persons. Firstly, the preliminary belief that legal relations of 
recognition attach individuals to one another neglects the number of ways in which 
legal relations have taken back space for dissent and self-affirmation. For instance, 
among civil cases brought before 1950 in the United States, only six recognized 
explicitly homosexual persons. Three of these six cases are divorce cases, but there 
                                                          
262 Ivi, 172.  
263 Ivi, 173. 
264 Ibidem. 
126 
 
is no judicial recognition of the husband as a homosexual person, only references 
to improper sexual behaviours. Before 1940, in the United States, the several men 
and women whom today we would call “gay” conducted invisible lives. No public 
discourse, there was little information on the subject, lesbian novels gave negative 
self-images of its characters, and states had laws that criminalized homosexual 
practices.265 Legal ostracism brought to internalize negative descriptions and 
embodied stereotypes. Second, the logic of reciprocal recognition favours a 
homogenising ethos. That is, the translation of the subjective experience into claims 
of justice depends upon a prior definition of what is enough for a claim to 
recognition to be well-founded. Without such a definition, evaluation of one’s 
contribution, and a shared experience of disrespect, one that justifies an 
uncontroversial normative action, would not be possible. Nevertheless, what an 
individual contribution stands for and the form of the recognition order, which 
contain normative claims to consider individual achievements fairly, are frequent 
objects of disagreement. From this angle, the risk is to question what recognition 
was thought to illuminate: that is, the ways in which existing norms and social 
practices cause exclusion.266 
In this vein, Nancy Fraser argues that the portrait of social, economic and 
political conflicts as struggles for recognition is psychologically reductionist and, 
in heterogeneous and diverse societies, it is anachronistic. Unlike Honneth’s 
normative monism, Fraser advances a tripartite theory of justice that culminates in 
the idea of justice as participatory parity.267 Participation is not only “political 
participation”. For Fraser, participation means an all-encompassing notion that 
defines the terms of coexistence in today’s society. In order to ensure such a parity, 
justice-based action must be holistic, but clearly differentiated alongside categories, 
which she finds ontologically irreducible to one another. Under these lenses, a 
participant is someone who has the same opportunity that other members have to 
                                                          
265 For a reconstruction, see John D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: the making of a homosexual 
minority in the United States, 1940-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).  
266 Axel Honneth, Disrespect: the normative foundations of critical theory (London: Polity Press, 2007), ch. 2 
and ch. 4.  
267 Initially, Fraser built her theory of justice upon a perspectival dualism between recognition and 
redistribution. Recently, she has added a third dimension – representation, but the three dimensions remain 
ontologically separated from one another. See Fraser and Honneth 2003. See also Fraser 2008.  
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live a decent life. A kind of life that, together with other members of society, he or 
she must have been able to choose.  
For Fraser, present-day claimants couch their demand in a variety of idioms. 
They orient their claims towards a variety of competing claims. And this 
heterogeneity of justice discourse poses a major challenge to the ideal type of rich 
notions of human dignity, self-realization, and to those accounts, like Honneth’s 
critical theory of justice, that equate the overall aim of struggles for justice with the 
possibility of leading a good life.268269 The emphasis on the diversity and competing 
agenda of present-day claims for justice pushes Fraser to identify three spheres of 
actions: that is, redistribution, recognition, and representation in agreement with the 
economic, cultural and political dimensions that she identifies in justice-based 
demands.270 Firstly, economic structure can deny people full participation in the 
society. Secondly, hierarchies and informal structures can prevent people from 
participating on par with others. Thirdly, arbitrary community-border making and 
inappropriate scheme of representation can deny people to have an equal voice.271 
Participatory parity, then, works in two ways. On the one hand, like a 
counterfactual, it substantiates claims against existing economic arrangements, 
patterns of identity-formation and mechanisms for political representation. To be 
clear, since the goal of participatory parity has not been achieved yet, there are good 
reasons for an immanent critique of existing economic, social and political 
structures. On the other hand, participatory parity establishes how things ought to 
be done. Namely, without participatory parity, merits of redistribution, recognition 
and representation are objects of contestation. Participatory parity is a standard 
according to which individuals and groups justify competing claims against 
misdistribution, misrecognition and misdistribution.272 
Participatory parity, therefore, informs actions across these three 
dimensions. Specifically, redistribution must ensure economic structures not to 
deny material resources to participate as peers. Moreover, participatory parity 
                                                          
268 Fraser 2008, 2.  
269 Ivi, 3 
270 Ivi, 6 
271 Ivi, 59-61. 
272 Fraser and Honneth 2003, 38. 
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requires a politics of recognition, but in the status model, no longer encapsulated in 
the question of identity. This means, as Fraser puts it, ‘a politics aimed at 
overcoming subordination by establishing the misrecognized party as a full member 
of society, capable of participating on a par with the rest’.273 Representation, then, 
accounts for the internal demarcations within a certain political community and the 
primary constitution of the borders of the political space.274 
So, once we have dismantled barriers, obstacles, structures both material 
and social, and inappropriate political boundaries, we are in a just society – one 
where all can participate as peers in social life.275 In one understanding, if we agree 
on the glaring injustices of our societies at the economic, social and political levels, 
the goal of participatory parity functions as the generator of transformative actions. 
In another understanding, if we agree on participatory parity as an appropriate 
normative standpoint, we have an ideal type of cooperation in hand. In the two 
understandings, however, Fraser presupposes that agreement on participatory parity 
as the standpoint informing fair terms of cooperation is uncontroversial. It is not 
difficult to imagine that there is disagreement on these terms. The point, however, 
is not on the characteristics of such standpoint of justice. Here, the concern is with 
the consequences of the postulation on an agreement on such terms of cooperation. 
In other words, in my understanding, for Fraser, parties may disagree on what 
justice demands us to do now, but they do agree on what justice is, and what is a 
fully just society. In this way, Fraser’s investment in the idea of participatory parity 
downplays some worldviews from a free-floating perspective. This move would 
necessitate an additional normative justification. As Lois McNay writes in an 
endorsement of Fraser’s model against Honneth, ‘the norm of participatory parity 
provides the standard in relation to which individuals and groups must justify their 
claims about misrecognition’.276 Such claims, Frasers says, cannot derive by 
reference to personal experience only. Individuals must be able to demonstrate that 
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the intersubjective conditions for participatory parity have been violated.277 
Distorted or manipulated claims, identitarian claims, claims from personal 
experience, and the like are not valid reasons for transformative action.  
In this way, the participatory parity paradigm transforms heterogeneous and diverse 
societies into a set of individuals who agree upon a substantive notion of justice, 
despite being in disagreement on other moral issues and the specific targets of 
transformative action. Nevertheless, the paradigm of participatory parity is 
entrenched with some economic, cultural and political categories that, however 
desirable they might be, in today’s societies, people do not share univocally. This 
means to displace the consequent exclusion of these groups from the critical 
perspective and to sustain prejudices against some fringes. And these prejudices 
may promote conformism in a way that may end up questioning what participatory 
parity was thought to illuminate: the diversity of emancipatory claims and the ways 
in which existing social, economic and political practices cause exclusion.  
 
Rainer Forst has advanced a third alternative approach to a critical theory of 
justice. On his view, a universally valid critical normativity arises from a principle 
of reciprocal and general justification. In his account, we must distinguish two 
phases. First, a critical reconstruction of the principle from demands of justice. 
Second, the evaluative and normative work of the principle on existing social, 
political and economic structures. On the one hand, for Forst, the claims of all forms 
of protesting, regardless of cultural belongings and their account of human beings, 
can be recursively traced back to a fundamental demand of justification.278 On this 
view, all claims-bearers demand to be respected as someone who deserves 
justification (has a right to justification) for rules, actions and structures to which 
he or she is subjected.279 In agreement with this, then, the most basic claim for 
justification is what people cannot reject one another – a right. That is, the logic of 
justification requires that what is meaningful for the individual, as an equal and free 
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human being, and expresses a binding claim that both the person and all other equal 
and free human beings cannot deny.  
On the other hand, once we have isolated the right to justification as an 
appropriate standpoint of justice, through discursive and intersubjective exchanges, 
affected members construct norms that, since none of those affected has a reciprocal 
and general reason against them, have binding force.  So, like Honneth, Forst argues 
for a monistic grammar of justice: justification. The right to justification is a 
principle that encompasses all contexts of justice by restricting the range of 
justifiable claims.  There must be no political and social relation that cannot be 
reciprocally and generally justified to all those who are part of the relative 
context.280 With reciprocity, Forst means to say that the author of the relative 
justificatory claim cannot demand rights or privileges that he or she denies his or 
her addressees. He also means to say that, in a justificatory practice, a person cannot 
justify a collectively binding norm in the light of his or her own personal opinions 
and interests.281 Let us clarify, if you are the CEO of a multinational corporation, 
and you ask for ninety days of vacation leave, when your employees have a 
maximum of twenty days per year, you are not using a reciprocally valid reason. 
Simultaneously, with generality, Forst defines the border of the justificatory 
constituency in correspondence with the extension of the community of all those 
affected by actions or norms.282 In other words, if you are the Job secretary, and 
you bid for a universally applicable ninety-days-vacation-leave, the community of 
all CEOs, the relative employees, families, and whoever thinks of being affected by 
the proposal, inside and outside the geographical borders of the country, must have 
the opportunity to be part of the definition of such proposals.  
Then, the right to justification informs both evaluative and normative action 
in our society. On the critical understanding, it works as a veto right and it supports 
a scrutiny of existing social and political structure of oppression and domination. 
The determination of the appropriate treatment, and the answer to the question of 
who deserves what, arises contextually, when people ask for reasons, the 
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justification of certain rules and institutions, or when the reasons they receive no 
longer suffice.283 On a normative understanding, the right to justification tells us 
that all norms, relations, structures, institutions and rules have to be generally and 
reciprocally justifiable. In agreement with this, the standpoint of justice is about 
how a person is treated – not what he or she has.284 Justice as justification is, as 
Forst writes, ‘about ending domination and unjustifiable, arbitrary rule, whether 
political or social in a broader sense; it is about citizens’ status as equals in political 
and social life’.285 Consequently, for a society to be just from the standpoint of the 
right to justification, all members have  an obligation to recognize affected person 
as someone to whom they owe reasons that justify their actions.286 Simultaneously, 
a fundamentally just basic political structure is an institutional architecture in which 
all affected human beings have means to deliberate, decide in common about social 
institutions, and establish concrete norms that are reciprocally and generally non-
rejectable.287 
 
We can illuminate three guiding threads in this account: the scope of a 
theory of justice (all affected human beings), the kind of individual engagement 
with problems and other people (participation), and a qualitative definition of the 
kind of appropriate participation (through general and reciprocal reasons). These 
three elements clarify that justice is not about what arrangements deliver, but rather 
it describes a network of relationships in which persons construct norms through 
discursive exchanges, when these exchanges admit only reciprocal and general 
claims as valid at the intersubjective level. In the to-and-fro of a justificatory 
exchange, each of the member counts on the other and demands of the other as 
much as she asks of herself. In this kind of reciprocal going and coming, there seems 
to be, to borrow from Sartre, “a pact of generosity” between addressees of 
justification (who demands) and speakers of this mutually beneficial exchange.288 
From this perspective, the play of mutual exchange of reasons seems a 
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fundamentally collaborative process, which, therefore, presupposes a minimal basis 
of joint coordinated action plan. For Forst, a basic form of recognition works as an 
assurance mechanism: that is, all human beings claim to be recognized as 
addressees of reasons for actions, when they are subjected to such actions.289 By 
extension, since all human beings believe they rightfully deserve justification, just 
arrangements are those that are justifiable to their eyes. Again, this way of reasoning 
relies on two assumptions. First, the assurance mechanism must hold true, and Forst 
gives us a plausible historical reconstruction for taking this point as valid. Second, 
a justification-based account of justice presumes that human beings are always able 
to participate in differentiated discursive practices.290 As we have seen in the 
previous chapters, this hardly holds true.  
By under-thematising the ability to do something, Forst also fails to capture 
the ways in which existing norms and social practices cause exclusion. He might 
argue that the normativity of the right to justification presupposes an equalizing 
action on all would be participants. In other words, as a possible affected member, 
the right to justification tells us that he or she must be in the conditions to affect the 
construction of justifiable arrangement. This is true, but it seems to me that, in this 
way, by extending its reach to all those affected, a right to justification can empower 
excluded members only when some kind of justificatory relationship is already in 
place. However, this argument depends on a partial understanding of the individual 
experience of exclusion. Exclusion bars a person from accessing something, say 
something, benefitting from social relations and material resources. Exclusion, in 
other words, entails isolation and a fracture between the person and the external 
reality. We cannot capture and solve such a fracture between a person and external 
elements by extending existing human relationships, because individuals do not 
necessarily experience exclusion as an intersubjective experience.  
In this context, if we want to capture and illuminate exclusion, it seems to 
me that a critical theory of justice should two do things. First, as I have done in the 
first chapters of this work, it ought to identify exclusionary practices and narratives. 
This means to unveil the exclusionary character that political concepts, tradition, 
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conformity, common sense and generalizations may have. Second, it ought to focus 
on the person as a single entity who tries to affect the external world in a distinctive 
way. For instance, this means to disaggregate exchanges of reasons for what they 
are: that is, disagreement among people who have something to say on a certain 
aspect of external reality that somehow affect their life.  
To sum up, in this section, I have argued that, by plugging into their 
accounts a fundamental intersubjective component, the critical theory of Honneth, 
Fraser and Forst fail to capture how existing practices and norms cause exclusion. 
On my view, as I shall demonstrate in the following, if we reconstruct the basic 
claim as a fundamental demand to appropriate external discursive or material 
objects, it is possible to defend a standpoint of justice that identifies economic, 
political and social structures, which, with Rainer Forst’s own words, ‘are marked 
by forms of exclusion, by privileges and domination’.291 
 
 
3. The right to have a say (I) 
How is it possible to mediate between the individual demand to affect 
elements of the external world and the intersubjective character of the standpoint of 
justice, which, of any value, must be valid for all human beings? As I mentioned 
above, part of the limit of recognition, redistribution and justification is that the 
determination of the general standpoint of justice occurs predominantly at the 
intersubjective level, with an inclination to favour conformity and under-thematise 
exclusion. In this section, I introduce the right to have a say. My idea is that a 
general entitlement to appropriate external objects can block arguments for 
exclusion and empower persons to act on objects of disagreement. In my view, as 
we shall see, the most fundamental principle of justice requires the distribution of 
a specific good: the entitlement to have a say, which encompasses all necessary 
legal and economic resources. Consequently, the normative standpoint says that no 
social and political arrangement can claim to be just unless members have had the 
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legal and economic means to affect its content. And, a fundamentally just society 
is a society that, through its legal and political structures, ensures the concrete 
realization of everyone’s entitlement to have a say.  
 
For a perspectivist political theory, central is the concern with the 
relationship between a possible perspective-holder and an external object. On this 
view, we break the ordinary intersubjective experience of disagreement into its 
basic components. Usually, we think of disagreements as situations in which people 
do not have the same opinion over something. Political theorists tend to see this 
situation from the within: they assume people can access the objects of 
disagreement, they also assume that they are able to exchange opinions with one 
another.292 In this way, the focus is on the qualitative definition of the kind of 
opinions that people can exchange.293 My view rejects the two starting assumptions 
as false. As we have seen in the previous chapters, these assumptions may lead to 
underestimating internal and external exclusionary demarcations.  
 
To avoid this exclusionary element, a perspectivist political theory advances 
a methodological claim. The study of disagreements, I argue, must begin with the 
deconstruction of disagreements into their constitutive parts, which are common 
across the whole spectrum of disagreements, from epistemic and aesthetic to 
political and moral. First, for disagreement to exist there must be more than one 
person. Second, people must have slightly different/different/very different 
opinions over something. Third, these opinions must be visible to one another so 
that the difference among the available options is recognizable. The deconstruction 
of disagreements helps us to unveil their fundamental architecture: two or more 
persons extend their agency on the same external element, and, because of this 
common denominator, they enter into a special relationship with one another. In 
other words, to the traditional focus on what occurs within disagreements, I isolate 
another object of normative investigation. Namely, the phase in which different 
persons enter in a relationship with one another because of an object of common 
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concern. This phase is both diachronically antecedent and normatively prior to the 
exchange of different considerations that, usually, defines disagreements.  On an 
object (O), the set of considerations {O₁, O₂, O₃, O₄} is the result of P₁, P₂, P₃ and 
P₄ having a consideration on O – and this consideration being accessible to the 
others.  
 
 
 
This subject-object relationship and the consequent subject-object-subject 
relationship may look like a reified and atomistic portrait of disagreements. To 
surpass discomfort with this account, it is important to clarify what I mean with 
objects of disagreement. My definition of object is deliberately open to different 
levels of abstraction and discursive contexts. Objects, I stipulate, are those 
purposes, aims, goals – discursive and materials – of an individual action, which, 
through recursive reconstruction, we can recognize as the common denominators 
across different considerations. The object, in other words, is both the reason why 
different persons are in disagreement – the aim, purpose, goal; and a threshold of 
reciprocity – common denominator, which enables exchanges. From this, we should 
not conclude that these two components are symmetrical. Actually, from the 
asymmetry of these two components, we are able to identify the basic claim that a 
perspectivist political theory aims to address. Specifically, for something to be 
recognised as an object of disagreement, more than one person has exercised her 
command on the same external element. Following these appropriations, an object 
constitutes an intersubjective relationship that connects all persons with different 
worldviews on the same object. However, for this intersubjective relationship to be 
possible, individual appropriations are constitutive. Consider again an object (O), 
the set of considerations {O₁, O₂, O₃, O₄} is the result of P₁, P₂, P₃ and P₄ having 
a consideration on O – and this consideration being accessible to the others. In this 
way, P₁, P₂, P₃ and P₄, establish a contingent relationship around O where O₁, O₂, 
O₃ and O₄ display differences and affinities with one another.294 This representation 
                                                          
294One may notice that, often, physical appearance (sex, skin colour, outfit, hairstyle, smell, and the like) do 
affect what one is for the other in disagreement. At the same time, different accents and manners also alter this 
intersubjective constitution significantly. This is true, and they are exactly some of the discriminations that the 
136 
 
tells us how an object can connect P1, P2, P3 and P4. We need more. Why are O1, 
O2, O3 and O4 accessible? More fundamental than their appropriation of O, there 
is a claim to access elements of the external reality, including O. This is the most 
basic claim that associates human beings regardless of their cultural ties or 
conception of the human being. On this ground, my thesis in what follows is that, 
if it is true that a non-exclusionary political theory expresses a normative concern 
for demarcations between who counts and who does not count, and if it is true that 
there might be disagreement about what justice is, one fundamental claim makes 
possible all arguments regarding what justice requires us to do. It says, I argue, that 
human beings claim to access material and discursive objects. And all these claims 
have a common normative ground in a general entitlement to have a say.  
 
In this way, a perspectivist political theory turns the traditional 
intersubjective emphasis of philosophical discourses on disagreement into a 
concern with an original subjective claim. My idea is that prior to all discussion 
about the scope and justification of a general standpoint of justice, a fundamental 
entitlement to appropriate external element seems necessary, the denial of which 
undermines the universal aspiration of all successive rights claims. Without such 
an entitlement, even the conceptual aspiration to construct universally valid 
normative principles may be unavoidably partial, or forget someone at the margins 
of common sense. Without such an entitlement, the justification of the genesis of 
disagreement also is lacking. Think of questions like, “Why two or more people can 
exchanges opinions, reasons and considerations on the same thing?”, “Why some 
and not all?” and “Why you and not me?”. They presuppose the existence of a 
reason for the state or condition of being entitled to participate.   
 
The special role of this entitlement identifies its normative priority over 
other rights. Namely, it considers that demands for rights incorporate a primary 
activity of potential rights holders to insist upon or against the rights in question. 
Consequently, the entitlement to have a say transcends the possible spheres of 
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available demands for rights and operates as their condition of possibility. In this 
way, it constitutes a normativity that is above all rights-claims but that all potential 
right holders are bound to affirm as a condition of possibility for their presence in 
the intersubjective relationship that defines specific standards of justice. At the 
same time, the right to have a say confers normative weight to other rights-claims 
because it asserts that all persons are the ultimate repository of justice. And, if 
specific standards of justice are to have any meaning, the person as a potential 
holder of a claim on such standards, is the one we shall empower to continue 
insisting that the intersubjective construction of binding standards can be binding 
for all. 
 
Thus, on the view I advocate, the basic demand that one’s claim to 
appropriate external objects is not ignored represents the fundamental constituent 
for having non-exclusionary relationships. Here, the entitlement to have a say is 
seen as the result of a subjective reconstruction of the conditions of possibility that 
ensure participation in intersubjective discourses about rights and other possible 
sources of disagreement. What confers normative weight to this entitlement is the 
observation that, in all communicative attempts, the starting point is a basic claim 
to affect elements of the external reality. In this way, the right to have a say secures 
the equal standing of persons from their demand to act, transform and assimilate 
what is given in the external world. Since the right to have a say expresses the 
fundamental claim at the basis of other rights claims; at the intersubjective level, it 
cannot be denied without a simultaneous affirmation of its constitutive importance. 
That is, Susan can try to prevent Luke from accessing an object of disagreement. 
However, we can bring back both claims, Luke’s claim on an object of 
disagreement and Susan’s claim against Luke doing so, to the same basic claim to 
affect some aspects of external reality. This implicit common terrain ensures that, 
from all perspectives, the right to have a say is the anchor for the construction of 
shared, norms, rules and arrangements. Therefore, the right to have a say is a basic 
right, which is conductive to other rights. At this point, a clarification of the form 
of this basic right seems in point. In the next section, I shall elucidate the structure 
of the right to have a say. 
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4. The right to have a say (II) 
How, then, should we think about the right to have a say? The right to have a say is 
a normative principle that enables individuals to construct other rights (principles) 
and constitute relative network of duties (obligations). The belief is that, without a 
general entitlement to appropriate objects of disagreement, there is no justification 
for the claim for the universal validity of processes and principles. In my view, such 
an entitlement overcomes a limit of contemporary political theory. It helps to 
individuate an important normative vacuum: that is, when theories leave possible 
affected subjects at the margins of construction procedures, the excluded subjects 
have no ground for claiming their due position in the definition of rules, norms and 
arrangements. To solve this impasse, I have argued, we need a universal pre-
institutional right, which, as a first order of normativity, places demands on what 
other political, social and economic arrangements must be like.295 It is pre-
institutional in the sense that its existence is logically prior to other political 
structures, legal systems and social practices. Since the claim to affect elements of 
external reality can be possessed even by human beings who live isolated or in a 
state of nature, such a claim, in my view, authorizes other normative arrangements 
and construes the role of each person in the community of human beings.  There 
might be other important claims, but, as we have seen in the previous section, 
because this basic claim defines a person presence in the world, other rights, like 
the right to justification, can be accorded once all the necessary elements to exercise 
the right to have a say have been granted.  
The right to have a say compounds different layers. I take the right to have 
a say to be a complex enabling and active right (Frida has a right to X), which 
includes two Hofeldian incidents.296 Wesley Hohefeld distinguished different 
senses of a right, which he classified in four incidents: the privilege, the claim, the 
power, and the immunity.297 The right to have a say includes two of the four 
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incidents. The right to have a say expresses a ‘paired privilege’.298 Specifically, 
Frida has a paired-privilege right to have a say or not to have a say. The right to 
have a say, therefore, endows Frida with discretion concerning her possible range 
of actions.299 Together with the paired-privilege, Frida also has the ability to change 
the normative situation of oneself and the other.300 The right to have a say, thus, 
also indicates a higher-order Hohfeldian incident: paired power. Specifically, Frida 
has the power to annul, and the power not to annul, Louise’s right to have a say. To 
clarify, at the level of privilege, the right to have a say enables Frida to have a say 
or not have a say, as she thinks appropriate. At the level of paired power, Frida has 
the discretionary authority to waive her claim against being silenced. The right to 
have a say, in other words, gives Frida the authority to authorize other people to 
impose her not to have a say. For instance, George is a monk who voluntarily 
submits his agential capacity to a higher authority, like the abbot Benedict, who, in 
turn, authorizes the Pope to have a say in his place.  On the other hand, this basic 
scheme allows us to detect those cases when the right to have a say is not actually 
at stake. Should a member of the society asserts that his or her right to have a say 
has been violated by forbidding him to prevent someone else to have a say (i.e. by 
silencing him with violence), this explanation shows that such member is not 
asserting the privilege right to have a say. He is rather asserting a one-sided claim-
right towards the others, according to which others have a duty of non-interference 
on his right whatsoever.  
Hence, from the view I advocate, there is no derivation of a fundamental 
standpoint of justice from an intersubjective practice, the construction of the basic 
right claim derives from a recursive movement from disagreement to the most 
fundamental claim that substantiates the individual presence in intersubjective 
discursive practices. In this section, I have deconstructed this standpoint of justice 
to clarify its normative architecture. In the next section, I shall continue this 
explanatory work by reading the right to have a say in analogy with other defences 
of political participation. For now, we can conclude that, according to the right to 
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have a say, a norm must be the result of a disagreement whose participants are all 
human beings with a claim on the source of disagreement. From this perspective, 
no morally or political reasons count against the norm rightness: that is, the fact that 
all human beings have exercised their right to have a say.  
 
 
5. The right to have a say, the right to have rights, the right to politics 
Now, someone may claim that the right to have a say is a limit (regulates 
action of a third counterpart upon members), rather than a privilege. Under these 
lenses, the crucial claim is that institutions lack the authority to regulate 
participation.301 This is true. However, such a way of thinking begins with the 
assumption that political arrangements accord with the right to have a say. From 
that perspective, a society is just because it secures everyone’s right to have a say. 
At that level, the right to have a say presupposes a limitation to state’s power: that 
is, it has no ground to force members with a right to have a say to participate in 
certain ways.  Simultaneously, if a state claims to be just, the right to have a say 
grounds a claim-right towards its institutions. That is, all members, qua human 
beings with a claim to affect external reality, have a right to have a say; 
consequently, when a state derives its just power by incorporating such a right, then 
it must secure and protect it.  
At this stage, a clarification seems in point. The language of a right to have 
a say resembles that of a “right of right”, “right to politics”, “right to political 
participation” and “right to have rights”.302 “The “right to have rights” defends a 
superior right to access institutional rights by a given political regime. Most 
prominently, it entails the right to belong to a political community where one can 
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recognize one another as equals.303 The “right to politics” and other forms of a 
“right to political participation” vindicate a right to participate in the process that 
constitutes positive rights.304 In the two understandings, the belief is that, since 
institutional and positive rights claim authority on all who live in a certain territory, 
would be affected subjects must be empowered with a claim to shape the ways these 
rights are conceived and implemented. The assonance with a right to have a say is 
obvious, but these overarching rights to access legal or political rights respond 
primarily to demands of legitimation and contestation of authority. ‘My argument,’ 
Fabienne Peter writes, ‘aims to show that human rights will fail to secure political 
legitimacy if the right to political participation is excluded from the set of basic 
right’.305 For Waldron, ‘one can plausibly say that participation is the right-
theorist’s most natural answer to the problem of authority and the disagreements 
about rights’.306 According to Balibar, the right to politics is ‘a universal right to 
political activity for every individual in all the domains in which the problem of 
collectively organized possession, power, and knowledge is posed’.307 Such rights, 
therefore, illuminate the space of manoeuvre for changing established juridical and 
political orders. Under these lenses, when rights to politics are not uniformly 
allocated across the society, rightlessness justifies non-conformity or, existing 
arrangements have to be reformed coherently with all citizens’ claim to shape and 
transform legal and political arrangements. The right to have a say is a general 
principle that evaluates both these arrangements and the right to politics itself. For 
instance, a demarcation between citizens and non-citizens, and the corresponding 
allocation of the right to politics, is itself an object of critical scrutiny from the 
perspective of a right to have a say. This does not mean to say that the right to have 
a say and these typologies of rights are not compatible. The present proposal argues 
that the right to have a say is the basic normative principle upon which we can 
construct and evaluate systems of rights, the agreement on the underpinning moral 
values, and strategies to ensure participation.  
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The difference between the right to have a say and the different typologies 
of empowering rights introduces another important observation: the right to have a 
say is not “the right for everyone to have a say”. The difference is thin, but evident. 
When human beings affirm their right to have a say from their basic claim to affect 
the external world, they do so from their distinctive point of view. By affirming this 
right, they claim that they deserve what is required to affect external reality, since 
this is the enabling condition for establishing other kinds of arrangements. 
Contrariwise, “the right for everyone to have a say” presupposes an intersubjective 
connection among human beings who have already exercised their most 
fundamental entitlement to have a say. In my view, this form of normativity would 
require a degree of reciprocity, mutually binding duties, and a contractualist 
component, which, at the level of the construction of such a right, may be circular. 
Namely, by defending general and universal participation, in the name of benefits 
for all, the most tolerant and open-minded members of the society impose their view 
on some other pockets. According to my perspective, despite leading to analogous 
normative propositions, a right to have a say is a most basic right that the right for 
everyone to have a say, and, as an enabling right, it is its very condition of 
possibility. So, this section has tried to demonstrate the relationship between the 
right to have a say and existing normative proposals to ensure participation of all 
affected subjects. As we have seen, a right to have a say is not necessarily in 
conflicts with these strategies. The difference is mainly conceptual. Simply stated, 
the right to have a say is a normative standpoint that evaluates these proposals 
critically from the point of view of the basic individual claim to have an effect on 
external reality.  
 
6. Conclusion 
To conclude, in this chapter, I have argued that, when it comes to grounding 
a critical theory of justice, the right to have a say has two merits. It identifies forms 
of social, economic and political exclusions, which may remain under-thematised 
in the important accounts of Axel Honneth, Nancy Fraser and Rainer Forst. 
Moreover, the right to have a say envisions a just society where all members have 
143 
 
the due means to mark objects of disagreement meaningfully. In this society, the 
justice of legal, political and economic arrangements ties with the inclusion of all 
members with a right to have a say. Similar to existing critical theories of justice, 
my account emphasises the need to avoid forms of privilege, domination and 
exclusion. Unlike other accounts, I argue that justice is about the relationship 
between a person and elements of the external world.  
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Chapter 7 
Legitimacy and the two orders of normativity  
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I have defined the characteristic standpoint of justice of a 
perspectivist political theory. As we have seen in chapter IV and chapter V, a second 
order of normativity also is constitutive of my account. When individuals have a 
right to have a say and, in this way, can appropriate external objects of 
disagreement, they constitute disagreements around issues of communal concern. 
At that point, a perspectivist political theory says that, for a solution of disagreement 
to claim authority, all perspectives on the same object must count the same.  
Now, it should be clear that the subject-object relation is central for a 
perspectivist political theory. From this point of view, we may think of 
disagreements as the expressions of simultaneous and satisfied demands to enter 
into relationship with external objects. However, the constitution of subject-object 
relations on a specific object of disagreement does not guarantee that, when other 
members act upon the same object of disagreement, all subject-object relations are 
protected in the practice of disagreement. For this being so, there is a second 
normative layer, which has two functions. On the one hand, it equalizes subject-
object relations within disagreements. On the other hand, it anchors the authority of 
the outcome to such an equalization. 
In this chapter, I explain that, in a society where all members have a right to 
have a say, the second order of normativity is a procedural mechanism that 
determines the legitimacy of collectively binding decisions. From this observation, 
my thesis is that political institutions, as sites of systemic decision-making, are 
legitimate if all members can recognize an individual subject-object relation with 
the outcome of disagreement. To substantiate my position, I hold some fundamental 
stipulations. For me, legitimacy means the way through which people authorize an 
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institution to exercise power and enact binding decisions.308 I also use institutions 
and basic structure of the society interchangeably. Here, I borrow from Rawls: that 
is, the basic structure is ‘the way in which major social institutions distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the advantages from social 
cooperation’.309 Moreover, on purpose, I use the word “members” to explore the 
normativity of a perspectivist political theory. By using members, I aim to stress 
the idea that both the standpoint of justice and the second order of normativity 
encompass all human beings who live in a territory where political, social and 
economic arrangements are organized around the right to have a say. In agreement 
with this, I consider temporary immigrants, refugees, foreign students, labour 
immigrants, diplomats as members. One caveat also is in point. This account of 
legitimacy depends on the institutionalization of the right to have a say. Without 
members having such a right, the second order of normativity does not hold. In 
other words, this chapter tells us how a legitimate decision would be, if members 
had the right to have a say. With these postulations in mind, in section 2, I shall 
define my conception of legitimacy. Section 3 answers some objections. One of 
these objections introduces a problem of scalability. Then, section 4 and section 5 
construct the outline of a decision-making procedure that may make legitimate 
decisions regardless of the scale of disagreement. Section 6 concludes the chapter.  
 
2. Legitimacy and the two orders of normativity 
The right to have a say submits the basic structure of the society to a general right 
claim – the individual claim to appropriate objects of external reality. This 
standpoint of justice tells us what non-exclusionary societies must guarantee. 
However, it leaves under-thematised the way through which a society so-conceived 
can take decision in a context of deep moral disagreement. In the present account, 
therefore, the two levels of normativity are interrelated but uncoupled. They are 
different evaluations of a state’s basic structure that respond to two different 
                                                          
308 This definition is the starting point of contemporary disputes about legitimacy. See Robert Paul Wolff, In 
Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper and Row). See also John A Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
309 Rawls 1971, 7.  
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political issues. The right to have a say, as we have seen, is a standpoint of justice. 
It attends to the concern of thinking about the ways through which the basic 
structure can shape chances in life across the members of a society. The second 
order of normativity, as I shall clarify in this section, is about the legitimacy of 
decisions in a context of disagreement. As well known, legitimacy addresses the 
apprehension regarding the ways through which decision-makers take decisions and 
concerns with the coercion following from such decisions.310 It is important to 
notice that, here, I do not take justice and legitimacy as conflating with one another, 
alternative or independent. The present conception of legitimacy is a conception of 
legitimacy for a society where members have a right to have a say, and the basic 
structure is constructed accordingly. On this view, therefore, the institutionalization 
of the right to have a say is the necessary condition for this conception of legitimacy 
to be valid. I am not constructing a conception of legitimacy for all worlds, but one 
that, under specific circumstances, says when institutions can expect people to 
comply with collectively binding decisions. 
 
Here, the question is: how can institutions substantiate the claim to rule over 
people who have a right to have a say and different worldviews? Two observations 
seem in point. Since there might be disagreement over collectively binding 
decisions, the quality of the outcome does not seem a plausible candidate to ensure 
legitimacy. Second, since the right to have a say ensures a right claim to appropriate 
all possible objects of disagreement, the claim to rule over people has to include a 
built-in quality of being revisable. A collectively binding decision, regardless of its 
legitimacy, remains a possible object of the external world that members are fully 
entitled to appropriate. With these two observations in hand, following the many-
to-one relationship, my thesis is that, from the point of view of each member with 
a right to have a say, for an institution to have a claim right to rule, for all decisions, 
a member’s valid consideration must count as much as other considerations count. 
The valid consideration of a member incorporates two expressions of agency: first, 
the choice to exercise the claim right to appropriate objects of the external world, 
                                                          
310 For a comparative assessment of justice-claims and legitimacy-claims, see Matt Sleat, “Justice and 
Legitimacy in Contemporary Liberal Thought: a Critique,” Social Theory and Practice 41 (2) (2015): 230-52. 
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second, the action upon a specific external object. If we keep these two elements in 
mind, then, a coherent definition of legitimacy has to hold the subject-object 
relation before, during and after disagreement. If so, it is possible to say that a 
decision has a claim right to rule when all members can recognize an individual 
subject-object relation with the outcome of disagreement.  
 
From this definition, someone may notice that, in the present account, there 
is a disaggregation of the legitimacy of institutions into the legitimacy of the 
decisions resulting from properly constructed disagreements. In this way, for the 
basic structure to have a right to rule, we can say that a proceduralist component 
integrates the substantive action of the standpoint of justice. Therefore, the 
legitimation of decision-making power depends on two things: the articulation of 
procedural mechanisms and the right to have a say. Seen in this way, the present 
account is a hybrid form of proceduralism. For proceduralist accounts of legitimacy, 
it is sufficient to have an appropriately constrained process to take decisions.311 
Here, the idea is that two kinds of constraints must be in place. While members’ 
entitlement to appropriate external objects is necessary for legitimacy, another 
condition helps to make specific outcomes legitimate despite disagreement. First, 
the substantive standpoint of the right to have a say commands institutions to enable 
all members to access all possible objects of disagreement. It also secures the 
members’ entitlement to challenge collectively binding decisions. Second, the 
procedural element requires institutions to construct disagreements in certain ways. 
Specifically, the condition that all valid and available considerations count the same 
helps to neutralize elements that are external to the individual subject-object 
relation with the object of disagreement. A legitimate decision, in other words, must 
be the result only of individual subject-object relations with the object of 
disagreement, either in the form of an absent relation (members decide not to 
participate) or in the form of an unmediated relation with the object (members 
decide to participate).  
                                                          
311 For instance, deliberative democrats think that legitimacy, at least in part, depends on the process of public 
deliberation. See James Bohman, Public Deliberation (Cambridge MASS: MIT Press, 1996) and Jürgen 
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge MASS: MIT Press, 1996).  
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In this way, regardless of the object of disagreement and the composition of 
the interaction community, institutions may enact legitimate decisions, because, 
without unbalances, such decisions are ultimately expressions of all members’ 
subject-object relations. This argument seems to recall that of Jürgen Habermas. 
For Habermas, democratic procedures, which deal with a wide series of 
argumentative strategies, must guarantee that, despite the diverse gamut of 
available reasons, intersubjective exchanges lead to the communicative 
coordination among actors, who mobilize their knowledge potential in order to 
achieve a rationally motivated agreement on the best available reason.312  
 
For him, politics introduces a degree of complexity that cannot be fully 
satisfied by an application of discursive ethics without any adaptation.313 Two 
passages are required. On the one hand, Habermas needs to modify the discursive 
principle in accordance with the heterogeneous nature of political communication. 
On the other hand, it is necessary to begin a recursive reconstruction of the 
evaluative standards that make possible differentiated communicative exchanges in 
the political domain. First, as Jeffrey Flinn summarises, ‘the principle of discourse 
… must be brought to bear on the medium of law if it is to specify a procedure for 
legitimate law-making’.314 This brings Habermas to define the principle of 
democracy: ‘Only those statues may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent 
                                                          
312 Habermas 1996, 450. 
313 See Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984). See also 
Habermas 1996, 3-6, 17-19, 107,  158-68, 196-7. See also, Jeffrey Flynn, “Communicative Power in 
Habermas’s Theory of Democracy,” European Journal of Political Theory 3 (4) (2004): 444-51. Habermas’ 
account relies upon a distinctive account of communicative rationality. Communicative rationality is rooted in 
the intersubjective structures of communication according to which the paradigm of a successful 
communication is a communication in which parties reach an agreement. Whoever makes use of a natural 
language in order to come to an understanding with an addressee about something in the world inscribes such 
an exchange within ‘the linguistic telos of mutual understanding’ as a basis to pursue illocutionary goals and 
structural conditions to tell other people what they ought to do. When a speaker participates in an exchange of 
reasons, as a discursive procedure in which parties share reasons that they expect the addressee to accept, she 
makes speech acts that condense a series of background justificatory reasons. Discursive processes of 
argumentation, then, unveil these reasons in a chain of mutual communicative exchanges that are oriented 
towards reaching an understanding between the two parties. From this reflective continuation of actions 
oriented towards reaching understanding among parties, who are moved by the force of better argument only; 
Habermas introduces the principle of discourse for the impartial justification of norms: ‘just those action norms 
are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses’. 
314 Flynn 2004, 436. 
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of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally 
constituted’.315 Second, discursive theory evolves in an analysis of differentiated 
discursive processes aiming to clarify the standpoint for mutual evaluation. The 
interconnection of these two theoretical operations leads Habermas to defend a 
proceduralist account of legitimacy. According to the discursive model of 
democracy, therefore, the locus of a governing body’s authority are the 
interconnected, but differentiated, processes of making laws that connect moments 
of opinion formation among affected members, and, in institutional settings, actual 
decision-making mechanisms, which deliver outputs in agreement with the 
expectations of those affected.316 
Unlike Habermas, according to my view, members have both opinion 
formation power and decision-making power. Members do not only monitor and 
think of policy solutions. In order to maintain the subject-object relation, the 
decision-making process has to put all members in the position to see the programs 
carried out by the basic structure of the society as their own programs. The 
grounding idea is that legitimate decisions are decisions that the members make, 
and legitimate institutions are institutions that make these decisions possible. In this 
way, all members, with or without valid considerations, can recognize their subject-
object relations in the collectively binding decision. If this is demonstrably true, the 
basic structure has a legitimate authority to enact collectively binding decisions, 
even if someone disagrees with the specific outputs. So, for a decision to be 
legitimate, the basic structure has incorporated the standpoint of justice (all 
members can appropriate elements of the external world), and the basic structure 
construct procedures of decision-making in which all members with a consideration 
on the object of disagreement exchange considerations without unbalances.  
If these two aspects hold true, all members are in the same position to read 
the outcome in the light of their individual subject-object relation. How? This thesis 
does not mean to say that all members identify with the outcome in the same way, 
but that, if willing to do so, they could recognize their individual subject-object 
relation in three ways, at least. Specifically, when members do not act upon the 
                                                          
315 Habermas 1996, 110. 
316 Habermas 1996, 486. 
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object of disagreement, they can identify their action upon the object in two phases: 
the first choice to do otherwise, and the entitlement to act upon the outcome in the 
future. When members act upon the object and their considerations shape the form 
of the collectively binding decision, they can identify their action upon the object 
at three levels: the initial choice, the action upon the object within the interaction 
community, and the entitlement to revise the decision. When members act upon the 
object but their considerations fail to shape the outcome, they can identify with the 
first choice and the entitlement to challenge the outcome. They can identify with 
the outcome itself if and only if their considerations counted as much as the winning 
considerations did. When the power to shape the outcome is equalized, and all 
members with a valid consideration on the same object have the same limited 
physical, rhetorical and financial capacities to act upon the object; retrospectively, 
they are in the position not to deny their expression of agency in the disagreement. 
Certainly, this equality within disagreement is artificially constructed. Such a 
procedural mechanism integrates the entitlement to advance demands and ensures 
that the individual subject-object relation is the only thing that matters within 
disagreements.  Therefore, to rephrase my first definition of a legitimate in the light 
of the argument I have developed so far; for a society where members have different 
worldviews, and a right to have a say, a legitimate basic structure is a basic structure 
that secures, for all members, recognition for the individual subject-object relation 
in all objects of disagreement.  
 
  
3. The tyranny of the outcome 
The thesis advanced so far may seem radical. For institutions to have a claim right 
to rule, they have to recognize their individual subject-object relation in the 
outcome. Therefore, judgements about the legitimacy of institutions depend on 
judgments about the way through which these institutions take decisions. Concerns 
with the desirability of my conception of legitimacy may look at the quality of 
outcomes. Forms of direct participation may be responsible for reform blockages. 
This might be true, but it also shows a lack of concern with diversity and 
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heterogeneity. Now, three other objections are in point. By addressing these 
objections, I begin with the description of an archetypical decision-making 
procedure that, through the protection of the subject-object relation, brings about 
decisions with a sound claim right to rule. First, someone may argue that, since the 
present account inspires forms of direct participation, it entails a majority bias. 
However, when we focus on the individual subject-object relation on a certain 
object of disagreement, there is no such a thing as monolithic majority that, through 
vote, regularly forces its will upon a minority. With such an emphasis on individual 
and differentiated subject-object relations with different objects of disagreement, 
when the issues changes, considerations also change so that the balancing of forces 
between majority and minority is issue-specific.  
 
The second objection argues that, since minorities are minorities, it is 
impossible for their considerations to count the same. From the present perspective, 
if this claims holds true, there is no legitimate decision. For instance, if a small 
minority opposes public education, this makes public education impossible. As 
someone may notice, now and in the future, this minority is inherently inhibited to 
have equal weight on the object of disagreement. However, I repeat, my account of 
legitimacy stresses the individual subject-object relation with the object of 
disagreement. On this view, would be members of minority groups are members 
with a right to have a say that have a claim right to access external objects: their 
considerations count as considerations on the object, not as considerations of a 
person who belongs to a minority group. If we see the problem from this point of 
view, there is no such a thing like an inherent minority position: that is, all 
disagreements entail different individual subject-object relations that, only 
retrospectively, we can divide between majority and minority views. Moreover, “all 
considerations must count the same” does not mean to say that a consideration has 
to be as likely to be successful as others are.317 I aim to say that all considerations 
on the same object must have the same chances to affect the construction of a 
collectively binding solution. On this view, if, within disagreements, we isolate 
                                                          
317 This claim would entail either an empirically informed theory of disposition or the idea that we can predict 
all possible objects of disagreement in a society where members have a right to have a say.  
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aspects external to each individual subject-object relation with the public issue; the 
observation that some considerations are particularly unlikely to get credit across 
members with a right to have a say does not entail that the relating solution is 
illegitimate.  
The third objection argues that, in modern states, it is impossible to achieve 
legitimate solutions of this kind. They are too large and too diverse. This objection 
introduces a point concerning the feasibility of the model, which may affect its very 
desirability. Simply stated: since it is almost impossible to achieve legitimate 
solutions under these conditions, why should we desire to organize the basic 
structure accordingly? I divide my response into two parts. In the remaining part of 
this section, I show that the present account is no less desirable than alternative 
proposals, and I argue that this remark is biased. In the next sections, I shall 
demonstrate that, even at a large scale, it is not implausible to think of decision-
making procedures in agreement with my conception of legitimacy for a society 
where all members have different worldviews and a right to have a say.318  
This objection points towards an important characteristic of many 
deliberative theories. Indeed, alternative accounts also do not guarantee that 
deliberation will reach collectively binding outcomes. The point is taken somehow 
as granted. For instance, for Habermas, abstractly characterized agents will reach a 
rational agreement because of the force of the best argument. We do not know the 
length of the process of deliberation, and whether or not, on certain issues, 
disagreement will be longer than the average life expectancy. In a well-ordered 
society, Rawls defines the kind of outcomes that citizens, who hold reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines, can support with moral reasons. However, he does not 
explicitly tell us the moment in time in which suitably constructed institutions reach 
such decisions. Rawls concentrates on the ways people should disagree on certain 
issues – constitutional essentials, and he defines how decisions on these issues can 
be acceptable, despite the fact of reasonable pluralism. This objection also reveals 
a widespread bias in political theory, which I contest. I contest the assumption that 
agreement is necessarily more desirable for people than participation in lengthy 
                                                          
318 Scalability also is a problem for existing literature on mini-publics, see John Parkinson, “Legitimacy 
Problems in Deliberative Democracy,” Political Studies 51 (2003): 180-96. 
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disagreement, which might cultivate one’s sense of self-respect and the dignity to 
feel oneself as a member of a community of peers. At the same time, often and in 
different contexts, hunger for outcomes and decisions has generated illegitimate 
decisions and instances of injustice.319 These two ways of addressing the 
feasibility/desirability objection aim to show that my conception of legitimacy, 
which may cause lengthy disagreements rather than fast and correct outcomes, is 
not necessarily less desirable than the other accounts. The generalization and 
scalability of this account are the objects of the next section.  
 
 
4. A decision-making procedure  
Now, the present conception of legitimacy allows for a justification of institutions 
independent from the quality of the outcome, but sensitive to the individual subject-
object relation. The idea is that, when there are members with different worldviews 
and a right to have a say, by favouring identification with its outcomes, institutions 
gain legitimacy. On this view, irrespective of the worldview one has, an institution, 
which enacts decisions in which all members can reconstruct their subject-object 
relation before, during and after disagreements, is legitimate because the source of 
the authority comes directly from those people who are subjected to a claim-right 
to rule.  
Therefore, from this perspective, the higher is the identification between the 
considerations of members and the decisions they have to comply with, the easier 
it is for members to accept the authority of these decisions. For this reason, in order 
for the political power to be legitimate, the political decision-making procedure has 
to exceed the institutional perimeter and favours the direct involvement of 
members, who raise questions and provide answers for the questions, while the 
                                                          
319 On this issue,see William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have 
Done so Much Ill and so Little Good (New York: Penguin, 2007). See also Elisabeth Pisani, The Wisdom of 
Whores: bureaucrats, brothels and the business of AIDS (London: Granta Books, 2008).  
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basic structure ensures the logistics to ensure correspondence between the demands 
of the members and the political decisions.  
Traditionally, arguments against direct forms of participation stresses the 
belief that, the more opinions exist, the more difficult is to achieve correspondence 
between opinions and the outcome of collective decision-making procedures.320 
Now, there is a question of scale. In complex, large and diverse societies, is it 
plausible to argue for decision-making procedures that bound the authority of the 
outcome of disagreement to the individual subject-object relation with the object? 
Such a decision-making procedure must secure equality, not because all members 
agree with the idea that equality matters, but, because members have different 
worldviews and approach objects of disagreement from distinctive viewpoints, so 
we need a mechanism that, in each context, ensures that individual subject-object 
relations are the only thing that matters within disagreements. 
The model here is that of local assemblies.321 Members of local assemblies 
meet to discuss specific issues. These fora aim to create spaces of decision-making 
through direct participation of those affected. By establishing mechanism of 
government administration through which members could control rulers, advance 
policy demands, deliberate and vote, these political bodies favour identification 
with public affairs.322 Despite proximity, even in these deliberative spaces, when 
particularly urging issues are at stake, there may be impasses and alternative 
strategies to reach collectively binding decisions are required. One of the available 
solutions is a voting procedure. Alternatively, an additional deliberative phase may 
anticipate the vote. In that phase, members with analogous considerations may 
construct a comprehensive position on the object of disagreement. Eventually, 
when members formalize all the available and valid options, they vote on the shared 
assumption that the resulting solution is binding. In these cases, since voting 
procedures are issue-based, allegiances may also change. Seen from my 
                                                          
320 James Madison, The Federalist Papers (Harmondsworth: Penguin Book, 1987), 127. 
321 On this issue, see Yves Syntomer, Petit Histoire de l’expérimentation démocratique (Paris: La Découverte, 
2011). For some examples, see Archon Fung, Empowered Participation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2004). See also “Putting the Public Back into Governance: The Challenges of Citizen Participation and its 
Future,” Public Administration Review 25 (2015).  
322 See also Archon Fung, “Empowered Participation in Minneapolis: The Neighbourhood Revitalization 
Program,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 30 (3) (2006): 638-55.  
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perspective, the extension of local assemblies has five requisites: a) members can 
advance policy proposals; b) members decide on these policy proposals; c) 
participation is open; d) the mechanism is issue-based; e) all participants have an 
equal weight in the decision-making procedure. The following model outlines a 
model that, irrespective of the scale of disagreement, leads to legitimate decisions.  
 
 
 
In practice, a decision-making procedure so-conceived is used for 
construction, approval and disapproval of public policies. For all possible objects 
of disagreement, in three phases [(A), (B), (C)], identification with the collective 
binding outcome is at stake. First, at (A), the basic structure of the society takes 
insights from the public sphere and opens disagreements on public issues. In (B), 
members display their considerations on the object of disagreement according to a 
Basic Structure of Society
Enabler
I
Locus of Sovereignity
Opening 
(A)
Public sphere
Context of Justification
II
Disagreement among valid 
and available considerations
III
Locus of 
Sovereignity
Participation
(B)
Basic Structure of the 
society
Ratifier
IV
Public Sphere
Context of Discovery
V
Locus of 
Sovereignity
Challenge
(C)
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procedural mechanism, which ensures their equal weight. When members with 
valid considerations reach a collectively binding decision, the basic structure of the 
society enacts the solution of disagreement as a collectively binding decision. This 
decision is not final. Once the basic structure of the society has ratified the decision, 
such a decision may generate other moments of disagreement and contestation, like 
(C), where members can initiate the process of decision making anew. On this view, 
opening, participation and the opportunity to challenge the outcome protect the 
individual subject-object relation with the object of disagreement at different 
phases. Members with a right to have a say push institutions to consider issues of 
their concern; through institutionalized procedures of decision-making, they decide 
and call upon institutions to ratify the outcome of their disagreement. Then, they 
hold the entitlement to act upon legitimate binding decisions and open another 
disagreement on the same public issue.  
In this account, it is central the idea that legitimacy depends upon the 
popular proposal, acceptance and deliberation of public issues. It defends a direct 
connection between members and decisions so that members can realize their 
control over mechanism to exercise power. Thus, if members feel that the degree 
of their influence over policy-making is low, legitimacy is also likely to be low. By 
extending the architecture of local assemblies, my account designates a procedure 
of direct consultation of the whole body of the society on issues that the body of the 
society demands. On this view, the realization of the claim-right to rule means the 
promotion and articulation of public consultations, and the adoption of norms and 
rules that members have constructed and voted. Now, as someone may notice, much 
of the grounding for the claim-right to rule takes place at (B). At (B), in 
disagreements of a large scale, without the required procedural mechanisms, 
distance, heterogeneity and length of the process may undermine the subject-object 
relation. In the next section, I shall address this concern.  
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5. The layout of a non-exclusionary decision-making procedure  
Concerns with (B) also are about the feasibility of the idea that all considerations 
must count the same. How could we group these considerations? Who does so? 
How? These preoccupations do not affect the claim that, when all members, through 
their subject-object relation, can identify with the outcome, a decision is legitimate. 
They say something else. Since, at present circumstances, we cannot know all 
available and valid considerations on public issues, and we lack adequate 
procedures to group considerations in comprehensive proposals, it is unlikely for 
my account to achieve its purpose. This kind of remarks does not question the 
desirability of a conception of legitimacy that focus on the general identification 
with public policy outputs. With these observations in hand, in this section, I shall 
outline a tentative proposal to answer concerns with the feasibility of procedural 
mechanisms at (B). In so doing, I want to show that, even under present 
circumstances, there are appropriate instruments to secure identification with 
collectively binding decisions. Consequently, an account of legitimacy that aims to 
defend such an identification should not be dismissed as implausible therefore 
undesirable.  
Now, it is important to unpack the three phases of (B): public display of 
valid consideration, grouping of analogous and valid considerations, vote.  First, 
how we make sense of public display at the state level? Actually, the existing 
system allows for some participation in political debates via regional and national 
forums that channel considerations at the national level. Additional channels may 
be created to favour peer-to-peer exchange of considerations on existing public 
issues.323 Prominently, to secure the display of all valid considerations, the internet 
is an asset. The basic structure of the society may comprise media platforms in 
which all members can advance policy demands, display their considerations and 
disagree on public policy issues.324 
                                                          
323 See Graham Smith, “Taking Deliberation Seriously: Institutional Design and Green Politics,” Environmental 
Politics 10 (3) (2001): 72-93.  
324 To solve the problems of scalability, literature on mini-publics also suggest the deployment of online 
deliberation. See Dvy Janssen and Raphael Kies, “Online Forums and Deliberative Democracy,” Acta Politica 
40 (3) (2005): 317-35. 
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Second, as we have seen, deliberation may be at impasses when there are 
too many options on the table. At the national level, it is not only difficult to 
deliberate, but it is very likely to be at impasses. For this reason, a mechanism that, 
without clashing with the fundamental subject-objection connection, translates all 
the available and valid considerations into subsets of eligible options is crucial. On 
the institutional media platform, we can imagine a software that groups all valid 
considerations and creates a limited number of subsets. Otherwise, we can think of 
representatives as having exactly this kind of cognitive role. On this view, there is 
no special moral or political relationship between the represented and the 
representatives. Representatives are functional to the command that all members 
with a right to have a say have to see that their considerations count no less than 
other considerations do. They group analogous considerations, and they open the 
resulting proposals to the vote of the members, who have expressed valid and 
available considerations on the object of disagreement. To ensure that this burden 
is equally distributed across members with a right to have a say, short mandates and 
a lottery selection favour the cyclic nature of this role. So, for all objects of 
disagreement, representatives generate new subsets. It is important to emphasize 
one point: representation would be issue based. Subsets are not the direct results of 
pre-existing moral or political worldviews, but rather they are the consequences of 
the individual specific connection with the object under investigation. When all the 
available subsets are available, public referenda among the members who displayed 
valid considerations may be proxies to re-establish the connection with the object 
of disagreement.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have substantiated the normative consequences of the second order 
of normativity. My claim has been that, for institutions to have a claim-right to rule, 
they have to create conditions for members to affect directly public issues, decide, 
and contest collectively binding decisions. The idea that, when all members can 
identify with the outcome, a decision is legitimate aims to push policies back to the 
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centre of public opinion. The guiding thread is that, for a decision to be legitimate, 
the action of the standpoint of justice is not enough. In other words, the basic 
structure may lose legitimacy without losing justice. For this reason, it is necessary 
to think of a justice-based enabling action and procedural mechanisms, which are 
internal to the very practice of disagreement.  These procedural mechanisms 
equalize valid and available considerations so that, regardless of the quality of the 
outcome, members are in the position to identify with the outcome.  
This chapter concludes the construction of a perspectivist political theory, 
which combines a general entitlement to have a say with the condition that all 
available considerations on the same object of disagreement must count the same. 
Central to this approach is the deconstruction of intersubjective relations into 
individual relations with communal objects of concern. From such a perspective, at 
all levels, the object of fundamental normative concern is the connection between 
a subject and the object. As we have seen in the last four chapters, when we focus 
on this juncture, we can ground a general claim not to be excluded. A claim that all 
individuals, irrespective of their worldview, can affirm as the precondition for any 
other disagreement. In the third part of this work, I will imagine a pluralistic society 
where the two orders of normativity are in place. For now, as a provisional 
conclusion, we can hold that, to be non-exclusionary, theories have to secure, for 
everyone without distinction, the tangible opportunity to make his or her difference 
visible. 
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III 
THE PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 
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Chapter 7 
A revisable utopia  
 
 
 
The use of ideal theory has divided scholars in contemporary political theory.325 
Political theorists, who share intellectual affinity with the scope of this project, have 
shown antipathy and harsh criticisms against ideal theorising. At different levels, 
people have criticised ideal theory for imposing rationalistic standards on the 
practice of politics, for neglecting the structures that embed individual agential 
capacities, for neglecting violence and oppression, for proposing normative 
standards that people will never be able to meet, and the like.326 Here, I certainly do 
not want to delve into the respective merits of ideal and non-ideal political theories; 
however, some preliminary observations are a necessary prelude to the rest of this 
work.327   
First, it is important to distinguish the two dimensions of an ideal theory: on 
the one hand, we have the theory itself, whose standards and preconditions might 
or might not ever met.328 At this level, philosophers form ensembles of normative 
prescriptions, which we judge for their quality to follow logically from a certain set 
of assumptions and conditions. On the other hand, we have the staging of the 
principles in imaginary social settings, which usually, in the eyes of the 
                                                          
325 Among many others, see Alan Hamlin and Zofia Stemplowska, “Theory, Ideal Theory and the Theory of 
Ideals,” Political Studies 10 (1) (2012): 48-62. Zofia Stemplowska and Adam Swift, “Ideal and Non ideal 
Theory,” in David Estlund (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012). See also, Laura Valentini, “Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map,” Philosophy Compass 
7 (9) (2012): 654-664. 
326 Here, among many others, I have in mind Emanuela Ceva, Interactive Justice: A Procedural Approach to 
Value Conflicts in Politics (London: Routledge, 2016). Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of 
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).  Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 
2003). Janosch Prinz and Enzo Rossi, “Political realism as ideology critique,” Critical Review of International 
Social and Political Philosophy 20 (3) (2017): 334-48. 
327 The observation that I do ideal theory in this work does not mean to say that ideal theory is the best available 
methodology for all the possible issues in political philosophy.  
328 On this point, I have benefitted greatly from the work of David Estlund. See David Estlund, “Utopophobia,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (2) (2014): 114-34.See also David Estlund, “Human Nature and the Limits 
(If Any) of Political Philosophy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (2011). David Estlund, “Methodological 
Moralism in Political Philosophy,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 20 (3) 
(2017): 365-79. 
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philosophers, are plausible approximations, abstractions and generalizations of the 
society in which they write.329  
In the previous chapters, I have moved within the first dimension. At this 
level, two clarifications are in point. First, by constructing a perspectivist political 
theory, I have tried to respond to a problem of this world – exclusion - with a 
generalizable account. A problem that, according to many theorists, notoriously, 
ideal theorists fail to detect and account for. Specifically, I have isolated a 
generalizable demand of justice, I have assembled a set of normative toolkits, I have 
constructed what is, for me, given certain premises, a sound response to an 
important political philosophical problem. Of course, for many readers, my 
response might be unconvincing. However, to borrow from the influential work of 
David Estlund in this field, considerations of the likelihood or success in realizing 
my normative standpoint are separate from the evaluation of a sound conception of 
justice.330 As a philosophical theory, like conceptions of truth in epistemology and 
of being in ontology, a political philosophical account can be a cogent account of 
justice without being explicitly prescriptive. A normative theory is just one in 
limitless series of different responses to the same philosophical problems.331  
Even if ideal in its character, a perspectivist political theory can play another 
role. For some, it works as an evaluative framework for thinking about justice in 
non-ideal societies. Nothing special indeed. This is common among defenders of 
ideal theories.332 As Rawls says, a conception of justice ‘clarifies cases of how to 
deal with existing injustices,’ it also elucidates ‘which wrongs are more grievous 
and hence more urgent to correct’.333 Thanks to this categorical framework, Rawls 
thinks, we can employ our knowledge about justice to orient comparative 
judgements on today’s society.334 Estlund also radicalises the same point. A 
hopeless theory, he says, ‘might seem not to counsel any action, and so not to be 
                                                          
329 This distinction seems applicable to the difference between the original position and the well-ordered society 
in John Rawls’s political philosophy.   
330 Estlund 2014, 114-115. 
331 This does not mean to fall in relativism. There can be one true conception of justice, but, for me, my theory 
is just the best available conclusion given my premises.  
332 Moreover, the evaluative disposition of a theory of justice also is a comparative merit among critical theory 
of justice. On this issue see Fraser and Honneth, 2001.   
333 Rawls 2001, 13. 
334 See Gerald Gaus, The Tyranny of the Ideal (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press 2016), 5.  
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normative … A theory can be normative by being evaluative, whether or not 
evaluation itself counsels action’.335  As he continues, ‘hopeless aspirational theory 
might be merely evaluative, without any practical import’.336 In other words, 
statements such as “society would be better like this” might be true independently 
from the possibility of doing something in the light of this fact.337  
With these preliminary claims in mind, in this and in the following chapters, 
I shall stage my normative account in an ideal social setting: the pluralistic 
society.338 At this stage, I need to make explicit some stipulations. A) In a pluralistic 
society, all members have different worldviews. B) In a pluralistic society, the two 
orders of normativity are public; and C) all people who happen to live in that 
territory (members) have a right to have a say.  D) In a pluralistic society, the basic 
structure of society incorporates the two orders of normativity. E) The two orders 
of normativity apply to both the basic structure of society and relationships among 
members.  
As someone may notice, these stipulations do not tell anything concerning 
the process of constitution and consolidation of a pluralistic society.339 People may 
wonder about the several stages that divide the world where we live from a 
hypothetical society that meets all my stipulations.340 Otherwise, people also may 
invoke a procedure of selection; one in which some idealized representatives pick 
my normative scheme to construct the basic structure of society and the 
distributions of benefits and burdens.341 A close look at the present normative 
scheme, I think, should clarify the reason why I cannot postulate intermediary 
passages or preliminary forms of intersubjective agreement. Specifically, as we 
have seen in the previous chapters, the two orders of normativity are not the result 
of an agreement among abstractly characterized parties. Because of the experience 
                                                          
335 Estlund 2014, 121.  
336 Ibidem 
337 Ibidem 
338 Here, we use “the” and “a” interchangeably.  
339 The transition from today’s society to the ideal world has been an object of major concern for the recent 
work of Gerald Gaus. His point is essentially epistemic. Namely, our view of the best foreseeable ideal is 
inevitably partial, since we do not have any knowledge of the entire landscape. The global optimum – utopia, 
therefore, is intrinsically difficult to determine, or, more simply, to find.  See Gaus 2016, 60, 84.  
340 See Gaus 2016. See also Amartya Sen, The idea of Justice (Cambridge MASS: Harvard University Press, 
2011). 
341 See the famous four-stage sequence in Rawls 1971. 
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of disagreement, parties with different worldviews affirm the two orders of 
normativity from their own perspective. In disagreement, they do not affirm these 
two levels at the same time. All parties have a differentiated experience of 
disagreement that they reconcile individually in the two orders of normativity. 
Eventually, a society turns out to be a pluralistic society when, in the same territory, 
all parties happen to affirm the two unnegotiable orders of normativity 
simultaneously. At this juncture, all members think that disagreements must be 
organized so as to ensure them all possible subject-object relations with external 
objects of disagreement. In some of these preliminary disagreements, in agreement 
with the two orders of normativity, would be members of a pluralistic society can 
define the specific shape of their contextualized institutional arrangements. The 
specific form of such arrangements, however, hinges upon the content of each of 
the considerations that participants in these first disagreements advance. We are not 
able to imagine the diversity of ideas in a group of people with different 
worldviews. On the other hand, we can say that all outcomes of these disagreements 
will be subjected to the two orders of normativity. For me, as we shall demonstrate 
until the end of this work, the two orders of normativity are strong enough criteria 
for the examination of the attributes of a pluralistic society, even if we are not aware 
of the actual institutional arrangements that such a society constructs.  
In this chapter, unlike other political utopias, I shall demonstrate that a 
pluralistic society has a built-in reflexivity – it is a revisable utopia. In other words, 
a pluralistic society is not the end-point of human imagination; but, rather, it is the 
first step of a series of different and interdependent non-exclusionary societies.342 
To describe the revisable character of a pluralistic society, I have to follow quite a 
long-route. The chapter shall clarify the problem gradually through the explanation 
of those elements that, one after the other, and at different levels, constitute the 
revisable form of the pluralistic society. In section 2, I shall explain the relevance 
of the problem of reflexivity for ongoing debates about ideal worlds. In section 3, I 
shall examine the extent to which my non-exclusionary conception of justice can 
                                                          
342 This revisable character is crucial to avoid policies that, on the assumption that there is no better ideal than 
a pluralistic society, regulate the conduct of members. From the present perspective, this kind of regulation 
would be exclusionary.   
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be one among many other conceptions of justice without presupposing asymmetry 
between worldviews. This section shall function as a conceptual background to 
section 4 and 5, where I shall demonstrate the reflexivity of a pluralistic society. In 
section 4, I shall argue that the entitlement to have a say justifies expectations 
among members, between members and institutions, but also from institutions to 
members. These expectations constitute the relational surface of a pluralistic 
society, which, as I shall see in section 5, informs the reflexive character of this 
utopia. To anticipate the central idea of the argument, unfulfilled expectations may 
transform the normative architecture of the pluralistic society into an object of 
disagreement. Eventually, in section 6, I shall conclude. Taken together, the 
argument reads as follows. From the right to have a say, members have expectations 
to access objects of disagreement in their own ways. In some cases, pluralistic 
institutions may fail to fulfil expectations of justice. This failure opens the space to 
the demand for more non-exclusionary arrangements. Such a demand may disclose 
a series of better-than-ideal-worlds.  
 
2. Revisable and non-revisable utopias 
There are two main ways to read utopias in contemporary political philosophy. On 
the one hand, people think that the construction of utopias is an admirable example 
of overcoming existing injustices and “thinking otherwise”. For instance, ‘utopias’, 
as Rainer Forst writes, ‘present colourful, literary depictions of political 
communities in which social conflicts are not primarily canalized and dealt with in 
legitimate and just ways, but in which the causes of such conflicts are eradicated’.343 
For this reason, he argues, utopian thinking is radical: that is, ‘it aims to pull out the 
roots of social evil’.344 On the other hand, people believe that utopias are mere 
dreams. The ideal construction of a more just social world functions, as Ingrid 
Robeyns puts it, as a ‘mythical Paradise Island’. An ideal, she continues, shows us 
                                                          
343 Rainer Forst, Justification and Critique: Towards a Critical Theory of Politics (London: Polity Press, 2013), 
177. 
344 Ibidem 
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where ‘the endpoint of our journey lies’. It does not necessarily give us specific 
indications about the route towards the Paradise Island. The ideal serves to orient 
our navigation, and it tells us what we are aiming for.345 From that perspective, 
utopias also are unchanging ideas that rely upon absolute principles and rationalistic 
means, which embed free agency for the sake of establishing partial forms of social 
cooperation.346 These two interpretative trajectories converge on the idea that 
utopian thinking is perfectionistic. No matter whether utopias read as instances of 
“thinking otherwise” or as dangerous collectivist interpretation of human agency, 
people agree with the idea that utopias establish perfect institutions and perfect 
societies once and for the all. 
In this context, questions about the possible reflexivity of utopias do not 
address the internal dynamics of these ideal accounts. In this way, the aspect of 
reflexivity reveals a normative question for the society where we live now: that is, 
what exactly do utopias mean for us? For instance, utopias can cause change in 
emotions and actions, which may result in unexpected ruptures. This means, 
however, to focus the normative analysis on the study of such ruptures, rather than 
on what utopias are. Specifically, Gaus puts the normativity of utopias under the 
language of choice. Why, he asks, should we forgo opportunities to create a more 
just social world so that we can pursue an uncertain ideal? Inherently uncertain 
ideals, he argues, are dangerous, since they commend autopoietic, unverifiable and 
perhaps unattainable constructions in lieu of the pursuit of mundane justice.347 As 
Mill famously puts it, ‘It must be acknowledged that those who would play this 
game on the strength of their own private opinion, unconfirmed as yet by 
experimental verification … [They] must have a serene confidence in their own 
wisdom on the one hand and a recklessness of other people’s sufferings on the 
other’.348 Alike Gaus and Mill, Forst reads utopias in connection with existing 
reality. As he says, a utopia ‘is distant, and yet still within the human world because 
the picture of the perfect society not only shows us how wrong and perverse our 
                                                          
345 Ingrid Robeyns, “Ideal Theory in Theory and Practice,” Social Theory and Practice 34 (3) (2008), 345 -47. 
346 On this issue, see Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2013), vol. 1.  
347 Gaus 2016, 142-43.   
348 John Stuart Mill, “Chapters on Socialism,” in Principles of Political Economy and Chapters on Socialism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 737.  
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society is, it also shows us the risks of the new’.349 By unveiling the key aspects of 
a better world, as Forst continues, utopias inspire action in this world: that is, 
utopias are matters ‘for human imagination and creativity’ that may ‘try other doors 
with this key or to think up other keys’.350  
Under these lenses, utopias reveals the problem of deciding between 
different courses of action, when we are aware only of the hypothetical endpoint of 
the journey. Alternatively, utopias disclose the contingency of what we consider 
immutable social and political practices. In this vein, when we stress the practice of 
questioning social and political practices, we take utopias for what they might mean 
for us, finite beings, who live here and now. This generalized way of approaching 
utopias implies a reduction of the problem of reflexivity in the ideal world. Namely, 
ideal worlds invite thoughts on current states of affairs. There is, however, another 
way of thinking about reflexivity in the ideal world. From such a perspective, the 
focus of the philosophical inquiry is on the conceptual space for internal revisability 
and change that utopias may or may not have.  
This way of approaching the revisability of utopias is not new.351 In his 
argument for the intransitivity of reforms, Jon Elster has claimed that worlds better 
than the allegedly perfect ideal world also must exist. From our point of view, he 
argues, we can imagine these higher worlds in an empty way. By reaching the first 
available perfect society, we unveil a new array of ideas, demands and possibilities, 
which are otherwise dormant in our imaginary. These possibilities disclose new 
angles for our ideational capacity. In other words, Elster says, unless we get to the 
best available perspective, we are not in the position to see options that might be 
better-than-ideal.352 In his reading of Elster, Gaus points out that two constraints 
substantiate such imagine of progress and reflexivity of the ideal. First, once we 
have reached the current ideal society, the better-than-ideal worlds must be visible. 
Second, this progressive series of ideals implies that ideal worlds are coherent with 
one another in the most relevant respect – that there is a movement upward in the 
                                                          
349 Forst 2013, 181.  
350 Forst 2013, 186. 
351 For instance, see Rawls 2005, 582. “Political liberalism … does not try to fix public reason once and for all 
in terms of one form of one favoured conception of justice”. For an extensive analysis of this issue, Gaus 2016, 
ch. 1 and ch. 2.  
352 Jon Elster, Logic and Society: Contradictions and Possible Worlds (Oxford: Wiley, 1978), 57.  
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pursuit of the ideal.353 The idea of a progressive series of ideals depends on the first 
internal idealizing premises, which are the basis of the current ideal. In other words, 
there will be some path-dependence in the articulation of better-than-ideal worlds. 
It is less obvious to assume that, despite this kind of internal coherence, a better-
than-ideal world must be visible to the inhabitants of our present ideal. If this holds 
true for all the possible worlds, from our present perspective, we could just imagine 
incremental changes to our utopias – the better-than-ideal worlds. By doing so, 
however, we also would admit that our ideal is not the best option among the set of 
available ideal worlds. This observation seems to contradict the idea that a utopia 
is a world where everything has all the required or desirable qualities and 
characteristics. There is an alternative option that hold the theoretical possibility of 
better-than-ideal words without losing the aspiration of utopian thinking. We can 
think that members of the ideal society will construct better-than-ideal worlds in 
the same way we conceive ideal states of affairs here and now. On this view, we 
may assume that, if achieved, utopias eradicate some causes of conflicts – those 
causes that the utopian thinker sees as relevant, but we cannot have the same degree 
of self-assurance, admitted we have, that other sources of conflicts will not arise. 
For us, given the observation that, according to the relevant criteria, utopias claim 
to be the closest possible implementation of such criteria, it is difficult to prefigure 
the motives and form of conflicts in the ideal world. However, these complications 
do not erase the possibility of conflicts once and for the all.  
For me, thanks to the normative architecture originating from the subject-
object relation, a pluralistic society has such a built-in revisability. Without such a 
built-in revisability, the risk is that of containing avant-garde forms of political 
action and causing exclusionary practices within the ideal world. As I shall see in 
the next sections, the two orders of normativity constitute a network of demands 
among members and between members and institutions. Central to the argument is 
the idea that demands do not necessitate their own fulfilment. Members can leave 
such demands unfulfilled. Members can feel that other members have not satisfied 
such demands adequately. Members can demand institutions to do things that are 
                                                          
353 Gaus 2016, 86.  
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beyond the institutional reach, given a certain state of affairs. At some critical 
junctures, these demands may push for a rethink of the basic normative scheme of 
the society. In order to open to this scenario, the normative requirements of the 
present conception and the normative requirements of other worldviews, which 
members of a pluralistic society may have, must be compossible. This kind of 
investigation will be the object of section 3.  
  
3. A worldview among many other worldviews  
In this section, therefore, I shall clarify the position of my normative scheme in a 
society where all members may have different worldviews. When this is the case, 
two levels of analysis seem indispensable. First, I must explain the reason why 
members of a pluralistic society also can sustain the present normative scheme; 
even if they have different views on how a society should organize its basic 
structure. Second, it is important to elucidate the conceptual position of a non-
exclusionary normative scheme as one among many different conceptions of 
justice.  
Now, I should go more into the details of the way through which members 
of a pluralistic society affirm the present normativity. This means to examine 
whether members with different worldviews can affirm the entitlement to have a 
say, and the consequent theory of political legitimacy. Observe first that, for this 
theory, a person acts in ways congruent to the first-order normativity when affirms 
her or his entitlement to appropriate objects of disagreement. In a pluralistic society, 
members act upon public issues, but the clash with other people doing the same 
motivates the reconstruction of the point of view that justifies the individual 
subject-object relation. By doing so, the member of a pluralistic society reaffirms 
the fundamental normativity that organizes the pluralistic society. At this level, the 
right to have a say empowers each member by furnishing his or her individual 
subject-object relation with a universal entitlement. In this way, members of a 
pluralistic society complement their distinctive worldviews with the affirmation of 
an individual allegiance to the right to have a say. Regardless of the nature of these 
170 
 
worldviews, the right to have a say ensures that members can enter into 
differentiated and simultaneous relations with external objects. In other words, it 
recognizes the observation that, in order not to be excluded from participation in all 
kinds of disagreement, members must have an entitlement to do so – an answer to 
questions like “why do you want to have a say on this?”, “why do you count?” and 
the like.  
Let me explain this passage in greater length. If members of a pluralistic 
society affirm both a non-exclusionary conception of justice and other worldviews, 
which can also be conceptions of justice, we have to deal with the formidable 
difficulties of a normative theory that applies to a society in which worldviews of 
all sorts coexist. This task becomes even more compelling when we want to 
demonstrate that members with different worldviews can affirm both a right to have 
a say and their own conceptions of justice. To make the point clear, imagine we 
have a certain number of different conceptions of a concept A. We define them as 
A₁, A₂, A₃, and Aₓ. What seems to be sure, as conceptions of the same concept, A₁, 
A₂, A₃, and Aₓ are one besides the other in a horizontal sequence.354 The same is 
valid for the normative conception we are advancing here. It can have different 
premises, and a distinctive scope; nevertheless, as one among many other 
worldviews, we must place it at the same level of generality. So, I need to 
demonstrate that the present non-exclusionary conception of justice is one that 
everyone, regardless of his or her prior commitments, can affirm. How can this be 
possible?  
Let us think of an example. Let us imagine five people who sit at the same 
long wooden table in a coffee shop. Mark, Bettie, and Louise are good friends. Frida 
and Karl, the other two persons, do not have any connections with the others. Mark, 
Bettie, and Louise discuss slavery, the topic of their last class in American History. 
They come from the same social backgrounds, and they have attended the same 
high school. However, their ideas on the topic divide them. The object of 
disagreement draws the attention of Frida and Karl, who try to enter into the 
                                                          
354 This reading allows for a kind of realist position about truth, as if there were different degrees of 
approximation to a certain concept. Even if this a question of great interest for us, for the sake of clarity, I leave 
a long treatment of this problem to another place.   
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disagreement. Mark, Bettie, Louise, Frida, and Karl help us to clarify the subject-
object relation. Objects of disagreements affect pre-existing interpersonal ties up to 
bring about a temporary relational network, which binds together a sub-set of the 
members of a pluralistic society qua persons with an individual subject-object 
relation with the object of disagreement. At the same time, the same object of 
disagreement causes to come to participate members who are alien to existing 
interpersonal ties. In disagreements, the object of disagreement causes new 
intersubjective relationships to exist, and it gives a new face to those that are already 
in place. For this reason, the relationship between a member and a certain object of 
disagreement is the specific territory where a non-exclusionary conception of 
justice operates.  
The focus on this specific juncture allows me not to consider what a certain 
worldview says. Since we take the subject-object relation in general terms, the 
distinctive features of each object of disagreement lose relevance in the process of 
selecting which relation counts. At the same time, it is not important to know what 
each worldview aims to do, but I only need to know that all members of a pluralistic 
society have different worldviews, and such worldviews direct members toward 
objects of disagreements in the external world. From this standpoint, then, we can 
argue that a non-exclusionary conception of justice – expressed by the right to have 
a say, which ensures the access to all possible objects of disagreement, does not 
preclude a concurrent commitment to organize collective arrangements in manners 
that are different from those of a pluralistic society. By commanding the erosion of 
the barriers of entrance that prevent people from exercising their agency upon 
public issues, a non-exclusionary conception of justice enables members to advance 
their deepest moral commitments without internal contradictions.355 For instance, 
when Frida is in disagreement on an object O with Luke, she is also affirming her 
entitlement to do so. Therefore, without assuming any asymmetry between a non-
exclusionary conception of justice and other worldviews, a conception of justice, 
which protects the individual subject-object relation with objects of disagreements, 
                                                          
355 I must remind the reader that all members of a pluralistic society have a certain worldview. This being so, 
when members do not aim to access objects of disagreement, it is suffice to say that, as potential appropriators 
of objects of disagreement, they might sustain the present normative scheme.  
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is not necessarily in contradiction with other commitments that members of a 
pluralistic society may have.  
Now, someone may argue that, in this way, members of a pluralistic society 
may have worldviews that deny precisely what a non-exclusionary conception of 
justice stands for. Paradigmatically, people with a racist worldview may claim that 
a certain group of people should be denied the subject-object connection with 
certain objects of disagreement. Machos also may think that women are 
irremediably flawed in certain contexts. Now, even if this account avoids raising 
barriers of entrance on grounds of existing pre-commitments, it does not fall into a 
naïve defence of an everything goes kind of society. A defence of the normative 
claim that all persons have an entitlement to act upon external objects is not like 
saying that all members of a pluralistic society can do whatever they feel like. For 
the latter, all members would be morally justified for all kinds of action they do. 
Such a position has two implications. On the one hand, members can never be 
penalised. On the other hand, other members cannot claim for compensation when 
they are the addressees of discriminating and marginalizing deeds. From our point 
of view, in turn, all members must be put in the same position to act upon external 
objects. This means to say that, when members contest some people’s entitlement, 
victims have a right claim to external objects that outweighs all other 
considerations.  
There are two ways to illuminate this claim. Let me use two examples. First, 
we can think that, within a pluralistic society, Frida is a racist person. She denies 
that a certain minority-group is entitled to have a say. This kind of issue concerns 
the first order of normativity. From the standpoint of the right to have a say, Lucy, 
a member of the targeted minority group, cannot be refused such an entitlement. As 
a consequence, she must be in the position to act upon objects of disagreement. The 
point is to understand what the object of disagreement is in this case. For Frida, 
Lucy is the very object of disagreement because Frida does not want her to 
participate (her participation in disagreements). If this were the case, how can Lucy 
access herself? Or, to put the same question in general terms, what happens when 
the triangular relationship subject-object-subject is not so transparent? It seems 
plausible to say that, even if the target of Frida is Lucy, Frida’s consideration 
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includes a general point on humanity as a whole: that is, “all human beings but Lucy 
have a right to have a say”. With this claim in mind, under the normativity of the 
right to have a say, Lucy is entitled to appropriate the discursive object in her own 
ways, and to demand pluralistic institutions to enable her to do so, regardless of 
Frida’s aspirations.  
Alternatively, we can imagine that Frida thinks that Lucy’s considerations 
are not relevant in all the possible communities of interaction. In other words, Frida 
accepts that Lucy has a right to have a say, but she also thinks that what Lucy thinks 
and says never counts. This issue falls within the second order of normativity: 
members affirm the general normativity, and they have to reach binding decisions 
accordingly. Within a pluralistic society, Frida is fully entitled to think so, and Lucy 
is entitled to think the same about Lucy. Frida and Lucy will have the right to act 
upon external objects, and, in the interaction community, their considerations will 
count the same. If this is not the case, both Lucy and Frida can take the collective 
decision as non-binding. In a pluralistic society, people like Frida are entitled to act 
upon objects of disagreement. Lucy, and other people with an egalitarian spirit, also 
have such an entitlement. Even if there is no barrier of entrance for those 
worldviews that aim to act upon objects of disagreement in an exclusionary way, 
when all members affirm the right to have a say, it is (at least) unlikely for Frida to 
affect the outcome substantially.356 If we follow the two examples, it is plausible to 
defend the claim that members of a pluralistic society can have reasons to support 
our normativity even if they pursue a conflicting conception of justice. A non-
exclusionary conception of justice enables them to be in the position to argue for a 
diverse normative order to be in place, and it provides a justice-based argument for 
introducing new disagreements on collectively binding decisions that members find 
unacceptable for their own reasons.  
In this way, the justification of a general normativity is internal to the 
member qua holder of a certain worldview. The affirmation of the right to have a 
say furnishes his or her access to objects of disagreement with a universal 
                                                          
356 In another context, Emanuela Ceva has an analogous observation. See Emanuela Ceva, “Just Procedures 
with Controversial Outcomes: on the grounds for substantive disputation within a procedural theory of Justice,” 
Res Publica 15 (3) (2009): 219-35. 
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justification. However, by defending a general entitlement as the normativity that 
members of a pluralistic society can accept whatever it may entail, I have to 
recognize that the perspective of entitlement does not allow naturally for an 
intersubjective metric of obligations.357 The right to have a say is eminently 
individual. The consequent view of a legitimate decision also links with the member 
as a person with a distinctive subject-object relation with an object of disagreement, 
not with the member as a part of a larger collective. This means to say that, when 
members know their gender, religious, political and moral status, and they know 
that they are entitled to act upon external objects; the perspective of obligations can 
be defined only once all parties have actually experienced such an entitlement.358 It 
is, therefore, important to think of the type of relation that arises from the 
entitlement to have a say, as the unnegotiable condition for the construction of other 
compossible entitlements, and reciprocal obligations. My response to this question 
shall be the object of section 4.  
 
 
4. Expectations of justice and expectations of legitimacy 
In this section, I argue that, when the basic structure of the society is non-
exclusionary, members of a pluralistic society expect to be able to act upon public 
issues. From the beginning, we have to make clear that support to the right to have 
a say does not bound members to do certain things. The right to have a say is an 
entitlement. As such, it guarantees only that all members have the power to act upon 
external objects. This assurance is the basis to regulate all subsequent distributions 
of benefits and burdens in the society, including the structure and terms of social 
contracts. However, since there is no presupposition of interpersonal ties in the 
subject-object relation, the right to have a say does not oblige members to do certain 
things. In this scenario, obligations and duties originate from social and political 
                                                          
357 The intersubjective character of obligations is a central feature of contractualism. See Scanlon 1998. On this 
issue, see Nicholas Southwood, “Moral Contractualism,” Philosophy Compass 4 (6) (2009): 926-937.  
358 It is important to notice that the member must experience his or her entitlement. This means to say that, for 
obligations to be valid, members must be able to have a subject-object relation with the relevant object of 
disagreement.  
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arrangements that are the result of interactions among members with the right to 
have a say. In other words, they do not spring from the right itself, but, rather, 
obligations arise from the consolidation of agreements among members, whose 
right to have a say has been already secured.359 For example, specific institutional 
arrangements, the form of punishment, the organizations of powers, and the like, 
generate obligations that are internal to the terms of their constitution, but these 
obligations can aspire to general validity if and only if members with a right to have 
a say have constructed them.  Now, does this mean to say that the general standpoint 
of justice has no influence of intersubjective relationships? Of course not, but this 
point deserves clarification.  
As a general entitlement, the right to have a say ensures that all kinds of 
public conducts fall under the heading of a communal, but differentiated, attempt 
to act upon external objects. Even if, unlike collectively binding agreements, 
obligations and duties do not arise naturally from this standpoint, the right to have 
a say empowers members of a pluralistic society to act as if other members were 
bound with them by certain obligations. This demand, eventually, regulates all 
consequent exchanges among members with the same entitlement. Let me explain 
this passage in details. The reasoning is simple: even without an agreement among 
parties, members with a right to have a say recognize as just only those relationships 
that respect their claim to act upon objects of the external world. When members 
act on this presumption, they take for granted in advance that other members will 
recognize their status in virtue of a communal adherence to the same standpoint of 
justice. At that point, the demand to act upon objects of disagreement includes a 
strong belief that other members cannot deny the subject-object relation with 
external objects of disagreement. So, when all members have a right to have a say, 
even if the general standpoint of justice does not bound other members, a person, 
who has a right to have a say, thinks that others have an obligation to let her act 
upon objects of disagreement.  
                                                          
359 The form of such arrangements is contingent to independent variables like the content of all worldviews, 
population, natural resources, languages, and the like. In this chapter and in the rest of this work, I shall draw 
conclusions from the two orders of normativity only, without looking at the character of all possible agreements. 
The idea is that, by empowering the individual, the two orders of normativity provide an evaluative standard to 
judge all possible disagreements, even those disagreements that concern structural components of a pluralistic 
society.  
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One after the other, the claims to access objects of disagreement originate a 
network of other-directed demands to be recognized as an entitled participant in 
disagreements. They are other-directed because members, by advancing their 
claims on objects of disagreements, demands other members to let them doing so. 
From their own points of view, all members, in other words, expect others to accord 
them the status as an entitled participant, the same status they deserve in virtue of 
the general standpoint of justice, which regulates the pluralistic society. When all 
members have a right to have a say, therefore, a spread and differentiated network 
of expectations constitutes the basic relational grammar of a pluralistic society.360 
This grammar substantiates all right-based-claims, toward both institutions and 
other members of a pluralistic society.  
Let me pause on the nature of these expectations. With expectations, I mean 
to say that a member X demands (implicitly or explicitly) another member Y for a 
certain state of affairs to be achieved. In a pluralistic society, such a state of affairs 
is the subject-object relation with an object of the external world. In general terms, 
from the point of view of X, between X and Y, Y that undertakes a certain action 
becomes the object of expectation. When X has explicitly showed her expectation, 
Y can avoid fulfilling such a demand, but, by doing so, she acknowledges that C 
might penalise what she thinks to be a wrongdoing. When a mutually binding 
agreement justifies the expectation of X, Y also knows the specific kind of sanctions 
she can incur. Under these lenses, for X, an expectation is a discrete event in an 
imagined and predictable series of deeds. A break in this chain may generate 
reactive sequence of events, which inaugurate new relational trajectories between 
X and Y, and a novel sequence with different expectations. Otherwise, the 
interruption of an expected course of action also might justify attempts to force the 
sequence back to its original cadence.  So, whether Y takes the expectation of X as 
binding depends largely on the degree of coordination and common knowledge 
between them. At the same time, even if Y does not takes the expectation as binding, 
X can still think that she deserves compensation.  
                                                          
360 In the conceptual structure of expectations, there is a certain degree of path-dependency, which founds on 
existing social institutions, habits, contextual forces. In another context, Rawls also draws attention to the link 
between expectations and social institutions. See Rawls 1971, 311. On habits, I benefitted greatly from Steve 
Matthews, “The significance of Habit,” Journal of Moral Philosophy (2017): 1-22. 
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Moreover, expectations can be of different kinds. In a pluralistic society, 
there are at least three sorts of expectations. 1) Members may have expectations 
toward one another. Since all members have an entitlement to have a say, each 
member may have a strong belief that other members recognize his or her 
entitlement. 2) Members also may direct their expectations towards pluralistic 
institutions. Once the basic structure of the society has incorporated a non-
exclusionary conception of justice, members may have a strong belief that 
pluralistic institutions enable them to affect objects of disagreement. When 
someone is denied his or her own entitlement, this expectation also may imply the 
demand to bring back the pluralistic society to the normal course of action. 
Moreover, 3) pluralistic institutions may expect members to accept collectively 
binding decisions when members can recognize their subject-object relation in the 
outcome.  
As someone may notice, the first two kinds of expectations appeal to the 
general standpoint of justice – I call them expectations of justice. The third 
expectation, in turn, expresses an unsophisticated reason for action that legitimate 
institutions may have. Specifically, pluralistic institutions expect members to 
accept decision that are legitimate according to the general standard. This is what 
we call expectation of legitimacy, which, therefore, connects with the second order 
of normativity.  Now, let me specify the normative consequences of these two 
further classifications for a pluralistic society. An expectation of justice is the belief 
to act upon all possible objects of disagreement in ways that meet the criteria of 
one’s worldview.  Expectations of justice may vary in intensity. One’s worldview 
affects what a member asks from his or her entitlement to participate. For instance, 
a solipsistic worldview may induce a member X not to demand vehemently his or 
her right to act upon external objects. Otherwise, strong political and moral 
commitments may push a member Y to demand loudly the recognition of her 
entitlement. Clearly, pluralistic institutions cannot force X to form subject-object 
relations. Pluralistic institutions are required to ensure the due means for X to enter 
into relation with external objects and to recognise this relation in the outcome. The 
intensity of one’s expectation of justice also may vary because of participation in 
disagreements. Namely, the participation in disagreements may strengthen the 
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demand to access other objects of disagreement, and, therefore, it may increase the 
intensity of the future expectations of justice.  
In the same vein, when members of the society are denied the full exercise 
of their entitlement, they expect institutions to put an end to existing barriers, with 
a strength that is linked with the moral imperatives inherent in their worldviews. 
For someone, reparation might be enough. Nevertheless, in my case, quantifying 
reparation is particularly problematic, and it presupposes an agreement, which is 
alien to the normativity of the right to have a say. Moreover, albeit expectations 
may vary in intensity and direction, they are not scalar. A member fulfils an 
expectation, or a member does not fulfil such an expectation. Equally, pluralistic 
institutions fulfil an expectation, or they do not. This is so because the demand to 
participate cannot be partially satisfied. How can a member form a subject-object 
relation with an object of disagreement only to a certain extent? On the one hand, 
it is plausible to think that members may simply delegate decisions to someone else, 
or they do not exercise their entitlement at all.361 On the other hand, members, who 
demand recognition for their entitlement, do not feel that their expectation is 
fulfilled until they have formed the expected subject-object relation with the object 
of disagreement. The strength of this demand may vary, but the non-scalar property 
of expectations does not change. Once members or institutions fulfil an expectation 
of justice, for that member, participation in disagreements materialises as a non-
negotiable entitlement. Within disagreements, for an institution to expect 
acceptance of collectively binding decisions, pluralistic institutions must ensure 
equal weight in the actual process of decision-making.  
This brings us to expectations of legitimacy. Before delving into the second 
category of expectations, it is important to pause on an aspect we alluded to in 
passing. There is a lexical priority between the two categories of expectations. 
Fulfilled expectations of justice allow interaction communities to produce decisions 
that can aim to be legitimate. Undeniably, the priority of expectations of justice may 
                                                          
361 It is important to notice that pluralistic institutions must put members in the position to decide what to do in 
front of meaningful public issues. Institutions are pluralistic if and only if all members can have subject-object 
relations with all possible objects of disagreement. Therefore, when members do not have subject-object 
relations with external objects, the explanation must reside only in reasons that are internal to the member of 
the society.   
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furnish decision-making procedures with moral considerations that can sensibly 
undermine the ideation of the most epistemically correct collective decisions. This 
is true. In a pluralistic society, by granting access to the object of disagreement 
without distinction, disagreements may be long and complex, and they do not 
necessarily lead to the favourite decision of an external observer. However, as I said 
earlier, it seems plausible to think that members with a right to have a say will have 
more reasons to accept decisions in which they can recognize the traces of their 
agency, rather than alien impositions from above.362 Therefore, from the 
perspective of pluralistic institutions, an expectation of legitimacy is the belief that, 
when members can recognize their subject-object relation in the outcome, members 
will accept the outcome of disagreements as binding. This does not mean to say 
that, if the procedure of disagreement applies correctly the two orders of 
normativity, members lose their fundamental entitlement to have a say in that 
specific respect. Expectations of legitimacy implies that, after a suitably constructed 
disagreement, pluralistic institutions can enact the outcome as if everyone agreed. 
Alike other types of expectations, members may not accommodate the expected 
course of action – they do not fulfil the expectation of legitimacy. 
As one may notice, the expectation of legitimacy recalls the procedural basis 
of the second order of normativity. This point helps me to clarify the relationship 
between the two kinds of expectations. All in all, if all the requisites for having a 
legitimate decision have been met (subject-object relation and equal weight of all 
available subject-object relations); institutions have a legitimate belief that 
members will comply with the enactment of controversial decisions.  
Nevertheless, members of a pluralistic society retain the entitlement to 
access all possible objects of disagreement. If we see collective decisions from 
another point of view, they are new objects of disagreement, and members of a 
pluralistic society can act form a subject-object relation with all possible objects of 
disagreement. In other words, despite legitimacy expectations, members’ claim to 
                                                          
362 On this issue, see Albena Azmanova, “The Right to Politics and Republican Non-Domination,” Philosophy 
and Social Criticism 42 (4) (2016): 465-75. This kind of reasoning echoes debates on the human right to 
political participation, which discuss the legitimacy of binding standards at the international level. On this issue, 
I have benefitted greatly from Fabienne Peter, “The Human Right to Political Participation,” Journal of Ethics 
and Social Philosophy 7 (21) (2013): 1-17.  
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contest the outcome must be recognized. It follows that, in a society where all 
members have a right to have a say, the outcome of communicative exchanges 
among members, whose considerations count the same, are legitimate, even if they 
are controversial from the general standpoint of justice. Then, institutions can have 
an expectation of legitimacy on such a decision. However, members’ expectations 
of justice can always trump institutional expectations of legitimacy. Specifically, 
the general standpoint of justice ensures members to access legitimate outcomes. In 
this way, the quality of outcomes loses relevance, since all decisions are possible 
objects of disagreement, which are accessible to the members of a pluralistic 
society.363 If projected to the general outlook of a pluralistic society, this point 
anticipates the fundamental revisable character of a pluralistic utopia. This 
character shall be the object of section 5. As we shall see, members with a right to 
have a say always retain the entitlement to access objects of disagreement; 
therefore, they can appropriate terms of cooperation qua possible objects of 
disagreement, and think of more non-exclusionary arrangements.  
 
 
5. Why the pluralistic society is a revisable utopia 
So far, I have explained what kind of network can arise from the two orders of 
normativity – and the protection of individual subject-object relations with external 
objects of disagreement. Specifically, a person with a right to have a say expects 
other members to recognize his or her own entitlement to act upon external objects. 
With different degrees of intensity, she also expects institutions to make the 
exercise of this entitlement possible. Therefore, when expectations of justice remain 
unfulfilled, institutions may become objects of contestation.  But, as we shall see in 
this section, fulfilment of expectations does not secure the solidity of institutions 
over time. Namely, since all members have the right to have a say, unfulfilled 
expectations justify disagreements whose objects may be the ruling institutional 
                                                          
363 When all members have an entitlement to have subject-object relations with legitimate outcomes, the 
contestation of legitimate outcomes becomes essentially a problem of feasibility in the framework of the 
pluralistic society, which includes variables such as physical costs, motivations, the length of the decision-
making procedure, probability of success, and social support.  
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architecture. Alternatively, when members think that other members and 
institutions have fulfilled their expectations of justice, they might crave for more 
non-exclusionary arrangements. In other words, participation in disagreements may 
give new strength to one’s claim to act upon all relevant objects of the external 
world. In the two cases, members of a pluralistic society break the chain of 
expectations in order to claim their right claim to act upon elements of the external 
world again.  
 
Therefore, members require pluralistic institutions to fulfil expectations 
whose intensity depends on the combination of external circumstances and the 
worldviews members have. When external inhibiting circumstances undermine the 
exercise of one’s entitlement to have a say, pluralistic institutions must do 
something. They must do something until the member does not feel that he or she 
can act upon all external objects of disagreement. Moreover, by doing so, 
institutional action may strengthen the intensity of one’s expectation to act upon 
external objects. The overall intensity of expectations of justice, however, is a 
subjective matter, which institutions are not able to anticipate. If intensity depends 
on individual moral dispositions, worldviews, together with contingent 
circumstances, there is not so much that members or institutions can do, when other 
members think that their expectations are unfulfilled. In this way, on the part of the 
members, the intensity of expectations can strengthen without predictable limits. 
However, it seems plausible to think that, if members have very strong expectations, 
it is more demanding to fulfil them fully, and this transforms members with 
expectations of justice into members whose expectations have not fulfilled, 
therefore with a justice-based claim to claim for arrangements that can ensure their 
basic entitlement to have a say – more non-exclusionary arrangements.  
Now, within the pluralistic society, unfulfilled expectations of justice may 
originate a mismatch: a pluralistic society itself can be the cause of strong 
expectations that are unfulfillable without significant changes. Let me explain. 
Since the right to have a say entitles all members of a pluralistic society in the same 
way, it has an inherent unconditional character – all members have a right to have 
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a say without distinction. And, when the expectation of justice is unfulfilled, the 
person has justice-based reasons to break intersubjective relationships and be firm 
on her battle. When members have new and strong demands to act upon external 
objects, and the available normative architecture has not adequate instruments to 
fulfil such demands; for some members, the normative architecture turns out to the 
object of their subject-object relations. In this way, the full realization of a 
pluralistic society, one in which all members act upon objects of disagreement, may 
bring to the continuing articulation of its own contestation.  
As a non-exclusionary society, disagreements are pivotal for the 
reaffirmation of the general standpoint of justice.364 On this view, therefore, a 
pluralistic society is the state of affairs in which, for the first time, all members of 
a society have an entitlement to act upon all objects of disagreement. From a certain 
point of view, a pluralistic society is not the perfect social order, it is only the direct 
consequence of people with different worldviews, who all adhere to the same 
normative scheme. From another perspective, a pluralistic society is a perfect 
society. It presents an image of a community in which exclusionary relations are 
eradicated. Moreover, it embodies a truly experimentalist posture. By adjusting the 
outcome of disagreement to new subject-object relations, a pluralistic society 
constitutes outcomes that are always more non-exclusionary. And, by doing so, the 
pluralistic society opens the door to more non-exclusionary arrangements. For a 
non-exclusionary society, this plasticity is indispensable. It avoids a status-quo bias 
and the justification of those normative arrangements that, to protect the coherence 
of the ideal world and its normative commitment, support exclusionary practices. 
To be non-exclusionary, a pluralistic society must keep the door open for all kinds 
of subject-object relations, which means to instil in a revisable component in the 
ideal-world. In a pluralistic society, members can always access objects of 
disagreement, and, among many other possible objects, the normative scheme at 
the heart of non-exclusionary arrangements is a possible object of a subject-object 
relation. So, without being in contradiction with two requirements, the protection 
                                                          
364 Usually, social utopias are society where there is no room for disagreement. Ernst Bloch makes this point 
very clear: ‘however much more future social utopias contain, this future is certainly more one of happy human 
flora than of demands that have been forced through’. See Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope (Cambridge 
MASS: MIT Press, 1995), 543. 
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of subject-object relations regardless of their content, and the observation that a 
non-exclusionary conception of justice is one among many other worldviews, there 
is no justice-based reason to deny members the entitlement to rethink the normative 
structure of a pluralistic society.   
 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have investigated the revisable character of a non-exclusionary 
utopia. To do so, I have illustrated the kind of relationship that members establish 
with one another because of their entitlement to have subject-object relations with 
all external objects. I have argued that the two orders of normativity inform a 
network of expectations among members, and between members and institutions.  
To sum up, my argument has followed three steps. First, I have isolated the problem 
of revisability in the ideal world. Second, from the study of the relation between a 
non-exclusionary conception of justice and other conceptions of justice that people 
may have, I have extrapolated a network of expectations. Members have 
expectations of justice to have subject-object relations with all external objects, and 
they expect institutions to protect this claim upon external objects. In agreement 
with this perspective, the range of possible objects may include the normative 
architecture of the pluralistic society. Third, I have argued that, in some cases, 
institutions generate expectations of justice that are not able to fulfil. Because of 
this mismatch, members may contest pluralistic institutions and demand for more 
non-exclusionary arrangements. Together, these three steps have shown that the 
pluralistic society is a revisable utopia, one that can open for other better-than-ideal 
worlds.  
A revisable utopia is an ideal representation of a society, whose fundamental 
normative scheme has a built-in perfectible character. This ideal world is 
perfectible, but, in the pursuit of a certain subsets of ideal worlds, it cannot be 
bypassed. For the discovery of better-than-ideal non-exclusionary worlds, the 
pluralistic society is a necessary condition. In this case, necessity is a matter of 
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agency, not probability. The observation that there might be other better-than-ideal 
non-exclusionary worlds does not mean that they will be discovered. Without the 
entitlement to act upon all objects of disagreement, members lack the claim right to 
revise the non-exclusionary terms of a pluralistic society and develop alternatives 
to the existing ideal. In the end, a pluralistic society is an ideal society, which might 
not be achievable from our world, but, if reached, it would put its members, without 
distinction, in the position to construct better-than-ideal worlds. 
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Chapter 9 
Freedom of expression in a pluralistic society 
 
 
 
In a pluralistic society, the core idea is that members with a full entitlement to have 
a say are able to have individual subject-object relations with all possible objects of 
disagreement. In this chapter, I focus on how people can and cannot advance their 
worldviews in public as members of a pluralistic society organized on the two levels 
of normativity. A pluralistic society seeks to open the space of public discourse for 
collective self-constitution; within this enabling environment, some members may 
seek the space to rethink the articulation of the standpoint of justice in different 
ways. As we shall see, this discourse brings together two different objects of 
analysis: oppositional politics and hate speech. On the one hand, oppositional 
politics and hate speech are practices that affirm freedom of expression as 
functional to the full enjoyment of the entitlement granted by the right to have a 
say.  Simply, the right to have a say specially protects freedom of expression as a 
necessary means to access objects of disagreement in one’s own way.365 On the 
other hand, oppositional politics and hate speech serve the purpose of political 
legitimation. All communicative act on a certain public issues can express the 
individual subject-object relation that is necessary for legitimate decisions in a 
pluralistic society. Together, these two levels of analysis shall demonstrate that, in 
a pluralistic society, restraints to communicative acts are justified only when these 
acts undermine someone else’s enjoyment of his or her status as a member of the 
pluralistic society with a right to appropriate all possible objects of disagreement. 
First, for regulation to be justified, there must be a higher value in favour of 
                                                          
365 See also, T.M. Scanlon, “Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression,” University of Pittsburgh 
Law Review (40) (1979): 519-21. It is beyond the scope of this section to assess liberal arguments in favour or 
against restrictions on freedom of expression. On this issue, see John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989): 44-6. See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). See Eric M. Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). More recently, the Dworkin-Waldron exchange has animated the debate in legal and 
political theory. See Ronald Dworkin, ‘Foreword’ in Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (eds.), Extreme Speech 
and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), v-ix. Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech 
(Cambridge MASS: Harvard University Press, 2012), ch. 3, 4 and 8. 
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regulation that survives the requirement of freedom of expression for all members 
who have the right to have a say. Second, all regulations also are restrictions of the 
legitimating constituency, therefore, given the direct connection between 
participation and legitimacy, they are dysfunctional for the enactment of decisions 
that pluralistic institutions can consider to be legitimate.   
Here, in my examination of oppositional politics, I focus only on its 
semantical aspects, those aspects that connect with the existence of shared objects 
of disagreement. An examination of the justification of oppositional politics will be 
at the centre of the last chapter of this work. With oppositional politics, however, I 
mean all those practices that express considerations on objects of disagreement in 
ways that are not necessarily discursive. Hate speech is a broad category that groups 
together a number of diverse speech acts. Broadly understood, hate speech attacks 
other human beings on grounds of their race, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, 
religious identity, and other membership, where this group membership is a morally 
arbitrary distinguishing category.366 Such definition of hate speech leaves implicit 
two fundamental aspects of hate speech, which are often at the heart of prohibition 
of fascist ideologies and discriminatory viewpoints. First, hate speech is a public 
act that, by targeting a certain group, aims to send a message to the society widely 
understood. Second, hate speech is in principle a rightful exercise of freedom of 
expression, which becomes problematic because of its content.367 
To build my argument, I recall the assumptions that regulate a pluralistic 
society. All members of a pluralistic society have a right to have a say. Members 
know that other members have a right to have a say. Institutions are pluralistic, 
therefore constructed in agreement with the two orders of normativity. Since all 
members have a right to have a say, institutions are required to ensure all the 
possible arrangements that are functional to the appropriation of objects of 
                                                          
366 This definition draws upon Corey Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? How 
democracies can protect expression and promote equality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012) and 
Caleb Yong, “Does Freedom of Speech Include Hate Speech?” Res Publica 17 (2011): 385-03. 
367 Hate speech does not undermine the stability of liberal democratic societies. It is an extemporaneous coup 
to an otherwise relatively stable order of values. In certain case, problems of law and order as well as discord 
among the members of the community are the immediate consequences of hate speech. This is the case of India, 
where restrictions to hate speech find justification in the need to avoid threats to the precarious equilibrium 
among groups. The same is not valid for the case of France and Italy, where hate speech laws appeals to values 
taken as central for the community.  
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disagreement without distinction. With these assumptions in mind, I shall proceed 
as follows. In section 2, I recall the two orders of normativity, and I place the right 
to have a say and the second order of normativity in the context of a pluralistic 
society. This work is preliminary to the study of oppositional politics and hate 
speech as different articulations of freedom of expression in the pluralistic society. 
In section 3, I shall examine oppositional politics in connection with the second 
order of normativity. This analysis shall leave open important normative questions, 
like the permissibility of protesting against pluralistic institutions, which are the 
object of chapter 10. Here, I assume that protests are permissible, and, if they are 
permissible, we ask ourselves how they can channel their message in existing 
disagreements. In other words, the question is: what is the discursive meaning of 
oppositional politics in a pluralistic society? In section 4, I shall examine hate 
speech. First, I see hate speech in connection with the first order of normativity. 
Second, I examine hate speech as a communicative medium through which 
individuals affects the forms of their communal life. In section 5, I shall 
disaggregate hate speech into four different practices. Traditionally, political and 
legal theorists have defended two kinds of positions. On the one hand, we have the 
neutralist approach, which affirms that state should not endorse any values.368 
Neutralist approach does not protect threats, but protects opinions that are hostile 
to the core ideals of liberal democracy from coercive sanctions.369 On the other 
hand, there are theorists who argue that freedom of speech does not protect 
viewpoints that are inimical to a liberal democratic society.370 In this chapter, we 
will not address the question of whether hate speech should be regulated within a 
liberal democracy, but rather whether it should be regulated in a pluralistic society 
where all members have a right to have a say. As we shall demonstrate, physical 
and psychological harms, and wrongs, that affect the entitlement to appropriate 
external objects require adequate compensations. Eventually, in section 6, I shall 
conclude by answering a possible objection to the pluralistic society.  
 
                                                          
368 See Ronald Dworkin, “A new map on censorship,” Index on Censorship 35 (1) (2006): 130-33. 
369 Bretschneider aptly coins the term “hateful viewpoints” to define these opinions. Bretschneider 2012, 1.  
370 Kenneth Lasson, “Group Libel versus free speech: when big brother should butt in,” Duquesne Law Review 
(23) (1984): 77-130. 
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2. The two orders of normativity in a pluralistic society   
In this section, I shall clarify the work of the two orders of a normativity in a 
pluralistic society. This work of framing shall enable me to draw the perimeter for 
the study of controversial communicative practices. The right to have a say involves 
a normative claim about a right that encompasses quite a few elements. There is the 
inherent assumption that something a person has reasons to care about is of great 
importance – the basic claim to appropriate elements of the external world (A). 
Moreover, this claim encapsulates the idea that, given the importance of the subject-
object relation with objects of the external world, burden and benefits across the 
society should be defined accordingly (B). Ultimately, this claim encapsulates the 
expectation that other members bear the same constraints (C).371 Alongside these 
three trajectories, what the right to have a say encapsulates can be set out as follows. 
Individuals realize that subject-object relations are necessary to unfold their 
agential capacity in public (A). At the same time, benefits and burdens must be 
distributed in accordance with the original demand for act upon external object (B). 
Such demand incorporates the belief that, once the demand has been satisfied, right 
holder will be able to bear, until a certain extent, the resulting limitation (C).  In this 
vein, it is unjust to enforce a collective decision without allowing members with a 
right to have a say to use their entitlement to have subject-object relations with the 
object under scrutinity.  
This normative basis of equal standing correlates with a second-order 
normativity, which organizes decision making-procedure in order to bring about 
legitimate decisions. In a context where all members have a just demand for acting 
upon elements of the external world, the second order normativity requires that 
legitimate decisions are decisions in which all members can recognize their subject-
object relations. The guiding idea is that members of a pluralistic society can 
reconstruct the path of interconnected intentional actions to their initial decision to 
participate in a certain disagreement. Consequently, for the diversity of worldviews, 
                                                          
371 I develop the three elements in analogy with Thomas Scanlon. See, T. M. Scanlon, “Why not base free 
speech on autonomy or democracy?,” Virginia Law Review (97) (3) (2011): 541. 
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within the present framework of justice, the most legitimate decision is a decision 
in which all members can recognize their individual subject-object relations.  
Therefore, when we put the two orders of normativity in place, the 
requirement arising from the right to have a say is that such a non-exclusionary 
society ensures that all members are able to have subject-object relations with all 
objects of disagreement. This normativity requires that social and political 
arrangements allow members to have the same opportunities and basic capabilities 
to act upon all possible objects of disagreement. Against asymmetry of power 
distribution and structural inequalities, a pluralistic society inspired by the right to 
have a say ensures material resources to put members in the position to voice their 
claims. At the same time, institutions of a political society, whose construction is 
informed by the right to have a say, must avoid social subordination - in the sense 
of being denied participation when all other members can act upon the object. The 
second order of normativity participates in the definition of legitimacy within a 
pluralistic society: a decision of public interest can be enforced when all members 
can recognize their individual subject-object relations in the collectively binding 
decision.372 The right to have a say ensures that members can establish subject-
object relations and challenge collectively binding decisions. The second order of 
normativity says that all subject-object relations that have a demonstrable reference 
with the same public object of disagreement, and only those relations that have the 
same referent, must count the same. At the same, the second order of normativity 
introduces a validity test: that is, only considerations on the object count the 
same.373  
Therefore, the first-order-normativity secures participation in 
disagreements, and thee second-order-normativity regulates disagreements so that 
all those available considerations, which have a demonstrable connection with a 
                                                          
372 Clearly, decision-making procedure must be just in order to bring about decisions that can claim to be 
legitimate. There is no such a thing as the pluralistic decision-making procedure. A just decision-making 
procedure is a decision-making procedure that ensure all members can exercise their franchise as peers. At the 
outset of a pluralistic society, this will be object of disagreement too. The legitimate decision from that initial 
disagreement is the canon of justice for the following decision-making procedures until some members prove 
this decision-making procedure to be exclusionary. 
373 In this chapter and in chapter 10, I use considerations and subject-object relations interchangeably. Clearly, 
by definition, subject-object relations are on the object of disagreement. For this reason, unlike the previous 
chapters, in the following, I understand the subject-object relation in a more relaxed way. It may be the case 
that the object of the subject-object relation is not the object of disagreement.  
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certain public issue, must have equal weight.374 In this way, the two orders of 
normativity encompass a series of claims to institutions, which are required to 
ensure the non-exclusionary character of a pluralistic society. For the members of 
the pluralistic society, it seems that the only deriving obligation is to communicate 
a demonstrable connection with the relevant objects of disagreement. These two 
aspects, demanding normative prescriptions for institutions and a seemingly relaxed 
set of normative demands for members of a pluralistic society, posit central 
questions that will accompany us in the rest of the chapter.  
 
3. Oppositional politics and the two orders of normativity 
If all available and valid considerations are to be included in the interaction 
community, two questions follow: Who is in the position to say that a consideration 
is not valid (validity test)? What about those communicative acts whose referent is 
not decipherable easily? In this section, I answer these questions by explaining the 
work of the validity test – and its application to the case of oppositional politics. 
The validity test is a relationship through which people debate over the relevant 
character in each subject-object relation. It opens and closes the borders of 
disagreements. Essentially, we do not have to think of the validity test as a 
procedure of selection. Voting, asking why a certain consideration relates with the 
issue of concern, pointing out that the connection with the object is fallacious, 
demanding clarification, labelling another consideration as irrelevant, finding 
another form of expression as misleading, falsifying one’s consideration, but also 
incorporating new considerations in the interaction community and many other 
forms of discursive exchange, these are some examples of the validity test. The 
validity test, then, is a communicative exchange among individuals in which one’s 
consideration is judged for its connection with the object of disagreement. The two 
poles must convince one another, and the rest of the members, that there is (or there 
is not) such a connection.  
                                                          
374 It is important to notice that these considerations are considerations that someone has expressed. If someone 
does not care about a certain issue, his or her consideration does not count for the legitimacy of the decision. 
For legitimacy, it matters only the initial decision between participation and doing otherwise.  
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Let me explain. Considerations are prima facie equally valid before the 
validity test. Through the validity test, a consideration may be proved misleading, 
therefore, left aside. For instance, in the pluralistic society X, considerations 
1,2,3,4,5 and 6 concerning BOGEYMAN are part of the set of considerations on 
BOGEYMAN. The validity test enters in action if Frida calls Louise on her 
consideration. If Louise convinces Frida that her consideration is actually about 
BOGEYMAN, the status of Louise’s consideration is confirmed. The validity test, 
therefore, does nothing more than reaffirming the status of one’s consideration as 
valid.375 An individual with a consideration on X enters into the interaction 
community and his or her presence is not questioned until someone else calls his or 
her consideration. This is so because, under the universal regime of the right to have 
a say, all members have an unnegotiable entitlement to act upon external objects of 
disagreement. The validity test simply enables members of a pluralistic society to 
have the opportunity to block deliberately invalid communicative acts, and it grants 
every individuals the same opportunity to prove others the connection with the 
relevant object of disagreement. If we imagine hypothetical dialogical exchanges, 
the logic of the validity test is ordinary: your consideration does not count until it 
is actually a consideration on the object of communal concern.  
Things complicate when, from the mechanics of the validity test, we try to 
imagine its institutionalization. Now, let us think of the work of the validity test at 
a national scale. The pluralistic society is deciding on a military intervention against 
a coalition of terrorist groups. To build our examples, we need to add some other 
stipulations. First, we have to postulate that the pluralistic society has adopted a 
certain decision-making procedure, which ensures all members the right to have a 
say, and their considerations, if valid, count equally in the process of decision-
making. To be in agreement with the theory, this procedure varies according to the 
size, worldviews, and population of a certain country. However, for the sake of 
simplicity, let us think of a potential pluralistic procedure. This is a procedure of 
five steps. (1) All members vote their representatives. (2) Members enjoy 
                                                          
375 This does not mean to say that, once Louise’s consideration has passed the validity test, she is granted the 
status in the interaction community forever. For instance, new evidence may demonstrate that her consideration 
is not actually on the same object. Until this happens, however, Louise’s consideration enjoys equal status 
within the interaction community.  
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institutional channels (petitions, mini-public, and public consultation) to determine 
the agenda of the representatives. (3) Representatives pool proposals in the light of 
the available set of valid consideration. (4) Members vote a proposal among a 
limited set of proposals in a public referendum. (5) After the results of the 
referendum, the basic structure enacts the proposals, and members retain the right 
to challenge such a proposal. In such a procedure, the validity test works at step (2). 
In the case of military intervention, let us assume that IR experts lobby 
representatives. They push for a strong military intervention, and, for influencing 
the construction of the public referendum, they brand other considerations as 
invalid. However, those members who hold such considerations enjoy full 
entitlement to show that their considerations are indeed valid, and they must count 
in the formulation of general proposals. For instance, taxpayers do not want public 
resources to be wasted in an uncertain war, pacifists abhor wars, risk-adverse 
members are worried for economic repercussions, and the like. The validity test, 
therefore, may force these members to reaffirm their considerations. However, if 
there is such a thing as the connection with the object of disagreement, 
representatives must give them equal weight in the procedure of pooling different 
considerations in a small number of proposals, which, eventually, members vote in 
a public referendum. 
In this way, the validity test seems more an encouragement to demonstrate 
the connection with the object rather than a proper procedure of selection. Let me 
explain. We say that a consideration is a connection between the object and one’s 
worldview, which an individual makes available to the public. With the subject-
object relation in mind, it seems implausible to say that a person, who has a certain 
worldview, develops a consideration that is unrelated with the object of 
disagreement. This means to say that all considerations are prima facie valid. At 
this point, a fundamental interrogative arises. How comes that a procedural 
mechanism denies people an entitlement that is at the basis of their franchise as 
members of a pluralistic society? Yet, even if this paradox gives the impression that 
the validity test does not bring any advantage to the commerce of considerations 
within a pluralistic society, it does help to construct a certain condition that rules 
out person-to-person vituperation – a problem of justice - without shutting off from 
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the interaction community all those people that have a say on that issue – a 
legitimacy-related issue. In other words, the aim of the validity test is to delimitate 
the space until which legitimate-based reasons are justified. The purpose of the 
validity test is to place temporary limits on those speech acts and deeds that question 
the fundamental entitlement of other members, and that do so without appealing to 
the same referent. This comes to be clear when we place the reasoning in context. 
If the dispute is between two members of the interaction community, an individual 
who holds a consideration on the object of disagreement might be required to polish 
his or her speech acts until the connection with the referent is cognitively 
demonstrable. If the performative character of one’s communicative act is a 
relevant part of his or her own considerations, the required referent must be 
cognizable from the point of view of people’s with other considerations.376 If the 
consideration is deliberately excluded, the person with a un-cognized connection 
with the object is fully entitled to appeal to the first order normativity, which forces 
other members to include her or his consideration in the interaction community of 
available and valid considerations.  
When the contentious is between a member of the interaction community 
and another individual of the pluralistic society, we have to consider other two 
possible scenarios. On the one hand, the validity test ensures that a direct attack 
against a member, who has a valid consideration, from outside is not directly 
translated into an argument for falsifying her consideration within the interaction 
community. Roughly, offences on a consideration-holder do not count as ground 
for legitimacy-based evaluation. The other side of the coin tells us that, if a person 
translates the same denigrating opinion into a consideration on the object of 
disagreement, his or her consideration counts in the relevant legitimating set. 
Specifically, let us try to imagine a heuristic state of affairs. Frida (the hater) attacks 
verbally and physically Louise (the victim), whose consideration is part of a certain 
interaction community. Regardless of its motivations, such a despicable act may 
influence how Louise’s consideration is cognized in that specific interaction 
community. If this is the case, the validity test ensures that only the considerations 
                                                          
376 For instance, fasting, strikes, public concerts, and the occupation of public spaces are practices of 
oppositional politics whose performative character seems to be inextricable from the referent.  
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on the object count. Therefore, no lateral judgments on the person should be taken 
into account for a person and her consideration to be considered as a relevant 
element of the legitimating constituency. This excludes judgments that look at the 
relationship between Frida and Louise. This also excludes judgments that speculate 
on Louise. Eventually, this leaves aside wider examination of recurring episodes of 
marginalization of the victim in other sites of disagreement.377 These forms of 
expression undermine the full enjoyment of the right to have a say and they may 
undermine the equal weight that a consideration is due to have in order for a 
decision to be legitimate. We can continue with Frida and Louise. Now, Frida 
attacks again Louise verbally and physically. Frida is so determined to put a spoke 
in Louise’s wheel that she constructs a consideration that mediates between her 
worldview and Louise’s object of disagreement. In this case, Frida’s consideration 
passes the validity test. Frida’s consideration is now part of the legitimating 
constituency. Perhaps Louise rejects Frida’s consideration, but Frida’s 
consideration counts.378  
 
This conceptual work opens to the study of practices of oppositional politics 
in a pluralistic society. Let me explain. The validity test does not imply a concession 
to the use of violence directed at suppressing other considerations. An exercise of 
pure violence on another member of the interaction community is not recursively 
generalizable by a member of the interaction community in terms that are 
demonstrably coherent with the object of disagreement. Expressions of violence per 
se have no claim to be included in the legitimating constituency. Moreover, the pure 
exercise of violence on another person violates also the first order normativity, 
because it prevents a member from playing her due part in a pluralistic society. 
However, many forms of violence do not involve direct harassment of other 
members of the pluralistic society. For instance, burning cars, turning garbage bins 
                                                          
377 Actually, marginalization is not possible in a pluralistic society, where all members have a right to have a 
say. In order to be non-exclusionary, pluralistic institutions must enable all members to act upon all possible 
objects of disagreement. However, this does not exclude the possibility that, in worse-than-ideal worlds, some 
members have experienced exclusion and marginalization.  
378 Someone might object that, by forcing Frida to frame her argument against Louise within the interaction 
community, Frida’s argument becomes simply another argument, which fails the initial intent. This is true, but, 
as we shall see later, outside the interaction community, the first-order normativity protects Frida.  
195 
 
upside down, sending intimidating messages, window-smashing, stones-throwing, 
the possession of public spaces, fasting, and the like. Usually, these forms of 
violence have a semantical connection with a certain object of public concern. 
Should we consider them as appropriate components of the legitimating 
constituency?  
The literature on civil disobedience takes violence as the discriminating 
component to define the perimeter of reasons that count.379 Civil disobedience, for 
instance, especially if we consider the often-invoked examples of Martin Luther 
King, Gandhi, and Thoreau, is not violent, and it must be acceptable within liberal 
democracies.380  Riots, like protests in Ferguson and 2011 chaos in Northern 
London, have an explicit violent character. This component makes them object of 
measures of law and order, and it discharges the acceptability component.381 
Traditionally, violent forms of protesting, therefore, have no claim to be included 
in the relevant legitimating constituency. In a pluralistic society, civil disobedience 
meets both the first order and the second order normativity. Civil disobedience is 
just, but also considerations advanced through civil disobedience must have the due 
weight in the relevant legitimating constituency. For instance in a disagreement on 
race-equality, there is no justice-based reason to exclude Martin Luther King’s 
communicative acts. Moreover, given the clear connection with the object of 
disagreement, Martin Luther King’s consideration is valid and must have a due 
weight in order for him to accept a decision in that context.  
For examples like Ferguson and 2011 riots in London, the role of the 
validity test is more complex. People do have a referent to a certain object of 
concern, but the aesthetic character of their action might make difficult for the 
interaction community to cognize the demonstrable connection with an object of 
                                                          
379 Habermas and Rawls’s definitions of civil disobedience emphasise its non-violent character. See Jurgen 
Habermas, “Civil Disobedience. Litmus Test for the Democratic Constitutional System,” Berkeley Journal of 
Sociology 30 (1985): 100. See also Rawls 1971, 364. Hannah Arendt sees civil disobedience as a practice of 
self-determination against the rigidifying tendencies of state institutions. See Hannah Arendt, “Civil 
Disobedience,” in Hannah Arendt, Crises of the Republic (New York: HBC, 1972), 49-102. 
380 This point comes out particularly clear in Andrew Sabl, “Looking forward to Justice: Rawlsian Civil 
Disobedience and its Non-Rawlsian Lessons,” Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3): 307-30. See also William 
E. Scheuerman, “Recent Theories of Civil Disobedience: An Anti-Legal Turn?,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 23 (4) (2015): 427-49. 
381 In this chapter, I am not aiming to develop an analysis on civil disobedience and resistance. I focus on the 
way through which a pluralistic society channels valid considerations in the relevant disagreements.  
196 
 
public concern and, therefore, include them in the legitimating constituency. 
Clearly, the problem is not only of inclusion. When considerations, which are 
available and valid, do not have equal weight, a decision applies illegitimately on 
the individuals who hold such considerations. To put otherwise, individuals, whose 
considerations are left aside despite being valid, have a legitimate claim not to 
accept the collective decision. In this sense, riots are a very thorny case. When riots 
do not prevent anyone from exercising the right to have a say, in a pluralistic 
society, considerations, which members express through forms of violence against 
things or themselves, must be part of the relevant legitimating constituency.382  
In such occurrence, the validity test is crucial to extend the legitimating 
constituency. Without the validity test, the risk is that of denying some members 
their entitlement to act upon external objects of disagreement.383  The validity test 
functions as an enabler. In its initial application, we saw that considerations were 
prima facie valid, and the burden of proof was on members who called other 
members to demonstrate their connection. With riots, considerations are prima facie 
invalid and the burden of proof falls on the protesters. Let me explain. In its general 
application, the validity test restricts the camp of the legitimating constituency 
whereas, here, the validity test extends the range of valid considerations. The 
vehement manifestation of one’s consideration may hinder the cognition of the 
communal referent and, eventually, it can frustrate the due inclusion in the 
interaction community. In such occurrence, if the validity test proves to be very 
demanding for the protesters, and if they think of having a valid consideration, 
institutions, because of the first order normativity, which requires everyone to be in 
the position to affect issue of his or her concern, must facilitate their inclusion in 
the legitimating constituency. By making the claim of protesters more transparent, 
through communicative mediation and advocacy action on the two parties of the 
                                                          
382 Actually, by reading the rhetoric and the motivations of such expression of violence, we often find out that 
it is the result of systematic exclusion. On riots, see Tommie Shelbie, “Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 35 (2) (2007): 127-60. Robin Celikates has tried to relax the non-violent 
component of civil disobedience. See Robin Celikates, “Rethinking Civil Disobedience as a Practice of 
Contestation – Beyond the Liberal Paradigm,” Constellations 23 (1) (2016): 41-2. Joseph Raz’s example of a 
strike of ambulance drivers also reminds us that non-violent forms of protesting may be more damaging than 
violent riots. See Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 262-75.  
383 The embarrassment of this kind of exclusion also comes from the observation that the would-be excluded 
parties have already expressed their connection with the object of disagreement. In this case, the validity test is 
a mechanism that enables some members to exercise their due entitlement in a specific disagreement.  
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validity test, institutions may channel inclusion within the interaction community. 
For instance, concerning a hypothetical disagreement about global warming within 
a pluralist society, fasting and strikes against land-grabbing must be translated into 
valid considerations. At the same time, when immigrants block borders, if there is 
disagreement on the degree of social inclusion that a pluralistic society can ensure 
for immigrants, in the pluralistic society, members of the interaction community 
may call the validity on the act of blocking borders. This puts the burden of proving 
on the protesters. Once protesters have demonstrated the relevant connection, their 
presence in the interaction community falls within the scope of the first order 
normativity, and, despite ostracism of other members of the interaction community, 
institutions of a pluralistic society must ensure that, for a decision to be legitimate, 
their subject-object relations have equal weight. This observation brings me to the 
conclusion of this section. The study of the validity test has shown the flexibility of 
legitimating constituencies in a pluralistic society. As we have seen, inclusion or 
exclusion of otherwise valid considerations cause problems of legitimacy for 
pluralistic institutions, which, therefore, find incentives to maximize the number of 
valid considerations on public issues. All-things-considered, this way of reasoning 
opens decision-making processes to forms of oppositional politics, despite their 
unorthodox performative character.  
 
4. Hate speech and the two orders of normativity  
The practice of protesting can be linked to freedom of expression as functional to 
the exercise of one’s fundamental entitlement as member of a pluralistic society. 
With forms of protesting, the task was easier because, normally, they point their 
fingers on specific policy proposals, and the problem of admissibility is eminently 
dependent on the way they advance their claim. Now, freedom of expression can 
also imply the diffusion of communicative acts that aim to affect one’s very status 
as equal member. A reading of this problem under the lenses of my two orders of 
normativity shall be the subject of the next two sections. If a hate speech act 
threatens to undermine one’s demand to participate qua member of a pluralistic 
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society; what does the standpoint of justice require us to do, considering that 
everyone has the entitlement to have a say? Alternatively, in a pluralistic society, if 
all the considerations should have equal weight in the decision-making procedure, 
to what extent members of a pluralistic society have to deal with offensive and 
discriminatory considerations? Whereas, in the previous section, the argument 
relied upon the traceability of one’s agency in the decision of a pluralistic society; 
here, we must make clear the extent to which the right to have a say protects all 
forms of expression, like forms of expression that attack other members. This is an 
important point for a pluralistic society because, for the sake of enabling subject-
object relations without distinctions, it can generate a circular assault on some 
members, who, because of hate speech, cannot enjoy their entitlement as granted.  
As we have seen in the previous chapters, the right to have a say demands 
institutional action at several complementary levels in order to ensure that members 
of a pluralistic society do actually have a say. Such first-order normativity protects 
members from both material and social barriers in a way that puts them in the 
position to access objects of disagreement. Maldistribution, distribution of injustice 
and unjust economic structures are obstacles that undermine what means to be a 
member of a pluralistic society. At the same time, cultural hierarchies and structural 
injustices, like sexual and gender discrimination, may be great hindrances that deny 
people the same standing as peers. For a pluralistic society, all members must have 
the equal status as agents that act upon external objects, and bear the consequences 
for doing so. Among the possible hindrances for the full exercise of the right to 
have a say, limitation to freedom of expression might be one of the most visible 
ones. Therefore, the first-order normativity, in order to ensure action upon objects 
of disagreements, demands institutions great protection of freedom of expression. 
It seems that this is the case also when freedom of expression means to attack other 
members on grounds of their race, nationality, religion, identity, gender, and the 
like. By saying that freedom of expression demands great protection, we means to 
say that, since freedom of expression is functional to the full exercise of the right 
to have a say, restrictions requires a stringent standard of justification.  
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Arguments for the restriction of hate speech are generally motivated by the 
harm produced.384 The idea is that a law regulating racist vilification because of the 
wound it inflicts is still viewpoint neutral because it is not motivated by disgust 
toward the racist speakers but rather by the effects that such speech act has on some 
members of the society. Another dominant idea is that restriction of hate speech are 
motivated by the harm it inflicts on the stability of democratic practices. 
Mobilisation for exclusionary worldviews creates the danger that a large majority 
of the population might choose an exclusionary or despotic government.385 Another 
approach has been the use of legal regulation to eradicate visible signs of hatred.386 
For some, hate speech legislations defend the dignity of equal citizenship against 
those who threat to undermine that status for a whole class of citizens.387 
There is something unconvincing in these responses. After all, the 
regulation of hate speech operates on the tangible manifestation of hate without 
addressing the unequal power relation between members of the same society. This 
way of reasoning seems to take as assumption that there are vulnerable groups. 
Because of an inescapable chain of past injustice, vulnerable groups, for good and 
for worse, will continue being vulnerable in the future, and that it is desirable this 
vulnerability not to become as visible as to determine a different distribution of 
benefits and burdens within the society. Deterrent actions, like fines or short 
incarcerations, would compensate the harm of reopening a wound that will never 
heal. They would also discourage haters from putting at stake harmony of the social 
community. In line with other harm-based arguments, the emphasis on unequal and 
open-ended power relations between members of the same society puts emphasis 
on what means hate speech for the addressee. Within the same community, different 
people are in the position to take advantage of their right to freedom of expression 
                                                          
384 Susan Brison, “The autonomy defence of free speech,” Ethics 108 (1998): 312-39. For a review, see Robert 
C Post, “Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment,” Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series 
208 (1991). 
385 On this point see Nancy Rosenblaum, On the Side of the Angels: an appreciation of parties and partisanship 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 412-55. Corey Brettschneider argues that liberal democracies 
should indirectly limit the harm of hate speech through their discourses and practices. See Brettscheneider, 
2012. 
386 Joel Kovel, White Racism: A Psychohistory (New York City: Columbia University Press, 1984). Jonathan 
Seglow defends regulations by using an argument for self-respect, see Jonathan Seglow, “Hate Speech, Dignity 
and Self-Respect,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (1) (2016): 1-14. 
387 Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge MASS: Harvard University Press, 2014), especially 
chapters 3 and 4. 
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in many ways and at different prices. This is exactly what the right to have a say 
and a pluralistic society do not stand for. A society so-conceived is an exclusionary 
society in which unassailable structures prevent some members from acting upon 
objects of disagreement.  
For this being so, the right to have a say has an unconditional character and 
applies to all members of a pluralistic society. If the aim of the first order 
normativity is to ensure that all members are able to appropriate external objects, 
the call for restrictions trumps great protection of freedom of expression when 
speech acts prevent a member from the exercise of his or her due right. In this way, 
restriction is justified in order to penalize those behaviours that prevent someone 
from exercising a due right, rather than addressing the ways members of a pluralistic 
society perform such a right, however objectionable these practices might be. For 
the sake of clarity, it is useful to turn back to Frida and Louise. We are in the 
pluralistic society X. Both Frida and Louise have a right to have a say and they can 
disagree with one another as peers. In order to ensure that all members can 
participate on an equal footing, institutions of X have enacted a system of 
affirmative actions that reserves places in top-tier colleges. This policy has brought 
about widespread disagreement, which have not stopped with the implementation 
of the policy. Louise is a member of a minority group. Frida campaigns against 
quotas. She does so, by using a racist language, attacking others on grounds of their 
race, nationality, religious identity, gender, sexual orientation or other membership. 
For harm-based arguments, the best way to keep the public perception of Frida and 
Lucy’s equal status is to regulate the space of manoeuvre within which Frida can 
campaign. The rationale for this regulation lies in the vulnerability of Lucy, the 
detrimental effect on the values of the society, and the special significance that 
equal status has for Louise’s group, given a long history of discrimination and 
injustice. For a right to have a say-based argument, Frida and Louise must have the 
same capacity to appropriate external objects of disagreement. If this is not the case, 
Louise has a justice-based claim to see differences equalized. Since the first-order 
normativity has the form of a general entitlement, pluralistic institutions do not have 
a justice-based claim to curtail Frida’s hate speeches. They must ensure that Louise 
has everything she needs to fight Frida on an equal footing.  
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The same is not valid if Frida deliberately prevent Louise from participating. 
In this case, the general entitlement to have a say not only imposes to equalize 
Louise’s status as potential participant, but it also grounds a justice-based argument 
for institution to penalize Frida. In her action, Frida is not making use of the spaces 
granted by the right to have a say as intended to protect everyone’s agency in the 
pluralistic society – she is not trying to access any object of disagreement. 
Therefore, justification for punishing Frida trumps the compelling reasons for 
freedom of expression, such as that every member must be able to find his or her 
own way to act upon objects of disagreement. Therefore, the first-order normativity 
requires institutions to find appropriate solutions to enable the addressees to affirm 
their status as members of a pluralistic society. In this way, even if the first-order 
normativity does not furnish institutions with a justice-based claim to curtail hate 
speech, it does provide institutions with a justice-based claim to work on the 
addressee of hate speech acts. In a pluralistic society, being able to participate on 
an equal footing means also to have the due means to rebut. This strategy is not 
necessarily less effective than regulation and curtailment. By protecting everyone’s 
entitlement to participate, institutions of a pluralistic society gain a comprehensive 
liability for realizing an atmosphere of widespread affirmation of one’s agential 
capacity.  
To sum up, so far, we have used a broad definition of hate speech that 
favours reflection in general terms. Such broad definition of hate speech does not 
pay the due tribute to the different kinds of communicative acts, all of which are 
instances of hate speech. It seems reasonable that even, within the scheme of a 
pluralistic society, different kinds of hate speech demands appropriate responses. 
In the following section, therefore, in unison with the literature in this field, I single 
out four categories of hate speech: targeted vilification, diffuse vilification, 
advocacy and campaign for exclusionary policies, libels.388 By examining these 
four categories, I aim to clarify how and why hate speech should be regulated within 
a pluralistic society.  
                                                          
388 I take these four categories from Yong 2011, 386.  
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5. Four kinds of hate speech and the two orders of normativity 
Before beginning with the study of all four kind of situations, it is important to fix 
what I have argued so far, and the assumptions upon which the model of a pluralistic 
society has been built. First, all members in a pluralistic society have a right to have 
a say, and they know that other people have the same right. Second, institutions of 
a pluralistic society have an obligation to ensure that all members of the pluralistic 
society can act upon all possible objects of disagreement. Third, members of a 
pluralistic society expect institutions to remove all obstacles and hindrances, both 
in terms of material and cultural resources, which prevent them from the exercise 
of their franchise. Moreover, as we have seen in the previous sections, the pluralistic 
society is built upon two kinds of normativity that follow one another with a strict 
order of priority. The right to have a say constitutes the general standpoint of justice 
from which members of the pluralistic society, with their own worldviews, can 
adjudicate institutions and collective decisions. Then, a second-order normativity 
completes this first-order normativity by clarifying how to organize disagreements 
in non-exclusionary ways. In this context, freedom of expression enjoys special 
protection as functional to the full exercise of the right to have a say, and as 
functional to the legitimation of collective decisions. At the level of the first order 
of normativity, this means to say that, when someone is prevented from expressing 
things in his or her own ways, he or she has a justice-claim to erase the obstacles. 
At the level of the second order of normativity, special protection of freedom of 
expression means to say that the only way to exclude a consideration from the 
legitimating constituency is to prove that its connection with the object of 
disagreement is false.  
Now, with these ideas in mind, we are in the position to study the different 
types of hate speech. Restrictions of hate speech would be justified if and only if 
they are grounded on a justice-based argument that trumps the justice-based 
argument for special protection of freedom of expression. Taken together, this 
analysis should help me to answer another objection. According to this objection to 
203 
 
the ideal of a pluralistic society, the protection of the right to have a say, regardless 
of the content of the worldviews, is likely to let despotic worldviews flourish and, 
perhaps, get consensus. Hate speech will be divided into four categories: targeted 
vilification, diffuse vilification, political advocacy for exclusionary politics and 
libels.  
a. Targeted vilification 
A vilification is a communicative act whose dominant intention is to wound and 
intimidate its audience. Its motivation is hostility towards specific elements of the 
addressee’s identity. In the case of targeted vilification, the hater directs the 
communicative act towards a specific individual. It can be a face-to-face encounter, 
immediate contacts and incidents without immediate contacts. For instance, target 
vilification includes sending intimidating letters and emails, the persistent course 
of a conduct that aims to exercise power over another person by using false 
messages and social mockery such as derision on the social networks. The case of 
a person who proceeds to yell profanities such as “fag and homo” against a 
colleague because of his sexual orientation is also a case of targeted vilification. 
The delivery of a pig’s head in front of a house where a Muslim family lives is 
another example of targeted vilification. The combination of persistent derogatory 
comments, name-calling, wet paper hurled towards a targeted person is also an 
instance of targeted vilification. In a pluralistic society, targeted vilification is not 
protected by a justice-based claim.389 This is so because the hater does not direct 
his or her communicative act to a precisely demonstrable referent. The aim of these 
communicative acts is not to advance an opinion, but rather they aim to induce 
certain psychological reactions in the addressee in a way that denies his or her due 
right to access objects of disagreement. Targeted vilification is like physical 
violence and abuse. Therefore, a pluralistic society does not ensure any protection 
because the justice reason for enabling people to participate trumps the justice-
based claim to act in one’s own way. To impose restrictions on this kind of hate 
speech is justified even in a pluralistic society, where everyone has a right to have 
a say. On the one hand, the cognitive and moral content of these acts is very limited 
                                                          
389 I borrow this definition from Yong 2011.  
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and they struggle to look like evaluative opinion to a significant degree. On the 
other hand, they build barriers and obstacles that prevent a member from the 
exercise of his or her own right to have a say. The balancing of the communicative 
relationship among members of a pluralistic society is more important for its 
institutions, and it does not preclude the hater to frame his or her worldviews in 
ways that allow everyone else to do the same.390  
b. Diffuse vilification 
Diffuse vilification does not direct to a specific member of a pluralistic society, but 
rather it addresses a sympathetic public audience. Examples of diffuse vilification 
are recent anti-Islam demonstrations, 2015 demonstrations of Neo-Nazis 
movements in England, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) rallies in India, the 
demonstration of the National Social Party of America in the village of Skokie 
where a predominantly Jewish community lived, as well as Northern-League anti-
immigrants posters and auctions in Italy. The intention of the majority of these 
speech acts is to wound and insult minorities because of their race or religious 
identity. From wearing Nazi Uniforms and the display of Swastika symbols to anti-
Roma posters in Italy and sit-in against mosques, the intention of diffuse vilification 
is to cause emotional distress on identity-grounds. Usually, these demonstrations 
are part of a larger strategy whose intent is to communicate evaluative opinions in 
order to gather political consensus. Therefore, the cognitive content is ostensibly 
directed towards a discursive referent that can be accessed also by the targeted 
minorities simultaneously. Since the aim is to address a sympathetic audience and 
to get consensus, the harm is minimal. By trying to win adherents to discriminatory 
views, diffuse vilification does not cause direct harm. The harm is connected with 
the intervention in the public sphere. Such intervention sends public signals that can 
be harmful.391 However, targeted minorities still have the capacity to organize 
counter-demonstrations. For instance, this has been the case in England, where civil 
society organizations mobilised against Neo-Nazis demonstrations. In a pluralistic 
society, diffuse vilification is protected. The general protection of freedom of 
                                                          
390 No acts that undermine one’s entitlement to have a say can be supported by justice-based reasons. This is 
so because all barriers that deny action upon external objects are violations of a non-exclusionary theory of 
justice. 
391 This analysis draws upon Yong 2011, 397. 
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expression as functional to the full exercise of the right to have a say includes also 
diffuse vilification. The harm of diffuse vilification is minimal and it does not 
prevent other members of the pluralistic society to exercise their right to have a say. 
Targeted groups do not lose the agential power to use their entitlement to have a 
say. They are able to counteract and gather consensus against diffuse vilification. 
Moreover, since demonstrations as a form of participation are fully protected by the 
right to have a say, an attempt to regulate diffuse vilification implies a content-
based regulation, which infringes the viewpoint neutrality of a pluralistic society. 
Therefore, justice-based claims to ensure everyone to have a say outweighs 
attempts to regulate targeted vilification. Consequently, the inclusion/exclusion of 
considerations that are inherent to acts of diffuse vilification depends on two things. 
First, the content of these communicative acts can be an object of public 
disagreement. In this case, their considerations are valid, and can claim equal 
weight in the interaction community. Second, the content of these communicative 
acts try to affect existing disagreements. If this is the case, they deserve equal 
weight if and only if there is a cognizable connection with the object under scrutiny.  
c. Political advocacy for exclusionary policies 
Exclusionary policies are policies under which certain identifiable groups are 
excluded from full and equal participation in the society. Usually, advocacy for 
such policies aims to deny racial or religious groups of their franchise in the society. 
If successful, this can be as infamous as ethnic cleansing and forced repatriation. In 
the literature, a regulation of these kinds of communicative acts is harm-based. 
When advocacy gains enough support, proponents of regulation argue, there is high 
probability that the translation of this policy discourse into practice leads to political 
overturn. In the literature on hate speech, this is one of the thorniest category: it 
epitomizes problems in the relationship between democratic procedures and 
democratic outcomes. The danger that a minority might choose anti-democratic 
forms of governments leads theorists to defend indirect form of democratic self-
defence, such as the spread of democratic values through political parties or through 
the examples of politicians and relevant institutional actors.392 From the point of 
                                                          
392 See Brettschneider 2010. See also Rosenbalum 2008 and Yong 2011.  
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view of liberal democracy, it is common sense to despise exclusionary policies that 
work on identity-based grounds, since there is widespread acceptance that a less 
liberal and democratic regime is not a desirable prospect. In the same context, it is 
not as immediate as in the first case to find strong support against advocacy of 
exclusionary policies that are libertarian, aim at abolishing redistributive policies 
and the welfare state. However, by limiting the access to due material means, these 
policies, if implemented, deny many people their franchise. In a pluralistic society, 
political advocacy for exclusionary policies should not be regulated. The protection 
of freedom of expression as functional to the exercise of the right to have a say 
includes also the advocacy of exclusionary politics. Reasons for the regulation of 
this kind of hate speech are not justice-based. As slippery-slope-kind of arguments, 
they direct the attention to the risks that a certain worldview may entail. When 
haters do advocacy for the exclusionary policies, they are not preventing anyone 
from the exercise of the right to have a say. Therefore, justice-based reasons for 
ensuring everyone to have a say trump non-justice based reasons on the content of 
one’s worldview. In a pluralistic society, there is no normative ground to regulate 
this sort of hate speech. And, for the second level of normativity, considerations at 
the hearth of advocacy of exclusionary policies are to be included in the legitimating 
constituency, when they refer to existing public issues.  
d. Libels 
With libels, we mean all those public assertions of facts and evaluative opinions 
that constitute adverse judgments and attacks on specific groups. Cartoons, media 
articles, videos, parliamentary racist invocations, pamphlets, partial interpretation 
of statistics and data, propaganda paintings are all examples of libels. Libels are 
also posters showing support for foreign dictators and hagiographical biography of 
despots as well as form of revisionism of historical accounts of genocide and mass 
cleansing. Libels have a significant potential harm. Libels target some members of 
the society directly and they foster divisions while disseminating sources of 
discontent and conflicts within the society. Despite the harm potential, libels, 
however, should be protected in a pluralistic society. Freedom of expression as 
functional to the right to have a say protects this form of hate speech. Libels have a 
clear cognitive content and they do not directly prevent anyone from the exercise 
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of the franchise. Against libels, members of a pluralistic society can answer with 
new evidence, an array of diverse argumentative means and mass counter-
mobilisation. For example, denigrating speech on crimes rates among Roma people 
can be challenged by providing data and statistics that tell members the truth. 
Documents and relevant historical materials may challenge negationist theses. 
These examples are all instances of disagreement within a pluralistic society. 
Moreover, in the practice itself of libels, there is no justice-based claim that can 
justify regulation. On the one hand, the first order normativity is worldview neutral. 
Then, no democracy-based arguments, for instance, are justice based. On the other 
hand, a restriction of opinions and factual interpretations because they are false, 
against common sense and disrespectful implies that truth, common sense and 
respect are requirement for participation in a pluralistic society, but this contradicts 
the normativity of the right to have a say. The right to have a say aims at enabling 
members to participate in the way they find more appropriate. In this vein, for the 
second order of normativity, when libels intervene in disagreements on public issue, 
they must have equal weight. If they deliberately attack participants in 
disagreements without addressing the issue under scrutiny, pluralistic institutions 
are expected to find ways to grant the addressees full enjoyment of their rights, 
despite such a discrimination. Eventually, libels themselves, can be objects of 
disagreements. In this case, the considerations of the authors, addressees and third-
party individuals must have equal weight. In other words, from this perspective, 
libels can be seen as valid/invalid considerations and as objects of disagreement.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have tried to clarify how the two orders of normativity work in a 
pluralistic society. The operationalization of our standpoint of justice and the 
relating conception of legitimacy generate disputes about the regulation of freedom 
of expression. Freedom of expression is functional to the full enjoyment of the right 
to have a say because it allows members the opportunity to find their own ways 
toward objects of disagreement. At the same time, freedom of expression also may 
seem dysfunctional to the non-exclusionary character of a pluralistic society. Prima 
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facie, the protection of hate speech and some forms of oppositional politics may be 
a justification for acts that curtail someone’s entitlement. Specifically, violence per 
se is a violation of the first order of normativity, then, it is not justified in a 
pluralistic society. Violent acts on things, which do not undermine one’s right to 
have a say, must be counted as valid considerations in the definition of the 
legitimating constituency, if they have a cognizable connection with a referent. Hate 
speech also is protected unless it undermines one’s entitlement to have a say. As 
we have seen, institutions must regulate only targeted vilification. Diffuse 
vilification does not hinder the exercise of one’s right to have a say, while a scrutiny 
of political advocacy for exclusionary policies and libels shows that arguments for 
restrictions are not justice-based. 
To conclude, I want to address a possible objection. Someone may argue 
that a pluralistic society, despite its non-exclusionary intent, can be more vulnerable 
to fanatics and haters than alternative models. This is not true. In a pluralistic 
society, when fascist members target directly other members in a way that would 
deny the full exercise of the right to have a say, institutions have justice-based 
reasons for blocking their action. When members with fascist considerations 
organize rallies and demonstrations, there is no justice-based reason for institutions 
to stop them doing so. The same reasoning is valid for political advocacy of 
exclusionary policies and libels. Being plenty of space within a pluralistic society, 
the burden of challenging fascist considerations is on the other members of a 
pluralistic. When holders of fascist considerations do not accept collectively 
binding decisions, they might act otherwise and bear the consequences for doing 
so, but the pluralistic society, as a whole, is not required to rethink the decision 
unless fascist members get so strong support to open a disagreement in which they 
can win. At that point, whether or not fascist considerations succeed is a speculative 
endeavour. Nevertheless, since all members of a pluralistic society are entitled to 
access such hypothetical objects of disagreement, against the prospect of seeing 
their rights curtailed, it is reasonable to believe that the vast majority of the 
members prefers the protection of their right to have a say. All in all, fascist ideas 
do have room in a pluralistic society, but it is far from being demonstrated that, in 
a pluralistic society, fascist ideas can get momentum more easily than in alternative 
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accounts. The success of one paradigm over another depends on disagreements 
among members with valid considerations. From the outset, no worldview has a 
preferential channel in the scheme of the pluralistic society. 
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Chapter 10 
The stability of a pluralistic society 
 
 
 
This chapter concludes the description of the pluralistic society as a utopian society 
in which all members have a right to have a say. In the last chapters, I have described 
some fundamental aspects of the pluralistic society, like mutual relations among 
members, its normative structure, hate speech and forms of oppositional politics. In 
this chapter, by answering the instability-objection, I shall conclude the description 
of the pluralistic society. Against a non-exclusionary conception of justice, people 
may argue that the resulting society will be inherently unstable. In the following, I 
argue that, when members exercise their entitlement to act upon objects of 
disagreement, the pluralistic society is stable.  
Taken together, this chapter also provides insights on other important 
aspects of the pluralistic society such as the form of institutional action, the nature 
of penalisation, disobedience and resistance. Therefore, by reading this chapter in 
continuity with chapter 8, chapter 9, and the normative argument of chapter 6 and 
chapter 7, I expect the reader to have a clear picture of the pluralistic society. 
Specifically, this chapter shall proceed as follows. In section 2, I shall clarify the 
nature of the stability-problem. With a stable society, I mean a society in which 
members have reasons to support institutions over time.393 This brings me to 
address the first case: “damaging considerations” within existing disagreements. 
Under the present account, as we shall see, “damaging” means “in contrast with the 
first order normativity”.  In section 4, I shall investigate the position of “damaging 
members”, namely those members who live in the pluralistic society, but refuse the 
first-order normativity. In section 5, I shall think of members who resist on 
pluralistic institutions on non-exclusionary grounds. Section 3, section 4 and 
section 5 demonstrate that, when members make the most of their right to have a 
                                                          
393 For an analogous understanding of stability, see Rawls 2005. 
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say, a pluralistic society is non-exclusionary, stable, and perfectible. In Section 6, I 
shall conclude.    
 
  
2. Stability, damaging doctrines and damaging members  
In a pluralistic society, where institutions have incorporated the two orders of 
normativity, the right to have a say is a claim-right against institutions and a liberty-
right to have subject-object relations with external objects of disagreement. As a 
claim-right, the right to have a say entitles the right-holder to some agreed-upon, 
compensatory actions, or to provision in case of need.394 It also includes protection 
against exclusion and deterrence. As a liberty-right, the right to have say protects 
the individual entitlement to have individual subject-object relations with objects 
of disagreement. In this work, I have argued that pluralistic institutions may 
penalise members when the exercise of the right to have a say (as a liberty-right) 
takes the right to have a say (as a liberty right) away from other members. On the 
part of the victim, such an occurrence generates a claim-right for compensatory 
action, or provision. Penalisation of the right to have a say, therefore, is permissible 
because of such a claim-right.  
At the same time, I have argued that, when members can recognize their 
individual subject-object relation in the outcome, institutions may expect members 
to comply. When institutions have this expectation of legitimacy, as we have seen 
in chapter 8, members also expect institutions to enforce decisions on those who do 
not comply. At the same time, because of the entitlement to act upon all possible 
objects of disagreement, members also can challenge legitimate outcomes. When 
they oppose legitimate outcomes, members affirm the right to have a say (liberty 
right) as an entitlement to disobey certain policies. For one has a right to perform 
it, since the right to have a say motivates ongoing and reflexive participation. So, 
to deny a member the appropriate space to act in keeping her view public means 
not to respect the normative demand that all members are entitled to appropriate 
                                                          
394 On compensation and provision, see Wenar 2005.  
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objects of disagreement. When, with the aim of bringing about a change in the laws 
or polices, a member acts in contrast with a collectively binding decision, he or she 
displays a commitment to the non-instrumental value of a non-exclusionary 
conception of justice. In other words, it does not directly question the stability of 
the pluralistic society. In the form of civil disobedience, like ‘a public, nonviolent 
conscientious yet political act contrary to law,’ or as public discursive practices, 
members have justice-based reasons to dispute and argue against allegedly 
legitimate decisions.395 This does not mean to say that pluralistic institutions ought 
not to enforce a contested but legitimate collectively binding decision. This means 
to say that, even if pluralistic institutions can require a person to comply with a 
legitimate collectively binding regulation, they cannot deny members the 
possibility to disobey publicly.396 Indeed, as Antony Duff puts it, for a person, the 
belief that a decision is wrong implies an avoidance of such a decision, a negative 
judgment about the conduct of other people who pursue such decision, and the 
communication of the negative judgment in some circumstances.397 All these 
aspects can be fundamental to grant a person his or her full right to have a say. 
Forms of ongoing contestation against legitimate but disputable collective 
decisions are not threats for the stability of a pluralistic society. Despite questioning 
specific regulations, these forms of contestation, more or less explicitly, show 
support for a non-exclusionary conception of justice. Contrariwise, when members 
advance considerations that go against the general standpoint of justice, someone 
may argue, I need to consider the possibility that the pluralistic society will be 
unstable. As anticipated in the introduction, these doctrines are the so-called 
                                                          
395 I borrow the definition of civil disobedience from Rawls 1971, 364. For the present purpose, it is suffice to 
say that accounts with different premises also do not consider civil disobedience as a threat for stability. 
Actually, a widespread assumption is that the civil disobedient expresses fidelity to the law. On this issue, 
Habermas, 1985, 100. Sabl 2001, 307. Scheuerman 2015, 428. Smith 2011, 145. Robin Celikates argues that 
such a constraint to civil disobedience should be relaxed in favour of less-normatively loaded definitions of 
civil disobedience. See Celikates 2016, 39.  
396 I do not deal explicitly with the right to civil disobedience. On my view, a defence of the right to have a say 
as a claim-right to resist (section 5 of this chapter) functions also as an argument in favour of civil disobedience 
within a pluralistic society.  
397 See Antony Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
98. I borrow this point from Kimberley Brownlee, “Rights, Civil Disobedience, and Punishment,” Unpublished 
manuscript, 2008. A shorter version of this paper is Kymberley Brownlee, “Penalising Public Disobedience,” 
Ethics 118 (2000): 711-16. She emphasises the communicative aspect of civil disobedience also in Kymberley 
Brownlee, “The Communicative Aspects of Civil Disobedience and Lawful Punishment,” Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 1 (2) (2007): 179-92. 
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“damaging doctrines”. The standard approach when examining damaging doctrines 
is to give conditions for the account to remain stable, that is, to specify necessary 
and sufficient conditions for stability within the theory. However, this methodology 
tends to be inelastic and, as a consequence, oversimplifies problems. There are 
generally valid conditions for the account to remain stable and there are unusual, 
but justified, concessions to the promise of treating all affected members in the 
same way. Consider Rawls’s claim to contain unreasonable doctrines as wars and 
diseases.398 Consider Sleat, who claims that non-liberals are an inevitable presence 
in liberal societies, he also claims that coercion, and violation of persons’ freedom 
is, therefore, an unavoidable feature of liberal regimes.399 Consider Quong’s idea 
that there is nothing like a right to be unreasonable in a liberal democratic society 
inspired by a liberal democratic conception of justice. Consequently, restrictions of 
hate speech or literature as well as transformative educational policies are 
justified.400  
Moreover, in this literature, the point of view is never that of the members 
who do not support the dominant conception of justice. Authors always focus on 
members who uphold the basic principles of the society – what they can and cannot 
do to be coherent with requirements of justice and the demand for stability. When 
this is not the case, the point of view tends to be that of institutions.401 Within this 
class of approaches, there will be some variations in the extent to which central 
interrogatives are addressed, but key features are always exemplified. Note, the 
questions will be: to what extent do members (who align with the assumptions of 
the theory) have a political obligation to take other members (who do not align with 
the assumptions of the theory) into account in the construction of collective 
decisions? Are there normative resources that allow institutions to undermine or 
restrict (coerce) the spread of particularly damaging doctrines while being within 
the limits of the standpoint of justice? So, the burden of political action is always 
placed on the members who best align with the assumptions of the theory, no matter 
what the responses to these questions are. Alternatively, there is an unproblematic 
                                                          
398 Rawls 2005, 64.  
399 Sleat 2013, 363.  
400 Quong 2004, 334.  
401 Ivi, 333-34. Rawls, 64-66. Sleat 2013, 362.  
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confusion between “damaging doctrines” and “damaging members”, as if they were 
one and the same thing.402 The simplification of damaging members’ moral agency, 
together with the confusion between the dissemination of doctrines and the 
performance of damaging worldviews, means to underestimate what means for a 
member to hold a damaging doctrine in a hostile environment – a society where 
institutions and social relations are organized in agreement with a certain 
conception of justice. On my view, “damaging doctrines” and “members who hold 
damaging doctrines” generate two different kinds of problems. Damaging 
doctrines, if translated into individual subject-object relations with objects of 
disagreement, cause problems of legitimacy. Should we consider damaging-
doctrines-inspired subject-object relations as part of the legitimating constituency? 
Does viewpoint neutrality count also for those doctrines that explicitly contradict 
the non-exclusionary desideratum of a pluralistic society? The discourse on 
members who hold damaging doctrines, in turn, addresses directly the general 
standpoint of justice. If we think of the right to have a say in terms of all members’ 
entitlement to have subject-object relations with external objects of disagreement, 
does one’s communicative act have to be related to that of his or her opponents in 
a way that makes room for all of them?403  
 
3. Damaging considerations in a pluralistic society 
In this section, I shall focus on damaging doctrines and the position of damaging 
considerations (damaging individual subject-object relation with a certain object of 
disagreement) within a pluralistic society. The theoretical question is the following: 
in a pluralistic society, which is worldview neutral, to what extent do considerations 
inspired by damaging doctrines find space in legitimating constituencies? In a 
                                                          
402 Quong thinks that containment targets doctrines. However, in his example of Nazis, he focuses his attention 
on people who hold unreasonable doctrines. See Quong, 323, 331-4. For Rawls, unreasonable doctrines are the 
object of containment. See Rawls 2005, 64-65. According to Sleat, illiberal people are the target of action. See 
Sleat 2013, 363. 
403 In an early essay, Waldron argued that hate speech had to be banned. According to Waldron, hate speech 
contradicts the systematic interpretation of the right to free speech: all must be in the same position to 
participate; therefore, our speech acts must also make room for us and the opponents. Jeremy Waldron, “Rights 
in conflict,” in Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 223.  
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pluralistic society, damaging considerations, we shall argue, must have equal worth 
in the legitimating constituency.404  
For instance, in a disagreement on the school calendar, a member of the 
pluralistic society argues that only Catholic Holidays count. Other members may 
also argue that, in a disagreement on the construction of the country’s statement on 
climate change and global warming, only the interests of oil companies matter. The 
two statements are valid considerations. They link a worldview with an object of 
disagreement, but they do so by advancing exclusionary messages, which disputes 
the non-exclusionary component of the right to have a say. To put it bluntly, it is as 
if these members were exploiting the right to have a say to challenge the pluralistic 
society from the within, by advancing considerations that the majority of the 
members should consider as wrong.  
It is important to distinguish between two claims we might make when we 
say of a person that her belief is legitimate but wrong. First, we might mean to say 
that she is not acting in accordance with the relevant evidence. The consideration 
of a person is not questioned for its fit with a pluralistic society, but, relative to the 
evidence available, this weakness gives other member an excuse to confute the 
consideration. Were the agent become aware of additional evidence to which other 
members have access, it would have a stronger case to prove her consideration as 
the best available in the legitimating set. Second, we might mean that one’s 
consideration is morally wrong. In this case, the consideration is deemed 
inappropriate because it shows any kind of failing relevant to moral assessment.405 
Crucially, here the problem is not a difference in the evidence available, but rather 
a dissimilar interpretation of what is supposed to be a common ground for mutual 
understanding. It seems, therefore, that the participation in the legitimating set is 
not at stake, but considerations deemed wrong furnish other members with strong-
enough prima facie excuses not considering them as appropriate for the final 
decision. In any case, we suggest that, considerations deemed wrong have chances 
to affect the collectively binding decision, but, in the deliberative phase within 
                                                          
404 Remind that, in a pluralistic society, we assume that institutions incorporate the right to have a say because 
all members do so.  
405 In the case of a pluralistic society, wrong means a belief that contradicts the non-exclusionary character of 
a conception of justice inspired by the right to have a say. 
217 
 
disagreements, persuasion may be very demanding. Moreover, following what I 
have said in chapter 9, members of a pluralistic society do not have any validity-
based reason to deny individual subject-object relations, when these relations have 
a demonstrable connection with the relevant object of disagreement. Consequently, 
around different objects of disagreement, there might be legitimating constituencies 
that are full of valid but damaging considerations, which may lead towards 
exclusionary outcomes.  
For instance, a Catholic member may argue that the working calendar has 
been organized around Catholic festivities and Sundays, therefore, a unilateral 
change might cause loses in efficiency and competition vis-à-vis competing 
markets.  On this ground, other members with different worldviews might accept 
unless they find this to be a serious hindrance for them to participate as peers (have 
individual subject-object relation with all possible objects of disagreements) in the 
pluralistic society. Equally, a robber baron may argue that the petroleum industry 
is so prominent for the pluralistic society that a strong commitment to the reduction 
of anthropogenic climate change may prevent several members from having 
adequate means to participate as peers. In the two examples, if exclusionary 
considerations win the two disagreements, and the procedure allows members to 
recognize their individual subject-object relations in the outcomes, decisions are 
legitimate, even if they are plainly exclusionary.  
However, to paraphrase Lev Tolstoy, all decisions are legitimate alike, each 
exclusionary decision is exclusionary in its own way. With climate change and 
school holidays, we see two stereotypical cases of exclusionary but legitimate 
decisions. In the former case, a legitimating constituency brings about an 
exclusionary decision that frustrates the entitlement to participate of some 
members. This is possible if and only if, once the decision has been enacted, the 
affected members themselves do not realize that the costs they pay are so high to 
preclude the full exercise of their entitlement. If they become conscious of obstacles 
they did not think of before, they do have a justice-based reason to ask pluralistic 
institutions for a new balancing, despite, in the meanwhile, the first decision 
remains fully legitimate. Simply, justice-based reasons trump legitimacy-based 
reasons for action. In the second case, the discourse is more complex. In a pluralistic 
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society, it seems to be very difficult to think that climate change palpably 
undermines one’s participation as peer in an immediately recognizable way. 
Despite evidence shows the horrendous effects of climate change especially on the 
poorest ones, in order to ground a justice-based reason, there must be proof that 
someone, who lives in the pluralistic society, cannot exercise his or her right 
fully.406 So, in order to challenge an exclusionary decision, which does not directly 
affect one’s entitlement to have a say, individuals, who have non-exclusionary 
considerations on that public issue, have to open a new disagreement, where they 
can influence the new outcome in agreement with their worldviews.  
These two examples cast light on a consequence of opening all legitimating 
constituencies to all valid considerations. Namely, no matter how many people hold 
damaging worldviews. When damaging considerations affects the outcome of 
different disagreements significantly, and simultaneously; a pluralistic society may 
produce a series of collectively binding decisions that are exclusionary, despite 
people holding damaging doctrines being a minority. This puts at risk the stability 
of a pluralistic society. A pluralistic society is stable in so far as it allows all 
members to have individual subject-object relations with all possible objects of 
disagreement, because this relation meets the shared basic claim to meaningfully 
mark elements of the external reality. In the remaining of this section, I advance 
two responses to this objection. The first response is philosophical. It quickly shows 
that such objection rests upon a fallacy. The second response admits that such a 
possibility exists. However, in a pluralistic society, it is almost heuristic. Instability 
caused by several damaging decisions ultimately rests on the responsibility of 
members, who do not exercise the entitlement to open new disagreements.  
First, the idea that several exclusionary decisions will ruin the stability of 
the pluralistic society rests on a fallacy of hasty generalization. When we infer that 
a statement about the whole is true because of it is true for some parts of the whole, 
we base our argument on insufficient evidence. The internal response, in turn, 
demonstrates how the two orders of normativity ensure stability despite 
                                                          
406 Remind that, if it has profound inequalities, a society is not a pluralistic society. Namely, when parts of the 
population are not able to have subject-object relations with external objects, a society does not ensure the 
general entitlement to have a say.   
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exclusionary and legitimate decisions. Let me explain. In a pluralistic society, 
everyone has a right to have a say and a decision is legitimate when all members 
with valid considerations can recognize their individual subject-object relation in 
the outcome.  As we have seen in chapter 8, institutions of a pluralistic society must 
fulfil expectations of justice, expectations that all members may have qua members 
of a pluralistic society.  To recall, when we say that members have a right to have 
a say, it is important not to limit the scope of this right to the participation in 
disagreements that already exist. Crucially, the exercise of one’s entitlement also 
means to introduce new objects of disagreement in the pluralistic society. New 
disagreements bring about new legitimating constituencies. However, the borders 
of the legitimating constituency are marked by the distinction between those 
considerations that do not have a demonstrable connection with the object of 
disagreement and those considerations that have such a connection. While I have 
suggested that the right to have a say applies only to members of a pluralistic 
society, the validity requirements is essentially wider in scope. The mismatch 
between the scope of the right to have a say and the scope of the conception of 
legitimacy, which nevertheless follows from the first-order normativity, is crucial 
for a pluralistic society to remain stable.  
To clarify this point, let me continue with the argument. I have defined the 
legitimating constituency as the set of valid considerations on a certain object of 
disagreement. I also have defined a consideration as the union between a worldview 
and a certain issue that matters – a subject-object relation. Although, in order to be 
bound to the two orders of normativity, the object of disagreement has to be internal 
to the pluralistic society, such an object of disagreement may call upon human 
beings who live outside the territory of the pluralistic society. In fact, an object of 
disagreement provides the basis for communicative exchanges that go beyond the 
natural or political limit of the pluralistic society. Specifically, from my account of 
legitimacy, it does not follow that considerations of members take priority over 
valid considerations from outside the territory of a pluralistic society. Though the 
act of initiating disagreements is a privilege that only members of a pluralistic 
society have (in virtue of the circumstance of living in a society informed by the 
first-order normativity), the legitimating constituency of such disagreements 
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depends on the number of valid and available considerations, regardless of the place 
in which the holders of these considerations happen to be. So, a legitimating 
constituency can be global even if the disagreement is contextually located within 
the pluralistic society. Consequently, considerations of members of the pluralistic 
society do not have any priority, other than the one of initiating disagreements.  
Let me now return to the example of climate change. The issue may call 
upon a very large number of people, from activists and farmers in the Global South 
to lobbies, traders and international organisations. In fact, it is not so difficult to 
imagine the expansion of the available considerations beyond borders. Global 
communicative networks, the internet and the different supranational and 
international institutions increase significantly the number of people that might 
have something to say on local issues. The second-order normativity goes on to 
assert that, in the pluralistic society, a decision is legitimate if and only if all 
individuals with valid and available considerations can recognize their subject-
object relations in the outcome.407 Damaging considerations, therefore, are valid 
considerations, which constitute a subset of an expanding network of valid and 
available considerations.  
Damaging considerations must have equal worth in the decision-making 
procedure. However, by granting all members the non-instrumental value to have 
subject-object relations with objects of disagreement, a pluralistic society can 
protect itself from damaging decision.408 When several and different disagreements 
pop up, by accessing the legitimating constituency with a valid consideration, 
individuals with a valid consideration reaffirm why participation matters from their 
own point of view. It follows that, with several disagreements in which members 
of the pluralistic society take part, there are many junctures where members reassert 
the reason why they should have a say. Participation exposes members to affirm 
their equal status. Damaging decisions call upon members to affirm their right to 
open new disagreements. This means to resort on the first-order normativity. 
Namely, members exercise the general entitlement in the form of a right to open 
                                                          
407 As a result, in a pluralistic society, a legitimate decision may be the combination of considerations from 
outside the pluralistic society, but that, through suitable mechanisms, have had an effect on the outcome.  
408 Participation in decision-making procedures is also instrumental. From the point of view of the member, 
because it leads to some other moral ends, it is also instrumentally valuable. 
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new disagreements. Therefore, vis-à-vis legitimacy-based sources of instability, 
stability hinges upon the actual exercise of the right to have a say. When a large 
portion of members attempts to take part in disagreements, it is more likely for them 
to reaffirm the non-instrumental value of their claim to have subject-object relations 
with external objects. When just a small part of the members attempts to participate, 
the society as a whole turns out to be more vulnerable to damaging doctrines, which, 
in such a scenario, might affect a number of public issues.409  
To summarize the argument of this section. In this section, I have clarified 
that valid damaging considerations must be part of the legitimating constituency, 
given viewpoint neutrality of a non-exclusionary conception of justice. In other 
words, a pluralistic society, given its viewpoint neutrality, has no means to contain 
dissemination of damaging doctrines. This generates a problem of internal 
instability: a pluralistic society might bring about a series of damaging decisions 
because damaging considerations affect several outcomes. Against this objection, I 
have argued that, when members of a pluralistic society do not exercise their 
entitlement to open new disagreements, the multiplication of damaging decisions 
may typify a serious threat for the stability of a pluralistic society. This occurrence 
may cause the spread of damaging worldviews within a pluralistic society, and it 
can cause several damaging that, taken together, inhibit the normative potential of 
pluralistic institutions. In the next section, I shall look at the same problem from the 
perspective of members who do not share the standpoint of justice – the damaging 
members.  
 
4. Damaging members in a pluralistic society 
The study of damaging doctrines has demonstrated that a pluralistic society, 
because of its viewpoint neutrality, has no normative arguments to avoid the spread 
of damaging considerations. Much depends on active members who have non-
exclusionary worldviews. In this section, I shall continue our investigation by 
                                                          
409 There is also the extreme hypothesis that only members with damaging considerations have subject-object 
relations with external objects of disagreement. In that case, the stability of the pluralistic society is seriously 
under threat. A series of damaging decisions might undermine the basis of pluralistic institutions so strongly to 
hinder all their means to enact the first-order normativity. 
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looking at those members that do not accept the standpoint of justice. Because they 
live within the borders of a pluralistic society, they are members, but they do not 
recognize the authority of its fundamental normativity. Indeed, as I have assumed 
in chapter 8, in a pluralistic society, there are several conceptions of justice and 
none of them is predominant. A non-exclusionary conception of justice is one 
amongst many other conceptions of justice, whose comparative merit is the promise 
to let all members, irrespective of their worldviews, have subject-object relations 
with all possible objects of disagreement. However, this standpoint of justice does 
not exclude the possibility that, once institutions have incorporated the two orders 
of normativity, some members stop affirming the right to have a say.  
Members who exalt selfishness and despotism do not extend the right to 
have a say to other members, but they affirm such right from their own point of 
view. Let me explain. They might leave this component implicit in their moral 
behaviour. Nevertheless, a recursive reconstruction of their agency shows that the 
right to have a say is a necessary condition for the spread of their exclusionary 
worldviews. Let me consider Frida. Frida thinks that she is the only person who 
deserves having a say. No matters what other people claim. Frida insists in saying 
that she is the only one that is to have a say. By doing so, Frida is not contradicting 
the right to have a say. She does not extend the right to the other members, but she 
is not able to negate that the right to have a say matters from her point of view. Of 
course, Frida might advance her claim without references to the right to have a say, 
but, the basic claim to access external objects remains precondition for the display 
of her worldview. Consider, in turn, members who live in a pluralistic society but 
do not affirm the right to have a say in the light of a higher moral authority. 
Commands of this supreme authority might imply a repudiation of the right to have 
a say as well as the search for alternative forms of interjection in the pluralistic 
society. Religious extremists would be the most obvious example. However, forms 
of radical political protest, like waves of left-wing and right-wing radicalism, seek 
also to create a revolutionary state through armed struggle.  These higher authorities 
might push members to be silent or to hyper-activism. If they are silent, in a society 
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that predominantly affirms the right to have a say, they are not a threat for stability. 
At least, they are not a recognized threat for stability.410  
In a society where all members have a right to have a say, hardliners, 
extremists and fanatics are not by themselves a problem for pluralistic institutions. 
This means to say that the standpoint of justice protects them, even if they refuse it. 
Therefore, there must be an explicit violation of the first-order normativity to justify 
coercion. In order to clarify this point, we have to pause and pay attention to the 
several faces that these forms of dissent can take. First, hardliners may 
misrecognize the structure of a pluralistic society and avoid participating in 
decision-making processes. In practical terms, by withdrawing their subject-object 
relations from public disagreements, hardliners also do not enter into the 
legitimating constituency. For this reason, their views do not constitute a problem 
for the stability of a pluralistic society. Let me explain. A pluralistic society can 
expect institutions to enforce collectively binding decisions when members can 
recognize their subject-object relations in the object. If members with a right to 
have a say decide not to participate, as we have seen in the previous chapters, 
institutions may expect them to comply with the outcome.  
Now, we can think of different cases in which damaging members can affect 
the stability of a pluralistic society. For instance, in a pluralistic society, there might 
be disagreement around the decision of observing a moment of silence to mark the 
anniversary of Armenian genocide. There is a lengthy and challenging 
disagreement among members with valid considerations. Despite a lengthy 
deliberative phase, I assume, the considerations are organized in agreement with 
cultural and religious cleavages: Turkish, Armenians, French members of a 
pluralistic society, Catholics, Orthodox Christians and Islamic minorities. 
Eventually, after a voting procedure, pluralistic institutions ratify the moment of 
silence. Now, members that have actually opposed the decision in the relevant 
legitimating constituency as well as those who have not participated in the 
disagreement are expected to comply with the decision. All those members that 
influenced in some way the outcome, by advancing their considerations (or being 
                                                          
410 For instability, the publicity of the threat is crucial. On the one hand, it could justify penalisation. On the 
other hand, it could cause emulation, external support, and even more instability.  
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silent despite having full entitlement to do otherwise), might be expected to comply.  
If they do not do so (hissing loudly at the moment of silence, showing disrespectful 
signs, harassing public manifestation), pluralistic institutions have a legitimacy-
based claim to enforce on them the collective decision. For instance, this might 
imply to push them out of public spaces during public celebrations, block them 
while harassing, and confiscate their sings. By being members of a pluralistic 
society, these members know the risk they incurred, so penalisation is legitimate on 
the ground that it is among the expected consequence of the exercise of the right to 
have a say. It is important to notice that this is not a form of forward-looking 
enforcement: namely, non-compliant members are not penalised because this might 
function as symbolic deterrence for other members. Enforcement is eminently 
backward-looking: a pluralistic society responds with an act that a member could 
expect as a consequence of his or her action. 
Second, some members make use of alternative forms of communication to 
voice their damaging worldview. In order to terrorize the pluralistic society and 
cause mistrials, terrorist activities might escalate up to preclude participation to 
other members. Consider the following example. An autonomist movement carries 
out unprecedented acts of terrorism. It leads public protests, but it also kidnaps 
political leaders. It assassinates key political figures and it bombs public spaces. 
Members of this movement find justification of this violent means in a high end, 
namely the introduction of an alternative political order. They do not consider 
regulations of the pluralistic society as binding so they act openly against the 
regulations of the pluralistic society. Consequent to these actions, there is a loss of 
some members of the pluralistic society. The action of the activist movement causes 
a breach in the protection of the universal entitlement to have a say, both by actually 
killing people and frustrating the genuine participation of some members. In a 
pluralistic society, this ensures institution a justice-based reason to penalise 
protesters according to the public scheme, which members of the pluralistic society 
have constructed. Whether or not members of the movement find pluralistic 
institutions as binding does not count anymore. The penalisation is justified by the 
fact that some members have lost their agency. Simply, as a part of what they are 
required to do in order to be pluralistic, institutions must compensate for this agency 
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loss, given the non-exclusionary commitment to ensure subject-object relations for 
all members of the society. However, this kind of enforcement does not judge upon 
the way protesters have advanced their claims, but it works in the light of the 
consequences of such acts. At the same time, since it is directed backward, 
penalisation only has a compensatory meaning.  
As a violation of the first-order normativity, these practices require 
institutions to penalise damaging members in accordance with the laws of a 
pluralistic society. However, it is important to make clear that the intent of 
penalisation is not the regaining of stability vis-à-vis a considerable risk. The 
purpose of penalisation is to compensate what some members, in their singularity, 
have done against another member’s entitlement to have a say. The aim is to assign 
the costs of this unjust outcome to those agents that caused the loss. The voluntary 
element is decisive. This element clarifies an important point. Namely, only those 
acts that deliberately aim to prevent someone from the exercise of his or her own 
franchise can be penalised with valid reasons of justice. For instance, if Jane 
accidently runs over Frida while Frida is going to cast her vote, Jane is not liable to 
be charged punishment on justice-based reasons. The chef of your favourite 
restaurant who causes you a terrible stomach-ache cannot be punished on justice-
based reasons, even if you are not able to exercise the legitimate franchise. In this 
case, by ensuring you adequate health-care, and an ample time-span for voting or 
participating in disagreement, or by making available a wide range of restaurants, 
a pluralistic society has accomplished the requirements of justice.  
So, the justification of penalisation is not in deterrence. Namely, the 
containment of the prospect that members of a pluralistic society will undertake this 
sort of action in the future. If this were the case, a pluralistic society would violate 
its worldview neutrality as well as the neutral stance on the practices that members 
can find appropriate to advance their worldviews in public. Justification for 
penalisation can only reside in the actual violation of someone’s entitlement to have 
a subject-object relation with all external objects. Under this view, coercive state 
interference compensates the consequences of usurping a right that should be 
granted. It is not a condemnatory action against a particular form of protesting, but 
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rather it is a way to make protesters responsible for a significant loss, which the 
pluralistic society has incurred because of a certain action.  
By granting pluralistic institutions the capacity to penalise the violation of 
one’s right to have a say, however, I do not secure the stability of a pluralistic 
society. First, before acting, protesters know the kind of consequences that they 
have to cope with. Their decision to take action shows the price they are able to pay 
for advancing their worldviews. Second, such penalisation does not have the kind 
of normative justification that can cause stability directly. Namely, pluralistic 
institutions do not have the normative justification to prevent someone from 
disobey. The right to have a say dictates that all members can access objects of 
disagreement in their own ways. Therefore, the expression of a member’s political 
engagement is not per se a ground for penalisation. Because of the breach in the 
promise to grant everyone the same entitlement to have individual subject-object 
relations, penalisation is a way through which a pluralistic society makes some 
members pay for the costs it has to bear. 
Third, members might protests in ways that do not violate other members’ 
right to have a say. When a protest does not entail a violation of the right to have a 
say, protesters are entitled not to bear the burdens of the social and political costs 
of their political action. These activities may take the form of bank robberies, 
strikes, systematic occupation of squares and monuments. In this case, pluralistic 
institutions lack justice-based reasons to penalise protesters. Worldview neutrality 
trumps claims for containment of protesters unless such claims demonstrate the 
thwarting of someone’s right to have a say. For instance, right-wing groups lead 
strikes in factories. They systemically occupy public spaces evoking nationalist 
heroes. They do expropriate banks in order to finance public action. They do so 
without channelling dissent in existing disagreements. They do not even attempt to 
raise issues of collective decisions. They only try to destabilize a pluralistic society. 
In this case, pluralistic institutions do not have a justice-based claim to prevent these 
members from doing so. A pluralistic society must ensure that all members can 
express their sincerely held convictions and to reclaim their entitlement to have 
subject-object relations with all objects of disagreement. Since all members of a 
pluralistic society have a right to have subject-object relations with all possible 
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objects of disagreement, a pluralistic society must ensure meaningful channels for 
participation and dissent. However, members, who do not recognize the normativity 
of this conception of justice, might find the resulting channels meaningless. For this 
reason, they may resort to radical forms of dissent. In this case, the commitment to 
ensure that all members can have an actual say provides a justice-based reason to 
let some members protest.411 So, while certain forms of public protesting may cause 
normatively grounded reasons for punishment – for instance, if the act in question 
directly harms third parties – no normative significance attaches to the mere fact 
that these demonstrations involve disobedience to pluralistic institutions.  
If we want to see these claims from the point of view of stability, the three 
kind of damaging groups do not constitute a threat for the overall stability of a 
pluralistic society. Let me explain. At the level of the first order normativity, even 
if members might refuse the non-exclusionary character of the right to have a say, 
pluralistic institutions are well equipped to keep widespread affirmation of the right 
to have say without undermining its worldviews neutrality. Pluralistic institutions 
have justice-based reasons to penalise holders of damaging worldviews, when they 
deny other members the entitlement to have a say. At the same time, institutions 
have justice-based reasons to let holders of damaging worldviews protest without 
assessing the form and the ends of such protests. Things change, if we think that 
holders of damaging worldviews bring forward valid considerations in the relevant 
disagreements. Regardless of what they say, from the perspective of pluralistic 
institutions, all those individuals who advance valid considerations, which 
eventually lead to a damaging outcome, must count the same. In this way, we 
deduce that, when members holding damaging worldviews actively take part in the 
relevant disagreement, there may be a strong threat for the stability of a pluralistic 
society. This brings us back to the argument concerning damaging considerations. 
A pluralistic society does not have normative reasons to avoid dissemination of 
damaging worldviews, when these worldviews translate into subject-object 
relations with specific objects of disagreement. In this case, the stability of a 
                                                          
411 It is important to notice that the demand to give equal weight only to valid and available considerations does 
not bind institutions of a pluralistic society to avoid forcing public decision onto dissenters, who did not bring 
forward valid considerations within the relevant interaction community.  
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pluralistic society depends on the participation of its members – and precisely those 
members who have no reasons to deny the worth of a non-exclusionary conception 
of justice.  
So, in the past two sections, I have tried to investigate the position of 
“damaging worldviews” and “members who hold damaging worldviews”. A 
pluralistic society has no-justice based reasons to contain neither damaging 
doctrines nor damaging members. With worldviews, there is no justice-based 
reason whatsoever. With damaging members, a pluralistic society has justice-based 
reasons to penalise damaging members if and only if they prevent someone else 
from exercising his or her right to have a say. Therefore, within a pluralistic society, 
there might be worldviews and considerations that go against its non-exclusionary 
character. Against these worldviews, a policy of deterrence has no justice-based 
reason because this policy violates explicitly viewpoint-neutrality. In this context, 
the stability of a pluralistic society may be seriously under threat when damaging 
considerations influence several collective decisions, and, at the same time, only a 
small portion of the members exercises the entitlement to have subject-object 
relations with external. In all other cases, when members open many disagreements, 
or when they attempt to challenge legitimate collectively binding decisions, a 
pluralistic society is overall stable.  
To sum up, we have seen that the right to have a say protects the 
fundamental claim to have an effect on elements of the external reality. From the 
point of view of the member, this protection means to be able to have subject-object 
relations with all possible objects of disagreement. From the point of view of 
institutions, pluralistic institutions are under a special expectation to defend the 
general entitlement to have a say. According to this view, the right to have a say 
requires political and social arrangements to allow all members to act upon all 
possible objects of disagreement. Any institutional action that contravenes this 
expectation justifies a justice-based resistance on the part of members. From the 
perspective of the members of a pluralistic society, overcoming injustice means to 
ask institutions to undo barriers that prevent someone from the exercise of the right 
to have a say. This implies the constitution of a peculiar kind of claim right. As we 
shall see in the next section, this kind of claim right marks a failure in the action of 
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pluralistic institutions: namely, members resort to the first order of normativity to 
contest institutions that deemed themselves to be justified on that same ground. In 
this way, the first-order normativity works as an external standard. On this view, 
members claim to possess the proper modality to enforce this standard on 
institutions.  As we shall see, the affirmation of the right to have a say as a claim-
right is the major source of instability for a pluralistic society. In this case, resistance 
and institutions have the same basis: that is, the non-instrumental value of the claim 
to appropriate elements of external reality.  
 
 
5. Resistance in a pluralistic society 
So far, I have argued that the stability of a pluralistic society is not under attack 
unless members do not participate. The idea is simple. Different disagreements are 
ways to reaffirm one’s right to have a say. Within a pluralistic society, such right is 
a necessary resource to have the opportunity to joining with other members in the 
collective decision-making process. When members experience what this 
entitlement means, they have reasons to affirm the right to have a say and a society 
constructed accordingly. However, in the conclusion of section 4, I have argued 
that, when both protesters and pluralistic institutions justify their action by 
appealing to the non-exclusionary desideratum, a pluralistic society might be 
unstable. This is the topic of the present section.  
The first task of pluralistic institutions is to guarantee that all members have 
an irrevocable right to have a say. I maintain that the construal of the right to have 
a say as a general entitlement facilitates political self-determination because it 
leaves to members the construction of specific regulations. First, in the public 
exchange of considerations, members with a right to have a say determine collective 
outcomes and modify them when appropriate. Thanks to such an entitlement, 
members of a pluralistic society can initiate disagreements and invite valid 
considerations from different worldviews. Second, the right to have a say draws an 
imaginary axis that all political and social arrangements turn around. It constitutes 
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a general standpoint from which members evaluate social and political 
arrangements.  
Moreover, at the two levels, we can say that the right to have a say has a 
maieutic force, which follows two directions. As we have seen so far, thanks to 
public exchanges of considerations, the right to have a say renders political and 
social arrangements responsive to worldviews that are normally excluded from the 
discourse about justice. Moreover, since the right to have a say does not depend on 
any prior worldview, it is intended to illuminate exclusionary practices, which 
survive in social and political arrangements, even if they are named to be pluralistic. 
For instance, oftentimes those members who find themselves in structural 
minorities may denounce that their own considerations might have won support, 
had there been even-handed decision-making procedures. In the acknowledgement 
of this incident, the right to have a say stands as an entitlement both to take part in 
the decision making process itself and to contest decisions reached by exclusionary 
processes.  
By shielding members of a pluralistic society from exclusionary political 
and social arrangements, the right to have a say also constitutes a justificatory 
reason for action against pluralistic institutions when these institutions do not 
continue protecting individual subject-object relations with all objects of 
disagreement. Therefore, in a pluralistic society, the real question is not whether it 
is ever permissible to disobey pluralistic institutions in the service of the pursuit of 
justice but when it is the case. In other words, what kind of injustice leads to 
justifying resistance to pluralistic institutions whatsoever? This question comes 
together with a derivative interrogative. When rise against pluralistic institutions is 
normatively justified, which are the otherwise-unjustified-practices that the right to 
have a say justifies? If we think of my discourse in this chapter, we can arrive at a 
preliminary answer to the second question. In a pluralistic society, when social and 
political arrangements fail to respect the right to have a say, the right to have a say 
justifies a violation of the entitlement of other members, which is the only practice 
that pluralistic institutions forbid prior consultations. In this section, therefore, we 
shall reconstruct the theoretical grounding of this response by answering the first 
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question. This shall help us to clarify why, in certain occurrences, it is permissible 
for members to violate other members’ right to have a say. 
In order to answer the first question, we must deconstruct the normative 
work of the right to have a say upon members of a pluralistic society. As we have 
seen in different parts of this work, a non-exclusionary form of coexistence reduces 
as much as possible the action of circumstantial elements onto the weight of a view 
in decision-making procedures. A general entitlement to have a say compels 
institutions to erase barriers, which deny subject-object relations with external 
objects of disagreement. This angle should help me to clarify the kind of injustice 
that justifies a claim-right against pluralistic institutions. If manifest or unseen 
barriers continue to exist, a society is only superficially pluralistic, since it denies 
some members the equal standing as participants in the resolution of disputes over 
public issues. Specifically, when the normal channels of voice are not available or 
effective anymore; when, in a pluralistic society, significant systemic injustices 
deny someone the right to have a say, resistance is unobjectionable from the 
evaluative point of the right to have a say. In these cases, we cannot expect members 
to accept collective decisions. We also cannot assume that they recognize in the 
institutions the normative basis upon which compliance should be expected.  
If we think of structural inequalities that favour certain worldviews over 
others, these inequalities violate the general entitlement that all members of a 
pluralistic society should have a say without distinction. For instance, permanent 
unemployment, chronic low-paying, systematic incarceration reiterate exclusionary 
forces, which interrupt the normal exercise of the basic right. If we think that 
decision-making procedures are de facto inaccessible to members with valid 
considerations, these closures are exclusionary practices that deny the exercise of 
the right to have a say. In all these cases, in the absence of a secure entitlement to 
have a say, the need to bring back the general normativity of the right to have a say 
at the centre of political and social arrangements might make some members unable 
to continue following the prescriptions of pluralistic institutions. To put it bluntly, 
to these members, who are object of the greatest injustice of a pluralistic society, 
the distinction between lawful and unlawful conducts does not have any normative 
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significance. An action in agreement with what a member considers as normatively 
right (righteous) trumps the prescriptive commands of pluralistic institutions.  
The mismatch between “what is righteous to do” according to the member 
and “what is just to do” according to pluralistic institutions casts lights upon a 
distinctive feature of the right to have a say. This brings me to answer the second 
question of this section. Which are the otherwise-unjustified-practices that, in 
certain circumstances, the right to have a say justifies? In the interest of a non-
exclusionary conception of justice, the right to have a say involves actions that, if a 
pluralistic society were not exclusionary, would be seen as deserving 
condemnation, like the violation of another member’s entitlement to have a say. 
This is so because, in these circumstances, an act of resistance serves better the non-
exclusionary desideratum of a pluralistic society than compliance with institutional 
prescriptions and the dominant social ethos.  
If an act of resistance is less exclusionary than institutions appear to be, 
then, vis-à-vis such act of resistance, institutions, whose authority is founded on the 
general entitlement to have a say, have shaky normative underpinnings to justify 
censure. Let me explain this passage. First, it is important to clarify the conditional 
clause. An act of resistance is less exclusionary when it prefigures the same society 
without the present obstacles to have subject-object relations with external objects 
of disagreement. This keeps the assumption that, when members resist, they adhere 
to the non-exclusionary desideratum, and they think that an ideally non-
exclusionary pluralistic society ought to strive to realize the promise to ensure a 
general entitlement to have a say.412 In this way, resistance pictures an alternative 
form of coexistence on the same premises of a pluralistic society. This brings us to 
the second clause of the passage; namely the reference to the general entitlement to 
have a say. The prospect of a society that is less exclusionary than the pluralistic 
society shows that existing institutions do not adhere to their normative justification 
fully. Nevertheless, the ultimate ground upon which pluralistic institutions claim to 
                                                          
412 I borrow the idea of prefiguration from Norman Geras, The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg (London: Verso, 
1983), 141. 
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have authority on members of a pluralistic society is precisely the same reason that 
pushes protesters to envisage less-exclusionary societies.  
Protesters and institutions have a communal denominator for action. 
Specifically, resistance violates some members’ rights in order to bring about a less-
exclusionary society. Institutions ought to compensate violations as a manifest 
infringement of the non-exclusionary desideratum. At the same time, the demand 
for reform and the demand for compensation reaffirm the non-exclusionary 
desideratum from different points of view. Despite the same rationale, the 
contrasting articulation of such claim makes a breach in the pluralistic society, such 
a breach shows the transitory character of institutions, which have incorporated the 
right to have a say. As we have seen in chapter 8, such a reflexivity is an 
indispensable quality for a non-exclusionary conception of justice to the extent to 
which it sustains practices of contestation against exclusionary practices.  
Let me explain. As a general entitlement, the right to have a say specifies 
what members can demand from other members and common institutions. 
Specifically, when pluralistic institutions are supposed to be non-exclusionary, 
institutional incorporation of the general standpoint of justice transforms right to 
have a say into a claim-right against institutions. By borrowing from Hohfeld, we 
can define the right to have a say in the form of a claim-right as follows. If Frida 
has a right against pluralistic institutions that they shall ensure her entitlement to 
have a say, the correlative is that pluralistic institutions are under a duty toward 
Frida to do so. Frida, in other words, acts as if her right were a justified claim to 
expect institutions to take action in her favour.413  Such a claim-right gives us reason 
to think that all members are entitled to take some steps to ensure that they enjoy 
their due right to have a say. Otherwise, it seems odd that members have to comply 
with institutions, which question the general entitlement to participate. It also seems 
odd to maintain that members cannot take steps to secure the right to have a say, 
when pluralistic institutions do not grant it.  
                                                          
413 Hohfeld 1919, 38. For recent works on claim-rights, see Gopal Sreenivasan 2005, 267-74. See also Leif 
Wenar, “The Nature of Claim-Rights,” Ethics 123 (2) (2013): 202-229. For an excellent reading of the right of 
resistance as a claim-right, see Simon Caney, “Responding to Global Injustice: On The Right of Resistance,” 
Social Philosophy and Policy 32 (1) (2015), 53. 
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When, as a claim-right, the right to have a say causes instability – members 
who do not sustain pluralistic institutions and violate others’ right to have a say, the 
right to have a say is still non-instrumentally connected with the claim to defend 
non-exclusionary social and political relations. Now, if one regards members of a 
pluralistic society as potential-participants, they are active beings whose 
fundamental claim is to be able to have an effect on elements of the external reality. 
Therefore, when a pluralistic society does not see some of the members primarily 
as the subjects who can determine its immanent logic, it follows that those same 
members, who are entitled to have a say, may feel themselves authorised to question 
the status quo.  
This action of resistance may cause instability. However, the consequent 
instability aims to ensure that a non-exclusionary conception of justice actually 
informs institutions. Whether this means to rethink the terms of coexistence, it is 
irrelevant from the standpoint of justice, because, if someone cannot act upon 
external objects of disagreements, it is a matter of justice to give back the due 
entitlement. In this case, institutions are not entitled to complain, because protesters 
are worse off than they are entitled to be, therefore, they have a justice-based reason 
to find their own way to push for more non-exclusionary social and political 
configurations.  
A pluralistic society, however, as a society whose social and political 
relations are constructed upon a non-exclusionary conception of justice, is a 
condition for this critical juncture to happen. By constructing the general 
expectation to be an active participant in the decision-making procedure, a 
pluralistic society builds into itself the possibility of instability. As a society 
inspired by the right to have a say, the pluralistic society has two fundamental 
characteristics. It affirms itself as a society that does not force norms without 
connecting with those who are subject to it. However, as a society in which 
everyone affirms the right to have a say from his or her own perspective, a 
pluralistic society can be supported until its members do not experience exclusion, 
according to the standards governing political and social activities. When this is the 
case, stability, namely the situation in which members support institutions that 
affirm a certain conception of justice, is not a concern. From the point of view of 
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the members (or some members), such an institutional configuration is not a 
representation of the general standpoint of justice, therefore it is not worth 
defending anymore. 
This is not a bad thing for a non-exclusionary political theory because its 
central features, those features that derive from the purpose of the general 
standpoint of justice, are uncontested. In conclusion of this section, let us clarify 
this point. Whoever brings about instability refuses, on the grounds of the gravity 
of the exclusion, which is held to be unjust, to sustain that the institutional forms of 
the right to have a say have been exhausted. On these terms, the challenge to 
institutions, which were deemed to be pluralistic, can only occur under the 
condition of a pluralistic society, where all members have a right to have a say. In 
the turmoil, the normative conditions of a pluralistic society remain intact. 
Protesters do not recognize the justice of the existing order, but the bounds of an 
appeal to the general standpoint of justice are still there. For this reason, despite 
instability, rather than challenging the spirit of a pluralistic society, the pressure of 
resistance is a chance to correct errors in the process of the realization of a just 
society.  
The right to have a say builds into a pluralistic society mechanisms of self-
correction because the animating cause of a non-exclusionary conception of justice 
is not to eliminate possibilities for revision, but rather reckoning diverse demands 
for change. Therefore, violations of the right to have a say are themselves strategic 
experiments without which a pluralistic society can retain neither its non-
exclusionary capacity nor its possibility for institutional innovation. For a non-
exclusionary political theory, if the society proves to be exclusionary, members as 
a collective, which are empowered by the right to have a say, must be permitted to 
rethink that original right too. This is so because, in the last instance, the pluralistic 
society, as a state of possibility, expects compliance because of its non-exclusionary 
character, as a possible order that allows all members to pursue their own 
worldviews, and affect objects of disagreement accordingly.  
This brings me to conclude my analysis of stability and resistance. 
Resistance puts the stability of a pluralistic society under siege but it does so with 
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a just cause. Such an instance of instability, however, does not furnish institutions 
with a justice-based reason to contain protesters, who have a justice-based claim to 
resist in turn. For members who engage in such a resistance are reclaiming their due 
entitlement as members of a pluralistic society, whose basic structure denies them 
the possibility to act upon objects of disagreement. In this vein, resistance is an 
implicit necessity. This is something different from an exhortation to resist. What I 
mean to say, in turn, is that resistance is built into a pluralistic society. A member 
who believes herself to be excluded from the exercise of his or her franchise has 
weighty reasons to challenge exclusion, even if these actions disassociate the 
member from the common practices of a pluralistic society. By doing so, the 
member affirms that a pluralistic society is as non-exclusionary as it claims to be. 
She also affirms that such a society needs changes in order to meet the non-
exclusionary desideratum. Provided that this kind of actions are possible reactions 
to exclusion within a pluralistic society, resistance is an always-present immanent 
possibility in a society where all members have a right to have say. When this 
possibility becomes real, the temporary and flexible character of pluralistic 
institutions become explicit.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have responded to concerns with the stability of a pluralistic 
society by highlighting three kinds of problems: damaging considerations, 
damaging members and excluded members. We have seen that stability may be a 
problem for a pluralistic society when members do not exercise their entitlement. 
This means to say that they do not participate deliberately, or that they are prevented 
from doing so. In the first case, the pluralistic society can generate damaging 
outcomes, which are nevertheless fully legitimate. Such occurrence may lead to 
exclusionary practices that generate discontents and frustration, therefore pushing 
people to claim back their due entitlement. In the second case, instability means to 
resist to exclusionary arrangements on the same ground that makes these 
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arrangements just. This important source of instability, I have argued, illuminates 
the self-reflective character of the pluralistic society.  
 This chapter concludes my dissertation. In the three parts of this dissertation, 
I have defended three theses. 1) For me, existing responses to the fact of pluralism 
are exclusionary. This observation justifies the demand for alternative normative 
strategies that entitle all individuals to participate in the decision-making 
procedures, regardless of their moral and political commitments. 2) Then, I think 
that a perspectivist normative theory can be one of such accounts. In this vein, my 
proposal constructs two orders of normativity. 3) Eventually, the pluralistic society 
is an ideal society in which members have a right to have a say, and the basic 
structure of society has incorporated the two orders of normativity. Together, the 
three steps of this work defend the construction of non-exclusionary political 
theories, which try to avoid normative pre-commitments in the examination of 
diversity and exclusion/inclusion. My simple intuition has been that the defence of 
the individual subject-object relation with external objects of disagreement informs 
an argument against exclusion.  
Now, to bring this matter to a close, I want to address another objection 
against the ideal of a pluralistic society. A society in which all members must have 
a right to have a say may generate a paradox. Thought to be the best response to 
pluralism, the imperative to ensure that all members can exercise their right to have 
a say may erase important sources of disagreement and restrict disputes only to 
issues that are not very controversial. If we think of the normative work of the right 
to have a say, this problem can be more evident. The standpoint of justice of a 
pluralistic society demands that all members of a pluralistic society can have 
subject-object relations with all possible objects of disagreement. In order to ensure 
such an access, the general and non-exclusionary conception of justice prescribes a 
relaxation of the limits to freedom of expression in all its forms, but also it requires 
members to have adequate material means and channels for self-respect. 
Nevertheless, if compared with the status quo, the implementation of these 
normative requirements impose solutions for a number of disputes, from gay-
marriage to fair redistribution and abortion, which are central objects of 
disagreement in today’s societies. By affirming the right to have a say, then, will a 
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pluralistic society hibernate a great deal of political conflicts in favour of a kind of 
perfectionist political programme? Is a pluralistic society exclusionary for those 
members who have particularly conservative positions?  
My response is straightforward. The standpoint of justice that characterizes 
a pluralistic society demands to erase all barriers that exclude someone from 
disagreements, even if these barriers may be potential objects of disagreement in 
the society where we live now. However, this is not a limitation to the pluralism of 
a pluralistic society. A pluralistic society is a utopia where all members have a right 
to have a say. In a pluralistic society, non-members, who have valid and available 
considerations, may participate in the existing disagreements. In this context, the 
widespread exercise of the right to have a say is a necessary condition for a society 
to meet the non-exclusionary desideratum. The number and quality of the objects 
of disagreement in such a society is neither sufficient nor necessary to define its 
non-exclusionary character – and its degree of pluralism. In other words, we cannot 
assume that a society, where we have the same number and kind of objects of 
disagreement as those objects we have now, is pluralistic. The objects of 
disagreement, which can arise among people who have the same entitlement to have 
a say, are a matter of philosophical speculation. By thinking otherwise, we assume 
again that pluralism is something that exists, with certain characteristics, which are 
contingent to a certain list of doctrines and public issues. As we have seen in the 
first two parts of this dissertation, this view has problems and may generate hidden 
forms of exclusion. We can otherwise think that both objects of disagreement and 
worldviews are contingent to the evolution of social reality. For instance, today, we 
do not challenge that the earth is round. Decades ago, anthropogenic climate change 
was not an issue of concern for academics and social activists. When black people 
were routinely denied access to buses and public spaces; institutional racism was 
not in the agenda. So, the worry that, by ensuring that everyone can have a say, we 
restrict the room of pluralism neglects a fundamental element: members of a 
pluralistic society deal with disagreements that are contingent to a distinctive social 
configuration, one in which all members have a say. Moreover, this objection 
confuses exclusion with pluralism. In a pluralistic society, members  have the right 
to have a say because this entitlement secure individual subject-object relations with 
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all objects of disagreement. In a pluralistic society, therefore, many of the structural 
forms of injustice, which, perhaps too quickly, we put under the rubric of pluralism, 
will find no space, because they are not modes of “the fact of pluralism” but forms 
of exclusion. 
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